

Political Science Quarterly

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Winter 1977-78

James David Barber — The Nixon Brush with Tyranny

Amitai Etzioni — Societal Overload

Exploring the 1976 Republican Convention:

Denis G. Sullivan — Party Unity

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Book Reviews

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Annual Corporate Meeting

In accordance with the bylaws, the annual corporate meeting of the Academy of Political Science will be held on Monday, January 30, 1978, at 3:00 P.M. in the Academy's conference room at 2852 Broadway, New York, New York, for the purpose of electing directors, presentation of the executive director's annual report, and the transaction of such other business as shall come before the meeting. The bylaws provide that the members of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors shall act as a nominating committee for board members. Additional nominations may be made in writing by twenty-five or more members of the Academy provided that such written nominations are received at the office of the Academy by December 31 preceding the annual meeting of the corporation.

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From the Managing Editor:

In this issue . . .

JAMES DAVID BARBER reviews his typologies of presidential character and outlines the predictions he published in early, pre-Watergate, 1972 of Richard Nixon's vulnerability to political rigidification if challenged in certain ways. He then describes how Nixon's response to the challenges of Watergate confirmed the earlier predictions.

AMITAI ETZIONI analyzes neoconservative suggestions that the United States suffers from a heavy dose of "overload" in trying to deal with social problems. He then suggests that we deal with overload not by curtailing societal missions, but by increasing our ability to accomplish them.

DENIS G. SULLIVAN, ROBERT T. NAKAMURA, MARTHA WAGNER WEINBERG, F. CHRISTOPHER ARTERTON, and JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN analyze the 1976 Republican presidential nominating convention from five perspectives. Sullivan explores the ways in which convention behavior contributed to the legitimation of the convention's nominees. Nakamura examines the images of Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan that were held by delegates and how these images contributed to, or inhibited, the losing delegates' adjustment to the convention outcome. Weinberg traces the writing of the Republican platform and explains how that process differed from Democratic party platform writing and reflected the particular ideological and structural composition of the Republican party. Arterton discusses the strategies and tactics of the Ford and Reagan candidate organizations. Pressman examines the behavior of delegates as participants in organized social groupings, or what the Democrats have come to call "group caucuses" or "affinity caucuses."

WENDELL BELL traces the behavior of the new state of Jamaica from the time it entered world politics as a politically independent actor through its first fourteen years of nationhood. Bell divides Jamaica's foreign policy into three stages: increasing consciousness of Black Africa, anticolonialism, and antiracism. Additionally, he shows that for a small state with a "penetrated economy," foreign and domestic policies often merge into one.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The Nixon Brush with Tyranny

JAMES DAVID BARBER

The Presidency is a peculiar office. The Founding Fathers left it extraordinarily loose in definition, partly because they trusted George Washington to invent a tradition as he went along. It is an institution made a piece at a time by successive men in the White House. Jefferson reached out to Congress to put together the beginnings of political parties; Jackson's dramatic force extended electoral partisanship to its mass base; Lincoln vastly expanded the administrative reach of the office, Wilson and the Roosevelts showed its rhetorical possibilities—in fact every President's mind and demeanor has left its mark on a heritage still in lively development.

But the Presidency is much more than an institution. It is a focus of feelings. In general, popular feelings about politics are low-key, shallow, casual. For example, the vast majority of Americans knows virtually nothing of what Congress is doing and cares less. The Presidency is different. The Presidency is the focus for the most intense and persistent emotions in the American polity. The President is a symbolic leader, the one figure who draws together the people's hopes and fears for the political future. On top of all his routine duties, he has to carry that off—or fail.

Our emotional attachment to Presidents shows up when one dies in office. People were not just disappointed or worried when President Kennedy was killed;

JAMES DAVID BARBER is James B. Duke Professor of Political Science at Duke University. This article is adapted from the recently published second edition of his book, *The Presidential Character*. Except for minor editorial changes, the predictive analysis of the Nixon Presidency that appears at the beginning of the article remains unchanged from when it was originally written in 1971 for the first edition of *The Presidential Character*. Professor Barber is now at work on a study of the relation between the mass media and presidential policies.

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people wept at the loss of a man most had never even met. Kennedy was young and charismatic—but history shows that whenever a President dies in office, heroic Lincoln or debased Harding, McKinley or Garfield, the same wave of deep emotion sweeps across the country. On the other hand, the death of an ex-President brings forth no such intense emotional reaction.

The President is the first political figure children are aware of (later they add Congress, the Court, and others, as "helpers" of the President). With some exceptions among children in deprived circumstances, the President is seen as a "benevolent leader," one who nurtures, sustains, and inspires the citizenry. Presidents regularly show up among "most admired" contemporaries and forebears, and the President is the "best known" (in the sense of sheer name recognition) person in the country. At inauguration time, even Presidents elected by close margins are supported by much larger majorities than the election returns show, for people rally round as he actually assumes office. There is a similar reaction when the people see their President threatened by crisis: if he takes action, there is a favorable spurt in the Gallup poll whether he succeeds or fails.

Obviously the President gets more attention in schoolbooks, press, and television than any other politician. He is one of very few who can make news by doing good things. *His* emotional state is a matter of continual public commentary, as is the manner in which his personal and official families conduct themselves. The media bring across the President not as some neutral administrator or corporate executive to be assessed by his production, but as a special being with mysterious dimensions.

We have no king. The sentiments English children—and adults—direct to the Queen have no place to go in our system but to the President. Whatever his talents—Coolidge-type or Roosevelt-type—the President is the only available object for such national-religious-monarchical sentiments as Americans possess.

The President helps people make sense of politics. Congress is a tangle of committees, the bureaucracy is a maze of agencies. The President is one man trying to do a job—a picture much more understandable to the mass of people who find themselves in the same boat. Furthermore, he is the top man. He ought to know what is going on and set it right. So when the economy goes sour, or war drags on, or domestic violence erupts, the President is available to take the blame. Then when things go right, it seems the President must have had a hand in it. Indeed, the flow of political life is marked off by Presidents: the "Eisenhower Era," the "Kennedy Years."

What all this means is that the President's *main* responsibilities reach far beyond administering the Executive Branch or commanding the armed forces. The White House is first and foremost a place of public leadership. That inevitably brings to bear on the President intense moral, sentimental, and quasi-religious pressures which can, if he lets them, distort his own thinking and feeling. If there is such a thing as extraordinary sanity, it is needed nowhere so much as in the White House.

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Who the President is at a given time can make a profound difference in the whole thrust and direction of national politics. Since we have only one President at a time, we can never prove this by comparison, but even the most superficial speculation confirms the commonsense view that the man himself weighs heavily among other historical factors. A Wilson re-elected in 1920, a Hoover in 1932, a John F. Kennedy in 1964 would, it seems very likely, have guided the body politic along rather different paths from those their actual successors chose. Or try to imagine a Theodore Roosevelt ensconced behind today's "bully pulpit" of a Presidency, or Lyndon Johnson as President in the age of McKinley. Only someone mesmerized by the lures of historical inevitability can suppose that it would have made little or no difference to government policy had Alf Landon replaced FDR in 1936, had Dewey beaten Truman in 1948, or Adlai Stevenson reigned through the 1950s. Not only would these alternative Presidents have advocated different policies—they would have approached the office from very different psychological angles. It stretches credibility to think that Eugene McCarthy would have run the institution the way Lyndon Johnson did.

I am not about to argue that once you know a President's personality you know everything. But the degree and quality of a President's emotional involvement in an issue are powerful influences on how he defines the issue itself, how much attention he pays to it, which facts and persons he sees as relevant to its resolution, and, finally, what principles and purposes he associates with the issue. Every story of Presidential decision-making is really two stories: an outer one in which a rational man calculates and an inner one in which an emotional man feels. The two are forever connected. Any real President is one whole man and his deeds reflect his wholeness.

As for personality, it is a matter of tendencies. It is not that one President "has" some basic characteristic that another President does not "have." That old way of treating a trait as a possession, like a rock in a basket, ignores the universality of aggressiveness, compliancy, detachment, and other human drives. We all have all of them, but in different amounts and in different combinations.

Predicting Presidents

The best way to predict a President's personality—character, world view, and style—is to see how he constructed it in the first place. Especially in the early stages, life is experimental; consciously or not, a person tries out various ways of defining and maintaining and raising self-esteem. He looks to his environment for clues as to who he is and how well he is doing. These lessons of life slowly sink in: certain self-images and evaluations, certain ways of looking at the world, certain styles of action get confirmed by his experience and he gradually adopts them as his own. If we can see that process of development, we can understand the product. The features to note are those bearing on Presidential performance.

Experimental development continues all the way to death; we will not blind

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ourselves to midlife changes, particularly in the full-scale prediction case, that of Richard Nixon. But it is often much easier to see the basic patterns in early life histories. Later on a whole host of distractions—especially the image-making all politicians learn to practice—clouds the picture.

In general, character has its *main* development in childhood, world view in adolescence, style in early adulthood. The stance toward life I call character grows out of the child's experiments in relating to parents, brothers and sisters, and peers at play and in school, as well as to his own body and the objects around it. Slowly the child defines an orientation toward experience; once established, that tends to last despite much subsequent contradiction. By adolescence, the child has been hearing and seeing how people make their worlds meaningful, and now he is moved to relate himself—his own meanings—to those around him. His focus of attention shifts toward the future; he senses that decisions about his fate are coming and he looks into the premises for those decisions. Thoughts about the way the world works and how one might work in it, about what people are like and how one might be like them or not, and about the values people share and how one might share in them too—these are typical concerns for the post-child, pre-adult mind of the adolescent.

These themes come together strongly in early adulthood, when the person moves from contemplation to responsible action and adopts a style. In most biographical accounts this period stands out in stark clarity—the time of emergence, the time the young man found himself. I call it his first independent political success. It was then he moved beyond the detailed guidance of his family; then his self-esteem was dramatically boosted; then he came forth as a person to be reckoned with by other people. The *way* he did that is profoundly important to him. Typically he grasps that style and hangs onto it. Much later, coming into the Presidency, something in him remembers this earlier victory and reemphasizes the style that made it happen.

Character provides the main thrust and broad direction—but it does not *determine*, in any fixed sense, world view and style. The story of development does not end with the end of childhood. Thereafter, the culture one grows in and the ways that culture is translated by parents and peers shapes the meanings one makes of his character. The going world view gets learned and that learning helps channel character forces. Thus it will not necessarily be true that compulsive characters have reactionary beliefs, or that compliant characters believe in compromise. Similarly for style: historical accidents play a large part in furnishing special opportunities for action—and in blocking off alternatives. For example, however much anger a young man may feel, that anger will not be expressed in rhetoric unless and until his life situation provides a platform and an audience. Style thus has a stature and independence of its own. Those who would reduce all explanation to character neglect these highly significant later channelings. For beyond the root is the branch, above the foundation the superstructure, and starts do not prescribe finishes.

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Four Types of Presidential Character

The five concepts—character, world view, style, power situation, and climate of expectations—cluster the Presidents since Theodore Roosevelt into four types. This is the fundamental scheme of my analysis. It offers a way to move past the complexities to the main contrasts and comparisons.

The first baseline in defining Presidential types is *activity-passivity*. How much energy does the man invest in his Presidency? Lyndon Johnson went at his day like a human cyclone, coming to rest long after the sun went down. Calvin Coolidge often slept eleven hours a night and still needed a nap in the middle of the day. In between the Presidents array themselves on the high or low side of the activity line.

The second baseline is *positive-negative affect* toward one's activity—that is, how he feels about what he does. Relatively speaking, does he seem to experience his political life as happy or sad, enjoyable or discouraging, positive or negative in its main effect. The feeling I am after here is not grim satisfaction in a job well done, not some philosophical conclusion. The idea is this: is he someone who, on the surfaces we can see, gives forth the feeling that he has *fun* in political life? Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson wrote that the Roosevelts "not only understood the *use* of power, they knew the *enjoyment* of power, too. . . . Whether a man is burdened by power or enjoys power; whether he is trapped by responsibility or made free by it; whether he is moved by other people and outer forces or moves them—that is the essence of leadership."

The positive-negative baseline, then, is a general symptom of the fit between the man and his experience, a kind of register of *felt* satisfaction.

Why might we expect these two simple dimensions to outline the main character types? Because they stand for two central features of anyone's orientation toward life. In nearly every study of personality, some form of the active-passive contrast is critical; the general tendency to act or be acted upon is evident in such concepts as dominance-submission, extraversion-introversion, aggression-timidity, attack-defense, fight-flight, engagement-withdrawal, approach-avoidance. In everyday life we sense quickly the general energy output of the people we deal with. Similarly we catch on fairly quickly to the affect dimension—whether the person seems to be optimistic or pessimistic, hopeful or skeptical, happy or sad. The two baselines are clear and they are also independent of one another: all of us know people who are very active but seem discouraged, others who are quite passive but seem happy, and so forth. The activity baseline refers to what one does, the affect baseline to how one feels about what he does.

Both are crude clues to character. They are leads into four basic character patterns long familiar in psychological research. In summary form, these are the main configurations:

Active-positive. There is a congruence, a consistency, between much activity

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and the enjoyment of it, indicating relatively high self-esteem and relative success in relating to the environment. The man shows an orientation toward productiveness as a value and an ability to use his styles flexibly, adaptively, suiting the dance to the music. He sees himself as developing over time toward relatively well defined personal goals—growing toward his image of himself as he might yet be. There is an emphasis on rational mastery on using the brain to move the feet. This may get him into trouble; he may fail to take account of the irrational in politics. Not everyone he deals with sees things his way and he may find it hard to understand why.

Active-negative. The contradiction here is between relatively intense effort and relatively low emotional reward for that effort. The activity has a compulsive quality, as if the man were trying to make up for something or to escape from anxiety into hard work. He seems ambitious, striving upward, power-seeking. His stance toward the environment is aggressive and he has a persistent problem in managing his aggressive feelings. His self-image is vague and discontinuous. Life is a hard struggle to achieve and hold power, hampered by the condemnations of a perfectionistic conscience. Active-negative types pour energy into the political system, but it is an energy distorted from within.

Passive-positive. This is the receptive, compliant, other-directed character whose life is a search for affection as a reward for being agreeable and cooperative rather than personally assertive. The contradiction is between low self-esteem (on grounds of being unlovable, unattractive) and a superficial optimism. A hopeful attitude helps dispel doubt and elicits encouragement from others. Passive-positive types help soften the harsh edge of politics. But their dependence and the fragility of their hopes and enjoyments make disappointment in politics likely.

Passive-negative. The factors are consistent—but how are we to account for the man's *political* role-taking? Why is someone who does little in politics and enjoys it less there at all? The answer lies in the passive-negative character-rooted orientation toward doing dutiful service; this compensates for low self-esteem based on a sense of uselessness. Passive-negative types are in politics because they think they ought to be. They may be well adapted to certain non-political roles, but they lack the experience and flexibility to perform effectively as political leaders. Their tendency is to withdraw, to escape from the conflct and uncertainty of politics by emphasizing vague principles (especially prohibitions) and procedural arrangements. They become guardians of the right and proper way, above the sordid politicking of lesser men.

Active-positive Presidents want most to achieve results. Active-negatives aim to get and keep power. Passive-positives are after love. Passive-negatives emphasize their civic virtue. The relation of activity to enjoyment in a President thus tends to outline a cluster of characteristics, to set apart the adapted from the compulsive, compliant, and withdrawn types.

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PREDICTING NIXON, SPRING 1972

One could hardly be wrong about Nixon's overall placement in the active-negative category. Particularly in campaigning, Nixon on the way up was famous for his grueling schedule of speeches, not only on his own behalf, but also for innumerable Republican candidates in off-year elections. From 1950 through his defeat for the Presidency a decade later, Richard Nixon was to be found rustling the hustings, flat-out, day after day, night after night, short on sleep, often exhausted, but never too tired for just one more speech. In office his pace slowed only slightly: Nixon-watchers were continually discovering him "exhausted," "almost grey with fatigue," cutting vacations short because he "simply could not stand the idleness." He traveled 160,000 miles as Eisenhower's emissary, wrote almost all his own speeches, and campaigned in 36 states in six weeks for Goldwater in 1964. Out of office in 1961, Nixon became the "pacesetter" for his Wall Street law firm. The main thing he liked about working in New York was that he found it "a place where you can't slow down—a fast track. Any person tends to vegetate unless he is moving on a fast track."

In the 1968 campaign, Nixon was persuaded to slow down his normally fractic schedule and to intersperse periods of rest and relaxation. He took it easier, learned to pace himself. Was this an exception or a new rule? Even if he had always worked as he did in the 1968 campaign, Nixon would have to be scored on the active side. And the overwhelming evidence from the rest of his pre-Presidential life confirmed that.

The evidence on Nixon's affect toward his experience is similarly clear. Through his political years, he has presented himself as a man intensely engaged in action he find emotionally punishing. On numerous occasions Nixon saw himself as *about to quit:*

—In 1952, after his dramatic speech about the Nixon fund, he was "ready to chuck the whole thing," according to his manager.

—In 1954, "Nixon confided to a few intimates the only consolation was that it would be his last campaign," and "He and his wife discussed their future from all angles, and the Vice-President agreed to retire from politics after his term ended in 1957. At Mrs. Nixon's request he noted the date and the decision on a piece of paper that he tucked in his wallet."

—In 1956, when Eisenhower intimated Nixon could have a Cabinet post instead of another term as Vice-President, "Nixon planned to quit public life in disgust, then resolved to run again. . . ."

—In 1961, he spoke to the Senate of his 14 years of government service, "as I complete that period."

—In 1962, after his defeat for the California governorship, he told the press, "You won't have Nixon to kick around any more, because, gentlemen, this is my last press conference."

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But there were also in the Nixon record as of January 1969 many more direct indications of his feeling that *the price of success has been suffering*, indications of depression, anxiety, and sadness in his political experience that contrast sharply with the sentiments positive types express.

—In 1947, as a new Congressman, Nixon "had the same lost feeling I had had when I went into military service." Then, after the Hiss case was broken, he said that no one could fight Communism without "expecting to pay the penalty for the rest of his life." Having won out over Hiss, "I should have been elated. . . . However, I experienced a sense of letdown which is difficult to explain or even to understand. . . . There was also a sense of shock and sadness that a man like Hiss could have fallen so low."

—In 1950, running for the Senate, Nixon was "a sad but earnest underdog."

—In 1952 the "Nixon Fund" episode left him "gloomy and angry"; in particular, Eisenhower's hesitation about retaining him on the ticket made him look "like someone had smashed him" and he "forced a disbelieving smile and muttered something to himself." Mrs. Nixon said, "Why should we keep taking this?" Leaving his hotel to deliver the "Checkers" speech "seemed like the last mile," Nixon recalled. After the speech he said, "I loused it up, and I am sorry. . . . It was a flop." He "turned away from his friends—and let loose the tears he had been holding back." (In fact, the speech was a great success.)

—From 1953 on, as Vice-President, "the first year was a disappointment. But the second—1954—was far worse; the worst of Nixon's twelve years in politics." In 1954 he told a friend, "I am tired, bone tired. My heart's not in it." He was "disappointed with much that had happened" and "disappointed also in the caliber of many Republicans and the Party's organization generally."

—In 1955, when Eisenhower had the first of his heart attacks, "Only a few friends were aware how acutely uneasy Nixon was about his capacity to meet the challenge. He aged the equivalent of quite a few years during those three months—in his own estimation, as well as that of those with whom he worked." "His voice was hoarse and charged with emotion. 'It's terrible, it's terrible!' he said over and over. . . . [H]e was trying to keep his composure, but he was in semi-shock. His eyes were red and his face drawn and pale."

—In 1956, Ike's hesitation about keeping him on the ticket was "an emotional ordeal for Nixon, one of the greatest hurts of his career." A friend said at the time, "He is a pessimist, and was running scared."

—In 1960, after his first debate with Kennedy, "The Nixon camp became grim and nervous and could talk only of 'recouping.' "

—In 1962 came his despondent diatribe after being defeated for the governorship.

Clearly Nixon was one for whom the burdens outweighed the enjoyments, the responsibilities outweighed the pleasures. His political life—which was nearly his whole life—was a punishing one. At most he derived from it a grim satisfaction in endurance, but there was not much of the spontaneous, easy en-

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joyment a fundamentally self-loving person feels from time to time as he goes about his chosen round. Nixon exerted extraordinary energies in a life which brought him back extraordinary hardships.

Nixon's is a special variant of the active-negative character. With his remarkable flexibility regarding issues and ideologies, Nixon can be "defeated" any number of times on specific questions of policy without feeling personally threatened. His investment is not in values, not in standing fast for some principle—although, if he were to stand fast, his doing so would certainly be rationalized in terms of principle. His investment is in himself, and Nixon's self is taken up with its management. As Margaret Mead has noted, "The President thrives on opposition. It is a form of stimulation for him." Thus he will court the strains of political resistance, finding in them yet another confirmation of his virtue.

But let the issue reach his central concern, the concern of self-management, and the fat may go into the fire. Threats to his independence in particular—the sense that he is being controlled from without because he cannot be trusted, because he is weak or stupid or unstable—will call forth a strong inner response. For Nixon, the prime form of the active-negative command "I must," is this: "*I must make my own way.*" Only when a crisis gathers around him, one he cannot escape by moving on to some alternative crisis, and he experiences a sense of entrapment is he likely to move toward the classic form of rigidification.

The key variable here is time. "Time running out," the President wrote on his pad before Cambodia. As the clock ticks forward, Nixon confronts his future in two stages. First is 1972. As the election approaches, Nixon's Presidential fate will clarify itself. If the uncertainties fade in the light of the polls, and the probability of a defeat for Nixon rises sharply, this President will be sorely tempted to do what he feels he must do before it is too late. The loss of power to forces beyond his control would constitute a severe threat. That would be a time to go down, if go down one must, in flames.[1]

The Nixon Performance, Spring 1976

How quickly the fog of history settles over the brutal terrain of the past! Wars become romantic adventures, depressions provide material for folksy fables, the pestilence is made into an antique amusement. Thus with "Watergate." The President who came after Nixon told us it had been just a nightmare and it was all over. "The system" took care of such problems (and surely would again, if need be). There was nothing fundamental to worry about, so we should put all that nastiness behind us and move on to make a better future.

Of course, that is the Nixonian way of looking at it. He always did have a

[1] For an expanded discussion of this point see James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 442.

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knack for diverting the public mind, whenever it began to focus too strongly on him. Like a television camera, Nixon moved from scene to scene, quickly, lest understanding set in. He knew, too, how to cooperate with the empiricism of history, by drowning the truth in the facts; today the obsessed Watergate buff can find a lifetime occupation tracing out just where, say, Ulasewicz was when he called Kalmbach on such and such an evening—much as the assassination buffs used to do. The flood of fact-packed books on the subject swells across the bookshelf.

I think Nixon was neither an accidental nightmare nor an automaton whose rise and fall were inherent in "the system." He will be back, in his essentials, the next time the public elects an active-negative President. He very nearly got away with establishing a Presidential tyranny in the United States. He was caught by a mistake he could easily have avoided—whatever the system. Because it is so important to the future of the Presidency to keep it out of the hands of future Nixons, his case is worth examining in detail.

Chapters 10 through 12 of my book *The Presidential Character*, written in late 1971 and published in the pre-Watergate spring of 1972, predicted what would happen with second-term President Nixon—not an astrological prediction of details, but an analytical forecast of the main themes. This brief essay does not untangle the whole complex story of Nixon and Watergate—that would take another book—but it points to the key evidence on the theory's critical points. Even in this truncated form, though, it is the story of our nearest brush yet with an American tyranny.[2]

THE NIXON TYRANNY

The Nixonians at the top of the Presidency took their cues and views from the President. Under his direction, and often encouraged by personal enthusiasm, they succeeded in a wide range of tyrannous achievements:

—They made secret war.
—They made secret agreements to sell immense quantities of deadly weapons to nervous nations.

[2] At the end of the Nixon regime there was a coup: the Presidency was run by a general who, by the luck of the draw, had a passion for reason, if also a certain lack of moral imagination. The general, who more than a year previously had ripped out Nixon's taping systems without permission, in the summer of 1974 entered into negotiation with the Vice President regarding the conditions under which he could come to power—the general again acting on his own. Another military leader, the Secretary of Defense, established a system by which he could veto the Commander-in-Chief's orders to the armed forces. A Presidential order conveyed to the Secretary of State elicited the reply, "Tell the President to . . . himself." (Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, The Final Days [New York, Simon and Schuster, 1976], p. 199). No tanks in the streets. No bearded madman gesticulating from a balcony. Just some quiet little rearrangements to keep things going—without the interference of the People's Choice. Fortunately it was one of the Nixon administration's few Horatios, rather than one of its many Iagos, who grabbed power. A system that has to depend on that kind of fortune is dangerous.

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—They supported foreign governments which ruled by terror and they helped overthrow progressive governments.
—They received bribes and sold high offices.
—They recruited and operated a secret White House police force and ordered them to break the law, continually and casually.
—They abrogated Congress's power of the purse by impounding huge sums.
—They subverted important segments of the electoral system, the judicial system, the law enforcement system, the tax system, and the free speech system.
—They purposefully and systematically lied to the public, the Congress, foreign heads of state and diplomats, and the loyal leadership of their own party and administration about matters of high political significance.

The important point here is not that Nixon was a bad man (he was), or that he was mentally unbalanced (he may well have been, toward the end), or even that he was guilty of any crimes for which he could have been convicted in a court of law (we will never know). Had Nixon never been President, none of that would have mattered much. It is his *political* significance that lends immense significance to his tawdry triumph over our Constitution.

Nixon demonstrated the vulnerability of the American political system. Throughout his career, his repeated victories after disastrous defeats show with dramatic clarity how the process of evaluating potential Presidents failed miserably to predict and guard us from the machinations of an expert flim-flam man. The American people had every opportunity to know what they were getting. They elected Nixon despite the most abundant evidence ever available regarding the character of any Presidential candidate.

Similarly with checks and balances. Nixon had no need to march on the Capitol at the head of his White House guard or to throw barbed wire around the Justice Department. He simply set up his own little government on top of the Constitutional one and dared the world to say him nay. It took four and a half years for Congress to begin to suppose that his impeachment should be suggested, and they took this move only after they had evidence hard and massive enough to choke Caligula's horse. Through nearly all his Presidency, Nixon had but to assert his authority to enhance his power, be it the power to bomb or tap, to impound or burgle, to broadcast or blackmail and bribe.

For those who take it as a sign of the system's stability that he was ultimately driven from office, it is sobering to remember that his downfall was nearly accidental. At point after point he could have been rescued by other accidents or by easy efforts of his own, as I hope to show in a few pages.

Perhaps there is some way the electoral machinery and the system of checks and balances can be readjusted, to prevent such enormous political risks. Or perhaps there is some way, without major procedural reform, to help the existing institutions acquire the vision and the will to see to it that we get quality Presidents. I see the most promising development along this line in the steady improvement of data and theory by which present-day decision-makers can predict, if not the "great" Presidents, at least the disastrous ones.

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Drawing on the work of many scholars, journalists, and biographers, I was able to see some parts of Nixon's pattern before he became President. On the eve of his first inauguration, January 19, 1969, I wrote that, "The primary danger of the Nixon administration, then, will be that the President will grasp some line of policy or method of operation and pursue it in spite of its failure." I wondered that night,

> How will Nixon respond to challenges to the morality of his regime, to charges of scandal and/or corruption? First such charges strike a raw nerve, not only from the Checkers business, but also from deep within the personality in which the demands of the superego are so harsh and hard. (For every President, this kind of thing comes up.) The first defense is pleading innocent: I didn't know, it didn't affect me. The guilty party (Walter Jenkins, Bobby Baker) is not my boy, I am not involved. The ordinary processes of justice must take their course. There will not be as in Harry Truman's case a sense of loyalty to the Pendergasts no matter what the charge, or Ike's readiness as in Dixon-Yates to make all the facts public, while withdrawing a bit. The first impulse (before the above) will be to hush it up, to conceal it, bring down the blinds. If it breaks open and Nixon cannot avoid commenting on it, there is a real setup here for another crisis, a dramatic appearance in which he is vindicated.[3]

In the early Spring of 1969, I followed up with a speech at Stanford asking, "Will there be a 'Tragedy of Richard Nixon?' " In this speech I suggested that Nixon was likely to follow the pattern of rigidification that had earlier been seen in Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, Andrew Johnson, and Lyndon Johnson. Other papers followed, leading up to the publication of *The Presidential Character* in early 1972.[4] The book was filled with retrospective "predictions": we *could* have known in advance what past Presidents would do (in the main) by noticing key biographical characteristics and combining them with the main situational elements. But, with one exception, all those "predictions" concerned events that had already happened. The Nixon case was the best test so far for my theory because there it was possible to make real predictions: given certain situations, Nixon's character, style, and world view would produce certain lines of action.

Unless we are willing to lapse again into the political sleep that brought us Johnson and Nixon—that gave us a decade of disaster in the White House—we need some way to improve radically on our predictions. In that spirit, I will first check the main Nixon characteristics against his history as it followed after the predictions, then trace the course of his rigidification, and finally speculate on the possible meanings, for our political future, of Nixon's peculiar obsession with appearance.

[3] James David Barber, "A Summary of Predictions of Richard M. Nixon as President," a paper distributed to colleagues at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, Calif., January 19, 1969, pp. 6, 18.

[4] See also "Some Strategies for Understanding Politicians," *American Journal of Political Science*, Spring 1974.

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OLD RELIABLE NIXON

Strangely, no one seems to have suggested that Watergate (by which I mean the whole wash of woe that flooded forth after that gate was opened in June 1972) gave us a "new Nixon." Through so many even-numbered years in the past, the discovery of new Nixons seemed to have become a national pastime as observers hoped against hope that he was not what he had been. In the event, though, old reliable Nixon came through.

The clearest continuity was Nixon's active-negative character. As he had before 1972, he poured on energy, night and day, at home and away. His Presidential activities came to take up nearly all his waking hours and, more and more frequently as his end approached, he woke and worked at night. "As long as I am physically able," he pledged in November 1973, "I am going to continue to work sixteen to eighteen hours a day. . . ."[5] He was a man in motion, restlessly flying off to Camp David, Key Biscayne, or San Clemente, where he often plagued his Secret Service guards to "drive somewhere, anywhere." As of the end of November 1973, the President had stayed in the White House only four of the forty-four weekends of his second term; in his last six weeks in office he spent only six days there.[6]

Reliable Nixon continued also in his stance as a suffering martyr in the Presidency. Even the version of the White House tapes he himself released to the public has him in continual complaint: "This damn case!" "I've been working very hard as you can imagine with everything." "I was up so late last night."[7] He told visiting Congressmen has had been through "seven months of pure hell."[8] He refers again and again to his troubled life, in all sorts of circumstances: he wants the truth "even if it hurts me," he says, and he has "broken my ass to try to get the facts of this case." Even after his enormous victory in the 1972 election, Nixon conveyed a "joyless, brooding quality," one of his Cabinet members remembered, and talked of how all Presidents had gone down hill in their second terms.[9] Even when he sat at ease in Washington while his bombers smashed out the lives of Vietnamese peasants, his sense of proportion and comparison deserted him: the Vietnam bombing became "my terrible personal ordeal."[10]

Nixon the manager of himself, "RN" the stage director or producer of the

[5] Elizabeth Drew, *Washington Journal: The Events of 1973-1974* (New York, Vintage Books, 1976), p. 108.

[6] Theodore H. White, *Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon* (New York, Atheneum Publishers, Reader's Digest Press, 1975), p. 292; Drew, *Washington Journal*, p. 138; White, *Breach of Faith*, p. 306.

[7] *Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House Representatives by President Richard Nixon* (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 580, 696, 836.

[8] J. Anthony Lukas, *Nightmare: The Underside of the Nixon Years* (New York, Viking Press, 1976), p. 450.

[9] White, *Breach of Faith*, pp. 218, 171.

[10] *Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations . . . by President Richard Nixon*, p. 1304.

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Nixon project—that is the place, I argued in 1972, to look for Nixon's strongest emotional investment. The typical compulsiveness of the active-negative person, which usually takes the form "I must," with Nixon invariably became "I must do it my way." Into his second term Nixon continued to insist on just that. The Watergate saga—particularly the cover-up—took its shape from Nixon's old sense that nothing would be right unless he controlled the way of it. His fear of being dead though living, of having no feelings, contributed heavily, I think, to his need to feel he had to do what he had to do—and in just the right way.[11] In the Autumn of 1973, Nixon said, "What matters most, in this critical hour, is our ability to act—and to act in a way that enables us to control events, not to be paralyzed and overwhelmed by them."[12] His Watergate vocabulary is full of the language of compulsion: "We've just got to ride it through." "I've got to get [it] out and I've got to get it out today! . . . The White House has got to move . . . we have to get out in front in some way."[13] The "way" was infinitely important. Safire pointed out to Nixon that his three favorite words were "in a way."[14] Nixon never seems to have judged the rightness of the "way" by any external criteria of ethics, morality, or even expediency. What mattered most was that things be done in a way that he could feel was *his* way—that is, a way that reflected his own dramatic sense of himself.

THE POWER DISEASE

Jonathan Schell finds "the fear of impotence" a recurrent theme in Nixon's public statements, as when he worried about moves to "tie the hands of the President" or "cut off the President's legs," or when he feared that America might become "a pitiful helpless giant."[15] One need not be so psychoanalytic, for the ambiguities inherent in the concept of "impotence" could detract from the important political truth that Nixon was a President in perpetual anxiety about holding and advancing his power. In the end, he lost not only power but authority, not only sanction but office, and along the way his aides learned to discount his more ridiculous orders, such as not to serve soup because some spilled one day, or "No more landing at airports!" after a foul-up at the end of a flight.[16] Nixon's fear of losing power undoubtedly is tied to his fluctuating sense of power, which he expressed precisely when he said to his press secretary: "That's an order, Ron—no discussion. Unless, of course, you disagree."[17] Given these fears

[11] Safire, *Before the Fall*, p. 534.
[12] Drew, *Washington Journal*, p. 49.
[13] *Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations . . . by President Richard Nixon*, p. 711; Lukas, *Nightmare*, p. 326.
[14] Safire, *Before the Fall*, p. 482.
[15] Schell, *The Time of Illusion*, p. 372.
[16] William Safire, *Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1975), p. 287.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 286.

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and uncertainties, it is no wonder he turned to a man of the type Charles Colson used to be, a hit man ready to obey whatever the President told him to do. "Break all the china in the White House if you have to," Nixon ordered.[18] That was the kind of man he needed. "Colson—he'll do anything. He'll walk right through doors," Nixon bragged.[19] What balm it must have been to his bruised power sense to hear his CIA Director say, "There is only one President at a time. I work only for you," or to learn that his White House general-in-residence informed a Deputy Attorney General of the United States: "Your commander-in-chief has given an order. You have no alternative."[20] At least once, Nixon in a fury undertook to rein in Kissinger. Colson reports the President's reaction to an apparent Kissinger press leak:

> He exploded, ordering me to call Kissinger at once. (It was then 6:30 A.M. in California.) "I will not tolerate insubordination," he barked into the telephone. "You tell Henry he's to talk to no one period! I mean no one. And tell him not to call me, I will accept no calls from him." With that he slammed the receiver in my ear.[21]

Of course, Nixon did tolerate insubordination—or at least he experienced plenty of it at the end, when he could not find much subordination anywhere. But he was forever railing against it at the same time as he struggled to control his own aggressive impulses. Like Lyndon Johnson, Nixon could take the pettiest ways to demonstrate his powerfulness, such as demanding, on a sudden whim, to be taken to a concert at the Kennedy Center, despite all the inconvenience and disruption an unscheduled Presidential appearance would cause.[22] This was a President who wanted to believe about himself that he was powerful—indeed, a "sovereign" who had his "subordinates" "on a short leash."[23] In a thinly disguised account of a diatribe by "President Monckton," novelist John Erhlichman portrays his boss's power feelings:

> . . . this government is shot through with miserable little people who do not love this country. Ideologues. They would pull down our institutions if they could; they have no real concern for the well-being of America. The only thing that motivates them is their desire for the realization of their left-wing goals, in education or health or welfare or whatever their narrow little field is. And they hate me, because they know I will try to stop them. . . . Oh, I don't mind their hate. I understand it. I am the first President in this country who really threatens them, and they know it. They fear me and so they hate me. And they should fear me; I intend to root them out. I don't care that they are disloyal to me personally. . . . But the Federal bureaucracy must not be disloyal to the Presidency—or

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 559.
[19] Charles W. Colson, *Born Again* (Old Tappan, N.J., Chosen Books, 1976), p. 72.
[20] Lukas, *Nightmare*, pp. 85, 438.
[21] Colson, *Born Again*, p. 79.
[22] *Ibid.*, Chapter Four, "The President's Night Out."
[23] *Submissions of Recorded Presidential Conversations . . . by President Richard Nixon*, p. 641.

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> the country. I have concluded that their disloyalty has reached such a magnitude that it seriously threatens our constitutional system, and even the nation. The goddamn traitors. . . .[24]

Yet this character is a fictionalized version of the same President who had to ask his aides for permission to enter their conversation—"Can I spend a minute?"—sometimes repeatedly in the same conversational sequence, as his own version of his tapes reveals.[25]

Nixon's confused inner feelings about power would have had little political importance had not the President acted politically on them. He did, with a vengeance, and with apparent indifference to the Constitution. Almost as soon as he came into office in 1969, he had contingency plans drawn up to handle a possible national uprising. As early as that first November, in preparation for the Vietnam Moratorium demonstrations, the President—who was very closely involved in the situation, despite his disclaimers—took extreme measures. The Washington police department set up a joint command with the CIA to collect "intelligence" about the demonstrators. This system was revived for the 1971 May Day demonstrations, when approximately 10,000 citizens were arrested without charges and detained. When the courts finally got around to disposing of these cases, only one defendant out of the first two thousand was found guilty.[26]

The Presidential subversion of the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Secret Service, the Post Office, and so on proceeded apace. The beginnings were unknown or only hinted at when *The Presidential Character* was published in 1972, but there was already some evidence of the President's power moves. His early attempts to control the bureaucracy by infiltrating it with political operatives, were in fact little more than exaggerated versions of what other Presidents had tried, but in 1970 one White House aide found an additional justification that throws more light on the mind-set then operative at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue: "It works in the Vatican. It works in the Mafia. It ought to work here."[27]

Nineteen-seventy was also the year that produced a temporary but widespread implementation of the secret "Huston Plan," dubbed for the twenty-nine-year-old White House staffer to whom the plan gave the responsibility for "domestic intelligence and internal security affairs" by means of mail-peeking, sneak-thievery, and the like. The one guideline under which Huston worked was the fact that there were no guidelines: "All restraints which limit this coverage are to be removed."[28] The President approved this plan, then withdrew his approval only when J. Edgar Hoover, armed with his own secret files, threatened

[24] John Ehrlichman, *The Company: A Novel*, p. 275 ©1976 by Simon & Schuster. Reprinted by permission.

[25] *Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations . . . by President Richard Nixon*, pp. 476, 349.

[26] Schell, *The Time of Illusion*, pp. 30, 71, 150-51.

[27] Drew, *Washington Journal*, p. 168.

[28] White, *Breach of Faith*, p. 135.

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the President. Although the plan was supposedly scrapped—Huston claimed it was never formally rescinded—some of its elements were later put into effect, in such totalitarian "capers" as the Ellsberg break-in, the wiretaps on newsmen and on Nixon's own brother Donald, and the varities of threats and acts against Americans on Nixon's steadily expanding "enemies list."[29] It was these domestic measures, in conjunction with the Presidential subversion of the armed forces, that were most significant, for they bought to bear, in illegal and harmful ways, the state's monopoly of force.

I think Nixon needed secrecy and surprise to feel powerful. Was there not in him a certain pleasure, a thrill of danger and escape, when he would look Senator Scott in the eye and say, "Hugh, I have nothing to hide. The White House has nothing to hide. I repeat we have nothing to hide, and you are authorized to make that statement in my name"? Or as he spoke with such a frank air to Elliot Richardson: "I'm innocent. You've got to believe I'm innocent"?[30] What even more transcendent gratification did he experience as he lied, again and again, to Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski—who, *as Nixon knew*, knew he was lying? He had long made it a practice to divert attention from his misdeeds by preaching against them—damning lawbreaking as he broke the law, condemning chiselers as he chiseled away, advertising his straightforwardness while he coached his aides in perjury. Perhaps the technique worked, for the casual political audience could easily mix up the prosecution with the defense in such circumstances. But I also think (though it cannot be proved) that a Nixon hungry for crisis and fearful of the "vegetable life" might be specially needful of the kind of triumph one experiences when one has hoodwinked the enemy. This is the triumph that is especially delicious to the man filled with resentment.

RIGIDIFICATION ROAD

Watergate was Nixon's rigidification, his political nemesis and tragedy. The theory and data in my book, published the season before the burglary, could in no way have predicted that a certain specific event—the June 17 break-in—would trigger the tragedy of Richard Nixon. Such forecasting is the business of astrology. Rather, *The Presidential Character* predicted contingently: given specified conditions, and given an active-negative character like Nixon's, a predictable process of rigidification was likely.

As predicted, that process was set off by "a serious threat to his power and his moral confidence."[31] Nixon moved into his crisis pattern and tried repeatedly to escape by means of his usual get-on-with-it diversion. When that didn't work, he froze up and ruined himself, along the way sapping the spirit of a political generation.

[29] Staff of the New York Times, *The End of a Presidency* (New York, Bantam Books, 1974), p. 218.

[30] Schell, *The Time of Illusion*, p. 320; Woodward and Bernstein, *The Final Days*, p. 61.

[31] *Ibid.*

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The full story of Nixon's political demise has yet to be told. There have been numerous books (and Nixon's own is yet to come), but none of them has made clear the most interesting and important biographic aspect of the story: the interplay between the private Nixon (as revealed in the tapes and the recollections of his aides) and the public Nixon (as revealed in the speeches and press conferences and summit shows). Certainly that story is too long and detailed for telling here, even if it could be done. Rather I must proceed by summary, inviting all the while the serious critic to dredge up competing evidence.

For a character like Nixon, disaster is always just around the corner, no matter how well things are going. Indeed, the better things are going the sooner you can expect disasters. In the spring of 1972, despite all sorts of good signs, Nixon was running scared. There were plenty of reasonable causes for his anxiety, for a wary fear that the election might suddenly demote him to citizen. From his perspective, he had lost, almost lost, or barely won too many times to take comfort in early poll leads. How much more distressing it must have been when the Harris poll in February had Muskie over Nixon at 43 to 40 percent, in March 44 to 39, in May 47 to 39.[32]

In his Watergate testimony, John Dean retrieved from his tape recorder memory the fact that within a few days of the break-in he warned two chieftains at the Justice Department that "I did not know what would happen if the investigation led into the White House, but that I suspected the chances of reelecting the President would be severely damaged. . . . I did not think the White House could withstand a wide-open investigation."[33]

The way to cut this risk to the President's power was to keep the whole affair as quiet as possible until after the election. At first the prognosis did not seem bad, for the break-in was initially reported on page 30 of the *New York Times*. There were some subsequent Watergate reports, a good deal of suggestive information on campaign "dirty tricks," and opponent McGovern's eloquent warning:

> We are confronted, in short, with both a moral and a Constitutional crisis of unprecedented dimensions. Ambitious men come and go, but a free society might never recover from a sustained assault on its most basic institutions. And one can only ask, if this has happened in four years, to what lengths would the same leadership go in another four years, once freed of the restraints of facing the people for reelection?[34]

In general, though, Watergate was kept almost as far from the headlines as the White House would have wanted. A poll in October, just before the election, showed only about half the public had even heard of the Watergate break-in. Nixon was endorsed by 753 daily newspapers, compared to 56 for McGovern,

[32] Lukas, *Nightmare*, p. 8.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 246.

[34] Frank Mankiewicz, *Perfectly Clear: Nixon from Whittier to Watergate* (New York, Popular Library, 1973), p. 262.

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and won the election by an enormous margin, 61 to 38 percent. Not until the following February would the Senate decide on an investigation.[35]

From Nixon's perspective, then, the gamble had paid off. Close attention—before the election—to the White House iceberg underlying the Watergate tip, whether by the press or Congress, constituted a very severe threat to his power because of the very real danger of his losing the election. On the other hand, the risk of covering-up seemed minimal: they had done it many times before and the whole issue appeared to be fading away.

THE FEAR OF SCANDAL

The second essential reinforcement for Nixon's rigidification was the fact that Watergate threatened to reveal the President as an immoral and unvirtuous person. Indeed, the eventual revelation of the tapes elicited just the condemning reaction Nixon feared. Even in their Presidentially sanitized version, the tapes showed a Nixon he would just as soon had remained private. As Representative Mann of South Carolina put it, "The more that people know about him, it seems the more trouble he's in." Even Senator Hugh Scott, a loyalist if ever there was one, dolefully concluded that the tapes showed "a shabby, disgusting, immoral performance by all those involved." This reaction was general among Congressmen, newspapers which previously had supported Nixon, and the public as revealed in the polls. Leading churchmen were reminded of "a felon's lair" and of conversations that "reek with the stench of moral decay." Columnist Joseph Alsop reacted with "sheer flesh-crawling repulsion." The Oval Office had become "the back room of a second-rate advertising agency in a suburb of hell." To William Randolph Hearst, Jr., Nixon emerged as "a man totally immersed in the cheapest and sleaziest kind of conniving." The President not only had broken the law, his oath, and his word, but also had shattered the public's trust that their President was at least as straight as they were. Even Nixon's old standby the Chicago *Tribune* had to admit that the tape transcripts and the scandal about Nixon's tax returns "stripped the man to his essential character, and that character could not stand that kind of scrutiny."[36]

Rigidification is a process, a slow freeze. Nixon's rigidification developed as one piece after another of the threatening pattern fell into place. At some point in the autumn of 1973 one Republican Senator perceived a key transition: the affair had "got to the ridicule stage . . . even among serious people." Nixon himself—who kept saying he wanted to be considered "un homme sérieux" like de Gaulle—predicted, as he released his doctored tape transcripts, that "they will embarrass me . . . and . . . they will become the subject of speculation and even ridicule. . . ."[37] One of them was played at a Washington cocktail party.

[35] Schell, *The Time of Illusion*, pp. 220, 291; Lukas, *Nightmare*, p. 277.
[36] Drew, *Washington Journal*, pp. 256, 262, 271.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 133; Safire, *Before the Fall*, p. 689; Drew, *Washington Journal*, p. 247.

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There was speculation that the tapes would eventually become a commercial item for disc jockeys and teenagers to chuckle over. To the active-negative mentality, ridicule is not funny. It is too close to the truth. It helps freeze a man.

STEPS IN NIXON'S RIGIDIFICATION

Certainly all the main elements of the active-negative rigidification process, as exemplified in the stories of Wilson, Hoover, and Johnson, were present in Nixon's slow-motion fall from the heady altitudes of his 1972 election victory. Plain to see are: the sense that one must resist the temptation to "give in"; the feeling that salvation lies in effort; the perception of oneself as engaged in a lone struggle; the appeal to faith; the sense of oneself as surrounded by lurking enemies.

The Fight Against "Giving In." Like his active-negative predecessors, Nixon moralizes his preferred line in such a way as to define the alternatives as temptations. Thus resisting becomes a virtue. His "but-that-would-be-the-easy-way" habit continued: "The easiest course would be for me to blame those to whom I delegated the responsibility to run the campaign. But that would be a cowardly thing to do," he said in a television address. As soon as the cameras were off, he told the crew; "It wasn't easy." As the end approached, he said he would not resign because, "From a personal standpoint, resignation is an easy cop-out." To Senator Buckley's suggestion that he resign, Nixon replied sarcastically that, "While it might take an act of courage to run away from a job that you were elected to do, it also takes courage to stand and fight for what you believe is right, and that's what I intend to do." He told the Cabinet that he could not resign because that would change the Constitution, and so "I will go through this with my head high—right up to the end, if it comes." The temptation was always toward weakness, relaxation, collapse: "All these people have come in here crying. I ought to be the one crying. I don't want anyone crying." He wanted others to know that "I sometimes feel like I'd like to resign. Let Agnew be President for a while. He'd love it." And earlier, when discussing the cover-up with Ehrlichman, Nixon equates "being forthcoming" with "caving [in]."[38]

The point is clear: although Nixon eventually does all the things he is "tempted" to do in these passages, he does them long after they would have done him any good. Along the way, the temptations—to cry or quit or talk—must be resisted with all his moral force and fervor.

The Answer in Effort. On the other side of the temptation coin is the exhausted face of the gladiator straining upward, lost in his quest, experiencing the sufferer's confirmation that he cannot possibly be doing this from any selfish mo-

[38] Lukas, *Nightmare*, p. 338; Drew, *Washington Journal*, p. 198; White, *Breach of Faith*, p. 294; Woodward and Bernstein, *The Final Days*, pp. 386-87, 435; *Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations . . . by President Richard Nixon*, pp. 1270, pp. 468-470.

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tive. We have seen the suffering-and-striving Nixon already: working to all hours, exhausted, constantly complaining and reaching for sympathy, all the while denying that he needs any of that. The tapes are full of Presidential metaphors of masochism: having to "bite the Dean bullet today," to "prick the boil and take the heat," "to get beat on the head and shoulders," "to be nibbled to death by a thousand hurts," not to mention numerous variants of Nixon's "scab-flicking" simile. But far from passive acquiescence, Nixon would do unto others as he expected they would try to do unto him, by sharp, disciplined struggle, however "painful." As the "crisis" deepened in the fall of 1973, Julie Nixon wrote on her calendar, "Fight. Fight. Fight."[39]

The Lone Struggle. As far back as January 1971, Nixon realized he had an image problem regarding isolation and tried to correct it by proclaiming "Open Door Hours." Statistics were to be gathered on how many people saw the President, and aides were to "build on the theme that he's the most 'Open Door' President in history."[40] It did not work and could not last, because Nixon simply was not an Open Door person. As Watergate deepened, this famous loner of a President got loner and loner. His contacts with the press, which already had been in steep decline, became even rarer.[41] Not only did his Cabinet members have trouble seeing him; even his own lawyers were sometimes cut out. St. Clair confessed that he had not heard the crucial tapes, and Garment complained at the end, "We had no access to our client."[42] Nixon spent hours alone in the Lincoln room, which is furnished for one, the air conditioning on high, the fire ablaze at his hearth, pondering his fate to the strains of "Victory at Sea." Cynics said that when he wanted to be alone, he brought along Bebe Rebozo, and the tow of them would sit together for long stretches without talking.[43] Your average politicians would rather talk than eat, argue than sleep, but by Christmas 1973 Nixon "didn't want to see anyone"—a problem that would have been more severe if the converse hadn't also been true: "and no one really wants to see the President."[44]

The fact of Nixon's isolation is evident. What it meant to him is summed up in his comment to John Dean, on March 13, 1974: "Bullshit: Nobody is a friend of ours."[45] By April of that year, J. Anthony Lukas reports, "Nobody trusted anybody in the Nixon camp. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean were routinely taping their conversations with each other and any other potential witness." At

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 457, 509, 611, 1161; Safire, *Before the Fall*, p. 370; Drew, *Washington Journal*, p. 99.

[40] Jeb Stuart Magruder, *An American Life* (New York, Atheneum, 1974), p. 140.

[41] Safire, *Before the Fall*, p. 349.

[42] White, *Breach of Faith*, p. 271.

[43] Rebozo's 1973 Christmas card bore a startingly cynical Yuletide greeting: "Neither material wealth, fame, power, nor admiration necessarily brings happiness." Drew, *Washington Journal*, p. 151.

[44] Lukas, *Nightmare*, p. 467.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 307.

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the end of April, Nixon at last fired these brittle and prideful counselors and took on a new crew. But the new aides, as Theodore White noted, "were loyal only to the public policies of Richard Nixon, his proclaimed purposes, the record that had won him the largest popular election margin in American history. He could trust such men to serve such public purposes, but not to protect him personally. He was alone—all alone against . . . 'the system.' "[46]

The Appeal to Faith. I will spare readers an extensive account of Nixon's litany of self-justifying idealisms called forth in order to protect himself from the prying eyes of reporters, courts and special prosecutors. On the one hand, Watergate was one of those "petty, little, indecent things that seem to obsess us," one of "the murky, small, unimportant, vicious little things" that contrasted so sharply with the high risk of "building a better world."[47] On the other hand, throughout his exhortations, Watergate threatened the Presidency itself, the fundamental Constitutional order, and the very peace of the world. Nothing is more familiar, to those who lived attentively through those days, than Nixon's extraordinary capacity to link his pettiest acts with his proudest purposes. The public could not be allowed to hear him plotting to fool them because "the President of the United States, under our Constitution, has a responsibility to this office to maintain the separation of power and also maintain the ability of not only this President but future Presidents to conduct the office in the interests of the people."[48] The active-negative's enormous capacity for moralistic self-justification shone brightly through the Watergate miasmas.

The Emergent Enemy. "As you know, we're up against ruthless people," Nixon reminded Alexander Haig as the crisis persisted. Nixon was used to that. He lived in what he saw and felt as a *generally* dangerous world, and always had. He could sense the lurking ambushers: "I guess the Kennedy crowd is just laying in the bushes waiting to make their move," he told John Dean. His aide Safire thought he was the first political paranoid with a majority.[49]

In an interesting exhortation in February 1973, Nixon told his Cabinet what he had learned from another sovereign:

> I was talking to King Hussein of Jordan. When he was sixteen years old, an assassin shot his grandfather, and he ran after the assassin and got shot himself. He made the point—if people throw rocks at you in a parade, you cannot sit down and look for protection. *The moment a leader shows timidity he encourages people to go after him.* People can sense when a leader is timid and they automatically attack. Remember, you are a member of the President's Cabinet.

[46] *Ibid.*; White, *Breach of Faith*, p. 221.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 398.

[48] Congressional Quarterly, *Watergate Chronology of a Crisis*, Vol. 2 (Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly, 1974), p. 170A.

[49] Woodward and Bernstein, *The Final Days*, p. 45; Safire, *Before the Fall*, p. 275.

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> Try to be conciliatory when others are conciliatory toward you, but when the other side doesn't want to heal wounds, fight 'em—you bet more respect.[50]

In a world of piranhas, one had better be a shark.

As the Watergate crisis failed to vanish in the wake of the grand tours, his list of enemies, so perceived, multiplied. There were the "Harvards," the Kennedys, the "upper intellectual types," the "establishment," the Jews, the Italians.[51] The famous "enemies lists' ran the gamut from James Reston to Robert Sherrill, and included such dangerous folk as Carol Channing, Steven McQueen, Barbara Streisand, Gregory Peck, Bill Crosby, Tony Randall and Joe Namath.[52] Former friends, such as Dean, Magruder, and Mitchell, and former henchmen, such as Hunt, Liddy, Barker, and the other burglars, become objects of disdain and derision, to be "stroked" or "nailed."

Choice or Necessity?

If Nixon's response to the Watergate accusations was simply that of a realist to reality, an inexorable ride down the slippery slope of tragedy, then his character would have little to do with it, once the process was begun. One could conceive of the story that way, just as any other historical sequence can be etched retrospectively into inevitability. What happened happened. That Nixon was ridiculed or challenged or whatever could be seen as having little to do with the case, once the case became a case. The alternative is to believe, as our own personal experience teaches us, that there are indeed choices to be made, forks in the road of life, and that how and why those choices are made can have fateful consequences.

We know now that Nixon was deeply into the Watergate affair almost immediately after the break-in, if not before. The break-in occurred on June 17, 1972. Nixon aide Haldeman's notes show the President and his top team talked it over on June 20th, but the tape of the conversation was later obliterated—probably by Nixon himself, if his secretary's testimony that he ran the thing back and forth indicates anything. The June 23 tape—the one Nixon held out to the end, the one that turned his most ardent loyalists against him—makes it abundantly clear that he was deep into what he, at least, thought of as choices about the exact way to handle the details of the cover-up. Despite all his subsequent claims that he was too busy making world peace to attend to such trivia, that all the relevant facts were out, that he and his were innocent and had nothing to hide, or that, at various points in time, he had only just recently learned what

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 685.

[51] White, *Breach of Faith*, p. 254; *Submission of Recorded Presidential Conversations . . . by President Richard Nixon*, p. 101; Woodward and Bernstein, *The Final Days*, p. 169; *Time*, May 12, 1975, p. 74.

[52] Marvin Miller, compiler, *The Breaking of a President*, Vol. I (Therapy Productions, 1974), p. 85.

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was going on, the June 23rd tape made it unmistakably clear that he had been in up to his eyeballs from the very start. In that tape Nixon told Haldeman to stop the investigation by pretending that it threatened CIA work. A haberdasher like Harry Truman, a soldier like Eisenhower would have understood that that was not the thing to do; a lawyer like Nixon must have known that it was an "obstruction of justice." The nation's chief lawman had cut the FBI off at the pass to save his own skin. " 'Don't go any further into this case, period!' " Nixon ordered Haldeman to tell the FBI.[53]

That was a choice. He could have chosen otherwise. He could have destroyed the tapes. He could have gone on television and made a clean breast of the whole affair, admitting his indirect culpability and dismissing those directly responsible. Even after the Ervin Committee investigation began, he could have brought that inquiry to a quick halt by testifying—his word as President of the United States of America against that of a young lawyer assistant who admitted his own perfidy. "If the President had come to testify in the early days of the hearings, he could have bowled the legs out from under us," thought Terry Lenzner of the Ervin Committee staff.[54] He could have promptly complied with the early subpoenas for tapes; it was at least possible that would have ended it. And at nearly any point before the last, he could have made a public confession of complicity, and a promise to reform, and a plea for forgiveness. In retrospect it seems that any one of these moves would have left him in the Presidency, especially considering how loath the Congress was to impeach him.

Instead, Nixon concentrated on rhetoric. In speech after speech, he urged the public to forget this Watergate nonsense and march on into the future. This was a trick that had worked so well in the past that it had become Nixon's habitual way to wind up a crisis before plunging into a new one. All the way back to the Checkers speech, Nixon had succeeded not by giving us new facts but by giving us new explanations, not by acting but by redefining the meanings of acts. I believe there were two reasons that this strategy did not work with Watergate. First, once the courts got into it, television flim-flam became ineffective. A court proceeding is a social invention for focusing attention, strongly and continuously, on a set of specific experiences. It does not always work to that end, but in this case the judge, John Sirica, was one of those rare birds who will not let go until he has pulled out the whole worm. The series of judicial proceedings, culminating in the 8-0 Supreme Court decision requiring Nixon to turn over the tapes, was the least promising stage upon which Nixon could hope to play St. Richard in order to hide King Richard.

A second and I think stronger reason why Nixon failed in his rhetorical escape efforts was the fact that in the final analysis he did not really want to escape. Like Presidents Wilson, Hoover, and Lyndon Johnson before him, something in his character attracted him to the path of grim perseveration, to the long, hard, lacerating march to a tragic denouement. Of course he was ambiv-

[53] Woodward and Bernstein, *The Final Days*, p. 271.
[54] White, *Breach of Faith*, p. 232.

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alent on this score; part of him wanted to escape. But another part seemed to be caught up in the same personal tragic tale, the same predestined plot arranged by the man himself for his own political destruction.

In the end, the most significant of all the many "lessons" of Nixon and Watergate was this: our political system did not protect us from an enormous and long-lasting Presidential confidence game. Nixon the rhetorician was a smashing success, over the years, especially considering what he had to sell. His history demonstrates a democratic vulnerability, a weakness in the nation's political fabric, through which the most loathsome deeds—disguised as bravery—can seep. He was finally pushed out of office only because of an accident. At the end of a long-afternoon, some investigators for a Congressional committee stayed just a little longer, asked just one more question, and uncovered the tape system. Otherwise Nixon would have got off scot free and the rest of us might well be in danger of our democratic lives.

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Societal Overload: Sources, Components, and Corrections

AMITAI ETZIONI

After a long eclipse of the conservative position in social science, neoconservative social scientists have recently begun to take a major part in the public dialogue about the present state of American society. In brief, the sociological essence of the neoconservative thesis being advanced in the pages of *The Public Interest*, *Commentary*, *The Wall Street Journal* and *Fortune* is that American society is showing the strains of a structural overload. The consequent dysfunction is caused by an explosion of rising expectations, by a tidal wave of feeling among the people that the government *owes* them services and resources,[1] and by "the manufacture of *incompatible* policy demands that impose burdens on government which no government can meet."[2]

As neoconservatives see it, American society in the 1970s is suffering from strains caused in the 1960s. That decade, popularly known as the "New Frontier-Great Society era," was characterized by utopian expectations as to what the "voluntaristic" or "organized" elements of society, government in particular, could accomplish. As an antidote, the neoconservative prescription is to curtail the scope of missions pursued by the society as a whole, partially dismantle the government as the main societal tool, adopt more moderate expectations, and advance only carefully pretested programs.[3]

[1] Daniel Bell, "The Revolution of Rising Entitlements," *Fortune*, April 1975, pp. 98–103, 182, 185.

[2] Aaron Wildavsky, "Government and the People," *Commentary*, August, 1973, pp. 25–32.

[3] See for example, "Special Issue on 'The Great Society': Lessons for the Future," *The Public Interest* 34 (Winter 1974). An issue devoted to a postmortem of the Great Society programs.

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Before analyzing these arguments, two general observations seem called for: it seems to me improper to dismiss neoconservative arguments (or those of any other group) on the grounds that they have political aims and implications ("defense of the status quo") and are therefore manifestly false. A thesis has a truth-value of its own regardless of the identity or intent of those who articulate it; it must be validated or rejected on the basis of empirical, logical, or normative arguments—not because of the psychological or sociological make-up of its authors.

Nor is it accurate to characterize the neoconservative argument as a mere defense of the existing (or crumbling) social structure. One of its basic premises is that a large number of societal attributes widely favored are being undermined by overload. These include civil rights, individual initiative and independence, economic vitality as well as "quality" in leadership, culture, intellectual life and science.[4] As a result, sociologists of other theoretical and political persuasions cannot evade the questions neoconservatives raise: is there in fact an overload of demands in relation to capacities? *Are* widely shared values being undermined? If so, is the overload a main cause? And if so, is a partial sacrifice of some values worthwhile in order to advance others, say equality, or might the values now undermined be safeguarded (in their old or new form) *without* slowing societal reform? I am unable, within the confines of one article, to deal with all these questions. I will attempt here to clarify the concept of societal overload, point to its components, and indicate the main alternative approaches in dealing with it.

The Concept of Societal Overload

Unlike concepts created specifically to carry a sociological message (such as Parsons's "pattern-variables"), the term *overload* carries with its connotations from common parlance. It calls to mind the image of a vehicle trying to transport a weight heavier than it was designed to carry. The suggestion that the corrective lies in removing some of the load is introduced by the prefix, *over*. *Overload* thus contrasts with *shortage of resources* which implies the opposite: that there is a given task or set of tasks that must be carried out, but for which resources are lacking. Just as the second term tends to distract attention from the fact that shortages can be made to disappear, not by finding more resources but by limiting our purposes (for example, we need not depend on foreign oil if we can cut our use of energy), so the term overload tends to ignore the possibility that a different structural vehicle, or a redesigned one, might not find current demands excessive.

Overload also has a technical meaning in connection with cybernetics, the science of steering, where it refers to cases in which units that gather and process information, render decisions, issue guiding signals, supervise performance,

[4] Robert Nisbet, *Twilight of Authority* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

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are receiving more inputs than they can deal with and hence either strain or break down.[5] From characterization of telephone circuits, computers, and information networks, the concept has been applied, usually metaphorically rather than with detailed precision, to political and societal systems.[6]

To explicate the concept further, it seems helpful to note that aside from the generalized signs of overload—a system failing to accomplish its purposes, failing to respond to some or all of the demands put on it—specific elements of a system may be especially strained. This in turn allows one to assess both the nature of the overload (is it characterized by one or few bottlenecks, or is it more diffuse and encompassing?) as well as the scope of the restructuring needed if one seeks a society that is able to carry the heavy load rather than one that seeks to reduce it.

These elements will be found in the mixture of communal and organizational factors implicit in the societal picture of the concept of overload. On the one hand there are elements of a community system: organized groups (such as the family and other collectivities), stratification layers, institutional structures, and so on. On the other hand there is a polity at the core of which is a government, with the features of an organization, including a formal division of labor, lines of authority, channels of communication, processes for defining goals and deciding upon policies, implementation mechanisms and so on. (The twin concepts are related but not parallel to the *gemeinschaft/gesellschaft*, or communal/associational twin, because a *gesellschaft* or associational society is not necessarily a highly organized one, although it is more predisposed to such a structure.)[7]

A society can be characterized as relatively more communal than organizational. Traditional Japan was said to have been more effectively mobilized and governed as an entity than traditional China, and so it has been said about preindustrial England compared with France.[8] Over time, of course, a society may become more organized, as did Russia during the transition from the late Tsarist to the Soviet regime. A higher level of organizational intensity does not necessarily entail an undemocratic political system. Israel is more organized than, say, Panama or Paraguay, but it is not considered less democratic. A relatively high level of organizational effectiveness *and* responsiveness on the part of government to the governed its achieved when the polity contains not only effective administrative structures, but also effective organization through which citizens can express their preferences and make the government respond.

[5] For review article see Karl E. Weick, "The Twigging of Overload," in Harold B. Pepinsky, ed., *People and Information* (1970), Pergamon General Psychology Series.

[6] For a political science treatment see David Easton, *A Systematic Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).

[7] For additional discussion see Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1968).

[8] See Marion J. Levy Jr., "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 2 (1953–54), pp. 161–197.

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Political parties, voluntary associations, public and private interest groups, social movements, are elements of such a participatory polity. The level of community and of organization and the balance of the two determine, as we shall see, the *load* a society can carry without undue strain.

The "Guidance" Thesis

As I see it, neoconservatives have correctly diagnosed serious strains in the societal system, and the strain is evident not merely at one or two points, but is generic and evident *throughout all the system's main components.*

As for correctives, the main neoconservative prescription appears much less valid than their diagnosis of the problem. While at first it seems quite plausible that if somehow the members of society could be persuaded to curtail their demands on the system the overload would subside, it might equally well be argued that the disaffection arising from unsatisfied needs would lead to mass rebellion or mass withdrawal, which in turn could cause even larger overloads. Still less convincing is the argument that greater reliance on the marketplace rather than on the government is a valid way to reduce the overload.[9] The marketplace is inevitably more responsive to those with more resources and power, and the inegalitarian distribution of resources and power is at the root of much disaffection and of other social problems as well; hence, greater reliance on the market would more likely heighten rather than alleviate the demands on the system.

The main alternative to the neoconservative position is the sugestion that the system be reformed or transformed so that it will be able to carry "heavier" loads, to be what I would call a more active society. This approach, I should like to be the first to point out, suggests *adding* the missions of societal and institutional change to a system already heavily taxed, and would as the efforts toward post-Watergate reform attest, magnify at least initially the sense of burden, conflict, and instability. Yet once meaningful changes were to occur, the renewed hope and commitment that would replace much of the present alienation and cynicism might well reduce at least one main source of overload. This is the loss of political legitimacy on the personal level (Daniel Bell refers to this as the loss of *civitas*[10]), which makes it necessary to cajole or coerce many millions of unenthusiastic, apathetic, withdrawn or rebellious citizens into compliance with laws, regulations, and missions they no longer experience as "theirs."

Our discussion will proceed by examining four major components of an active, or "guided," society, the nature of the overload burdening each component, and the structural modifications that could be made to increase its capacity. The theoretical reasons for choosing these four elements have been spelled out else-

[9] Bell, "Rising Entitlements."

[10] Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

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where;[11] the evidence about the scope of specific overloads has been cited before, and many of the suggestions for specific reforms are not novel. This essay charts the main components of the overload and contrasts an active way of coping with the neoconservative approach.

CONSENSUS

All other things equal, the more people agree with each other and their leaders on the purposes collective societal action seeks to accomplish, the less strain on the system. A number of observers have pointed out that in recent decades the American citizenry has become increasingly demanding in the number and scope of issues and problems it expects government to deal with. The demands stem from a variety of societal groupings, which are not in agreement with existing national policies and procedures, nor with each other on the change they seek. The fervent anticommunism of the cold war, which for a time provided a fairly widespread and unifying source of consensus, weakened during the 1960s. The war in Vietnam was the most divisive the nation has been engaged in since the Civil War. On domestic issues not only is the nation divided between those who seek more social reforms (for example, minorities, the women's movement) and those who would reverse many of the reforms already enacted (for example, those that concern desegregation, abortion), but in addition, the various camps are divided among themselves (white vs. black civil rights activists) and disagree sharply over the methods through which shared goals should be advanced (for example, those who favor integration differ in their attitudes toward busing).

More broadly, Americans have difficulty reaching a consensus in part because millions are philosophically conservative yet programmatically liberal. Thus, a survey of American political beliefs in 1967 found 79 percent of respondents in a random national sample agreed with the statement, "we should rely more on individual initiative and not so much on governmental welfare programs," while only 12 percent disagreed (9 percent expressed no opinion). Similarly, 49 percent agreed (38 percent disagreed and 13 percent "didn't know") that "social problems here in this country could be solved more effectively if the government would only keep its hands off and let people in local communities handle their own problems in their own ways."[12] Yet despite the large numbers who favored a cut in government social activism on philosophical grounds, 65 percent wanted to retain a whole range of specific governmental programs directed at social problems (Medicare, federal aid to education, low

[11] Amitai Etzioni, "Toward a Theory of Societal Guidance," *American Journal of Sociology* 73, no. 2 (September 1967): 173–187; *The Active Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1968); *Social Problems* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976).

[12] Hadley Cantril and Lloyd A. Free, *The Political Beliefs of Americans* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967), pp. 24–30.

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rent housing subsidies, urban renewal, federal unemployment and antipoverty programs); 21 percent held neutral opinions of these programs, while only 14 percent were opposed to them. In August 1971, 87 percent of a national sample favored federal spending to help the elderly, 80 percent to reduce pollution, 74 percent for Medicaid, and so on.[13] (More recent data gathered during the 1976 election campaign suggest indirectly that people may have grown more conservative philosophically, and less supportive of specific programs; however, the basic discrepancy remains.)

In addition to the sheer number of individuals who favor or oppose particullar policies or programs, it is important to take into account the intensity with which particular positions are espoused and the willingness of persons to become politically active in behalf of them. Thus gun control, though favored by 67 percent of Americans,[14] is opposed by a minority for which the issue is much more salient—a major reason gun control legislation has repeatedly been blocked. Similar differences in activism in behalf of one's beliefs seem to distinguish the large numbers who favor decriminalization of marijuana and other victimless crimes from the minorities who oppose such changes in policy.

Moreover the increase in alienation, the increased politicization of issues,[15] and the decrease in respect for authority seem to have encouraged self-interested attitudes and actions, while rendering appeals to common values, the public interest, or the general good less compelling. (A Harris poll commissioned by the Senate Committee on Governmental Operations found that between 1966 and 1973, overall scores on the alienation index rose from 29 to 55 percent. By 1976, general disaffection reached 61 percent, according to a Harris poll of March 1976.)

Students of effective polities have pointed out that confrontations about one major issue at a time allow polities to adapt, without serious dysfunction, but when several issues rise in close sequence, they tend to overload the system. Thus it is likely that Britain was able to democratize with little political instability (compared with other nations) in large measure because of what T. H. Marshall described as its three-stage evolution of citizenship—*citizenship* being a concept that refers to the equal rights and duties associated with full membership in the political community. According to Marshall, the three components of contemporary citizenship developed and gained acceptance one by one over a period of three centuries. The eighteenth century was characterized by the adoption of equal civil rights (for example, equal justice under the law regardless of social position); the nineteenth century was characterized by the acceptance of equal political rights (for example, universal suffrage); and finally,

[13] William Watts and Lloyd A. Free, *State of the Nation* (New York: Universe Books, 1973).

[14] Gallup Poll, March, 1975.

[15] Daniel Bell and Virginia Held, "The Community Revolution," in *The View from Below: Urban Politics and Social Policy*, Norman Fainstein and Susan Fainstein, eds. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972), pp. 309–313.

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the twentieth century has been witnessing a movement toward increased social and economic equality (for example, the rights associated with the welfare state).[16]

In contemporary America, before any one issue, whether major or minor, is "processed" and consensus is reached, several other issues arise. Thus the race, youth, and poverty issues of the late 1950s and early 1960s are still with us, albeit in a less active form, while the women's movement, gay liberation, and the environment movement raise a whole slew of others. Even matters such as the proper form of health insurance, aid to older persons, or the use of the metric system are continuously churning. The resulting whirlpools of disagreement are both a consequence of overloaded channels of consensus building and an aggravating factor.

Neoconservative sociologists maintain that as a consequence of more and more conflicting demands made on government, the normative and structural integration of American society, its basic "unity," has been undermined, while the institutions designated for nonviolent resolution of the competing claims of different societal groups are no longer able to perform effectively. According to Daniel Bell, the process of turning to government to secure one's rights has recently "been unfolding in a peculiarly destructive way in the United States. Just about *all* grievances now get dumped in the lap of government while the voluntary associations that once furthered the claims of different groups are withering."[17]

Moreover, Bell asserts,

> the ultimate problem presented by the revolution of rising entitlements is not that it will cost a lot of money—though it will certainly do that. What is potentially more dangerous is the threat that the revolution presents to our political system. It threatens to overload the system, to confront it wih far more grievances than legislators and judges know how to cope with. What makes this threat especially devastating is the absence, thus far, of any agreed upon rules for settling the differences between all the contending interest groups.[18]

Given these conditions, widespread collective violence and general political instability are said to menace the nation. The eruptions in the ghettos and in the South as well as on the campuses during the 1960s are seen as signs to this effect.

While the argument that the society's mechanisms for building consensus are overloaded seems to me quite persuasive, I see the nature and meaning of collective violence in the 1960s as misdiagnosed. The crux of the problem is not merely that this neoconservative concern for national unity ascribes to it a higher value than to satisfying the claims of the rebellious disadvantaged

[16] See T. H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class," *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 65–122.

[17] Bell, "Rising Entitlements," p. 76.

[18] Ibid., p. 78.

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groups, a value judgment which cannot be treated as logically or empirically supported, but that the neoconservative argument also assumes that acts of collective violence on the part of such disaffected groups have been a major threat to American democracy and wholly negative.

As I see it, collective violence (unlike personal violence, especially crime) was rather limited in frequency and scope in the 1960s. A number of other observers have pointed out, and have buttressed their claims with historical research, that collective violence during the 1960s was sizable only in comparison with the immediate two preceding decades in American history.[19] Relative to the American experience of the past hundred years (particularly during the period of emerging labor unions) as well as the recent history of other industrial democratic nations, the incidence and seriousness of collective violence in the United States during the 1960s does not stand out as particularly high.

Moreover, violence, as distinct from vocal protest, appears to have been perpetrated and provoked frequently by the authorities rather than by the dissidents.[20] But most important, the collective violence of disadvantaged or disaffected groups during the 1960s was basically a form of signalling dissatisfaction and desire for change,[21] not an attempt to coerce a major sociopolitical revolution resisted by the majority. Indeed, sporadic violence of the 1960s succeeded in alerting both the elites and publics to unattended problems and for the most part it rather rapidly subsided once remedial action in the desired direction was taken—even when that action was *much* less, or proceeded at a much slower pace, than what the dissidents desired (for example, equality for blacks and withdrawal from Vietnam). To characterize black leaders as "angry" and as the source of "unrealistic expectations" that make the system "ungovernable" seems basically mistaken.[22]

Though neither mass violence nor sustained disruption of the established order, let alone political revolution, has occurred as a result of turmoil during the 1960s, there is insufficient consensus to support effective public policies in many areas. Indeed, while disagreement takes a less spectacularly visible form in the 1970s, a case might be made that lack of agreement on the proper course to follow is in fact more pervasive than it was in the 1960s, as far as domestic matters are concerned. From busing for purposes of racial integration to forming a national health policy, from stressing the fight against inflation instead of

[19] Sheldon G. Levy, "A 150 Year Study of Political Violence in the United States," in *Violence in America*, Hugh David Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds. (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 84–100.

[20] Gary T. Marx, paper presented at a meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 5, 1968; see also Gary T. Marx, *Protest and Prejudice* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).

[21] Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America* (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1965); William A. Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest* (New York: Dorsey Press, 1975); cf. Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Paradox of American Politics," *The Public Interest* 41 (Fall 1975): 142–165.

[22] Bell and Held, "Community Revolution," p. 310.

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against unemployment, from the Equal Rights Amendment for women to gun control, there is a sharp disagreement among members of the public, their leaders, and their representatives. This has been illustrated recently by the fact that two years after the energy crisis was declared an urgent problem, no national energy policy had yet taken shape because of unresolved disagreements.[23]

The chief neoconservative suggestion for dealing with the disunity stemming from the dual revolution of rising aspiration and rising asperity over government's failure to meet expectations is for people to downscale their desires. This, it is argued, could be achieved if people were able to realize that they are asking, if not for the impossible, then for "too much." According to Wildavsky, "we are all, in fact, doing better and feeling worse."[24] Another source of the problem is said to lie in the intellectual *rhetoric* about alienation which, for example, underscores the monotonous, fragmented life of the assembly line, while ignoring that fewer than 2 percent of American workers are on the assembly line. Wattenberg adds

> . . . perhaps the major danger today is only that we will be catch-phrased and crisis-managed to death before all is done. It is time for a reassessment . . . It is time to investigate the capital-lettered applications that seem to issue from every typewriter through the land, spreading apparent doom on an otherwise healthy society.[25]

The main alternative approach, especially if one views many of the demands being made on the polity as arising out of real unmet needs, is to increase the productive capacity of the society, the justness of its distribution, and its capacity to form consensus as to what is and can be done and for whom. (We focus first on the latter variable; distributions reflect in part consensus and in part power and are discussed subsequently; productive capacity is a matter for separate discussion.)

To increase capacities for consensus formation, the prerequisites need first to be developed. At present, Americans often share a greater commitment to collective symbols (for example, to the flag and to the Constitution as a sacred document rather than to its actual content) than to ultimate values.[26] One reason is that unlike the educational system of, say, France, the United Kingdom or Israel, the American schools do not instill in students a basic set of agreed-upon national values. A minimum shared national "core" cirriculum would need to be developed before the educational system could serve as a means whereby most Americans could come to agree deeply on such values as civil liberties, individ-

[23] For a masterful account see Elizabeth Drew, "The Energy Bazaar," *The New Yorker*, July 21, 1975, pp. 35–72.

[24] Wildavsky, "Government and the People."

[25] Ben J. Wattenberg and Richard M. Scammon, *This U.S.A.* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 305.

[26] For data see Amitai Etzioni, "Americans Reject their Constitution: What is to be Done?" *The Educational Forum* XXXVI, no. 4 (May 1972): 461–463.

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ual rights, and equality. Such shared values could then serve as a foundation on which to build support for specific public policies.

In some democratic nations, one or more years of required national service provides successive generations of mixed class and ethnic backgrounds with a national experience and hence a shared sense of unity over and above diversity.[27] A transition from a volunteer professional army to a year of national service for all young Americans, in an organization like the Peace Corps or VISTA or in the armed forces, would help American society to move in this direction.

Television is one of America's greatest common denominators. It seems to promote a nationwide preoccupation with consumer products. Recent attempts to reduce the role of national networks and increase the role of local programming (favored by neoconservatives) weaken the role television can play in forming national consensual bonds. If reversed, greater reliance on network programming, especially an increased role for the public educational network, could promote greater national consensus.

Pluralism of subcultures and preferences can be maintained in these three spheres without undermining their ability to prepare the ground for national consensus. Thus, while all young American may serve a year, they may be free to choose the mode of service (military, civilian; domestic; overseas; conservation or antipoverty and so on). The educational common denominator of core values would still leave most choices concerning curriculum content and educational methods to local settings. And television broadcasts projected nationally could be produced in a variety of regional and other pluralistically based cultural centers.

While a national curriculum, a year of service, and public network television could enhance the overall predisposition to consensus formation, consensus on specific policy issues will still need to be processed in large measure through political parties, primary and general elections and other representative political structures. Various suggestions have been made to make these more "effective." Some suggestions are limited in scope: if, for instance, members of the House of Representatives were to serve four years instead of two, less of their time might be spent on campaigning and more on their congressional work. If their salaries were to be substantially increased in return for an agreement that they would not accept any other fees, members of Congress and state legislatures would not only be less beholden to private interests, they could also be required to work full time at representing their constituents in the legislatures, as opposed to devoting significant time to representing wealthy clients in court or before the bureaucracy as is often currently the case at the state level.

Other suggestions run deeper. Both James MacGregor Burns[28] and Clifford

[27] S. N. Eisenstadt, "Analysis of Patterns of Immigration and Absorption of Immigrants," *Population Studies* 7 (1953): 167–180.

[28] James MacGregor Burns, *The Deadlock of Democracy* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1963).

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Hardin[29] argue that political consensus will continue to be difficult to achieve, or fail to be solid enough to act upon, as long as the electoral system permits one party to dominate the executive while another dominates the legislative branch.[30] By guaranteeing to a single unified party control of both branches—while at the same time creating a secure institutionalized mechanism through which the minority party could function as a vigorous opposition—advocates of such reform claim that consensus within both the public and government could be made secure enough to provide a mandate for dealing with complex problems requiring comprehensive solutions. And in addition, parties would have a greater incentive to present responsible, alternative policy positions to the voters at election time. It has also been suggested that a multiple party system, or two "clear cut" ideological parties, one liberal and one conservative, would be more effective in translating differences of positions within the community into political positions, so those could effectively deal with each other.

The possibility of some initial increase in strain produced by a policy designed ultimately to reduce it is illustrated by the changed rules governing the selection of delegates to the Democratic nominating convention. Parties are, of course, a significant part of the consensus-building structure because they pull together diverse groups, such as labor unions, the poor, ethnic minorities, and the liberal middle class into a consensual camp that shares positions on public policy. They reduce many positions into a much smaller number of more widely acceptable ones, then submit them to a national election, which gives priority to one position. While some of the *sub*party positions maintain autonomy even after national consensus has been negotiated, and representatives in Congress often cross party lines in their votes, nonetheless, the party's function remains that of advancing the consensus-building process through *reduction* in the range of positions.

During the 1960s a large variety of previously inactive or disenfranchised social groups heightened their political awareness, activization, and demands. If they began by taking their grievances into the streets rather than into the corridors of government and councils of power it was in part because they were excluded wholly or partially from the more normal forms of political participation. Slowly, minorities, women and youth increased their institutionalized political participation. Accordingly, poll taxes, literary tests and other barriers to voter registration and office holding by blacks and other minorities began to fall; youths 18 to 21 gained the right to vote. However, until 1972 participation by these new groups in the presidential nominating process did not increase by much. In preparation for its 1972 convention, however, the Democratic party, which for ideological and historical reasons was best prepared to incorporate

[29] Clifford Hardin, *Presidential Power and Accountability: Toward a New Constitution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); see also Sen. Walter F. Mondale, *The Accountability of Power: Toward a Responsible Presidency* (New York: McKay, 1976).

[30] Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971); see also *Presidential Elections Fourth Edition*, 1976.

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these new groups, revised its rules for selecting delegates so as to increase the representation of minorities, women and youth.

As sociologists would have expected, this first caused increased conflict and disagreement as the old groups (for example, Mayor Daley of Chicago, AFL-CIO President George Meany and their forces) had to adapt to the new situation. The increase in the variety of groups whose views had to be taken into account in building consensus, as well as the new internal party power balance that had to be negotiated, created a temporary overload. Eventually the rules were modified, with the new groups having to relinquish some of their initial gains. Reduction of the overload did therefore entail some decrease in demands and willingness to compromise on the part of the new groups. Significantly, however, and of at least equal importance was the willingness of the older groups to relinquish some of their power in favor of a wider coalition of groups, broadening public appeal and greater consensus-building capacities this would give to the Democratic party. Thus, a temporary overload was overcome by increased participation and accommodation of the internal party structure to permit greater consensus-building capacities.

The significance of this development is a double one. First, it illustrates that a policy may adapt to strains by doing more (despite some backtracking since 1972, the current Democratic party's consensus bulding is now much more encompassing than it was before). Second, that attempts to deal with the overload of new demands in a polity through institutional reforms may well cause new strains initially, but in the longer run they may reduce strains.

Samuel P. Huntington, a neoconservative political scientist, writes:

> Al Smith once remarked, "The only cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy." Our analysis suggests that applying that cure at the present time could well be adding fuel to the fire. Instead, some of the problems of governance in the United States today stem from an "excess of democracy," in much the same sense in which David Donald used the term to refer to those consequences of the Jacksonian Revolution which helped to precipitate the Civil War. What is needed, instead, is a greater degree of moderation in democracy.[31]

For reasons indicated in our preceding analysis, we cast our ballot with Al Smith.

Power

Societies have two axes of power: a "horizontal" dimension characterizing relations among the various organized groups within the society (for example, corporations vs. labor unions) and a "vertical" dimension characterizing relations between government and the populace. The two are closely related in that the government is more attentive to those groups that have more power; however,

[31] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Democratic Distemper," *The Public Interest* 41 (Fall 1975): 9–38.

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they are not mirror images because to maintain its legitimacy, the government tends to be somewhat less *in*egalitarian in its policies than the societal power profile per se would suggest.[32]

A key feature of recent American power relations has been the mobilization of more and more societal groupings into organized groups that are actively political. As a result of myriad factors, the spread of college education, the rise of social movements, the development of new communications and production technologies, and the social effects of World War II and the war in Vietnam, minorities, farmworkers, welfare clients, women, and youths, among others, became more self-aware and active.

These mobilizations, as neoconservatives correctly point out, tend to heighten politicization of issues and widen the areas of conflict, if only because mobilization often sparks counter mobilization. Thus, the formation of the United Farm Workers led to formation of political associations among growers, just as the formation of national trade unions among workers hurried on the formation of national trade associations among manufacturers.

Second, organized groups tend to politicize conflict by involving the government. Thus, to stay with the farmworker example, a law was recently passed in California that grants farmworkers the right to unionize and specifies that the question of whether to have a union, as well as which union to have, be decided by democratic balloting, under the supervision of state officials to ensure honesty. Other examples: conflict between the women's liberation movement and its opponents dealing with such matters as government-imposed equal employment opportunities, other antidiscrimination laws, and an equal rights constitutional amendment; conflicts between the right-to-life groups and proabortion groups, with the role of government in regulating abortion.

As neoconservatives see it, organized conflict, especially when it involves the government, results in the politicization of social life, leads to threats to national unity and to even greater reliance on the government, which weakens the societal fabric. This in turn, following de Tocqueville, is said to erode the barriers to tyranny.

As I see it, while the mobilization of heretofore underrepresented or excluded groups does result in intensification of conflicts and an expansion of the government's role, such developments may be the transitional pains of adjustment of the power structure to a less inegalitarian system, rather than lasting strains. The history of the entrance of the working classes into political life illustrates this point. The passage of the National Labor Relations Act recognized the right of workers to organize and be represented by a union, and largely eliminated violent confrontation between corporations and workers. The NLRA established a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate modes of conflict and conflict resolution, and channeled business-labor conflict into the routinized legitimate

[32] Amitai Etzioni, *Social Problems* (Engelwood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976); cf. Joseph A. Pechman and Benjamin A. Okner, *Who Bears the Tax Burden?* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974).

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modes. After this, large scale and widespread industrial violence largely subsided.

It has been argued that recent demands differ from those of labor, in that the latter have been chiefly economic whereas the new ones include demands for esteem, approval, status symbols, and other such "resources" which are difficult if not dangerous for the government to allot. As I see it, labor's demands had such dimensions, too, and the difference between labor and the newly active groups is of degree. Second, once economic inequities are removed (for example, equal pay for equal work for women and minorities), political representation is provided, and the legal sources of indignities (such as the right to dispose of property and obtain credit) are removed, social manners tend to adjust themselves and require little official intervention.

The main alternatives, hence, are whether to call on newly active groups, which do not receive a proportional share of societal allotment and government attention, to moderate if not cancel their claims, in the name of national unity and societal stability and, to escape the alleged threat of tyranny, leave the existing power structure and its corollary inequities intact—or, call on the privileged power groups to accept greater equality of allocation and access to the government as the best way to cope with the overload.

Some neoconservatives argue that equality of assets, income, and power is not desirable because it harms a variety of other values, including reward for entrepreneurship (said to be essential to economic vitality) cultural excellence, freedom, and quality of political leadership (equality is seen as going hand in hand with a mass society).[33] They present a set of sociological hypotheses which can be tested. For example, how important is private enterprise to the economy? Were most recent *economic* innovations initiated and funded by the government? Does more equality reduce freedom? Or is it a *prerequisite* for it? These are also proper subjects for value judgment. If, for instance, mass participation in culture does undermine some qualities, does one prefer equality of access to highbrow tastes?[34] But this line of study and judgment is rather different from using the concept of overload to argue, in effect, against more egalitarian distribution of societal power (even if it entails temporary or longer run intensification of government intervention), because as the labor movement experience suggests, we can adapt to the strains involved by accelerating power reallocation rather than by stopping it.

Turning now to the second axis, neoconservatives have indicated its size and scope.[35] The government is involved more and more in areas that were once uniquely the province of the private sector or the private individual. Govern-

[33] Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1940); Charles Frankel, "Comments," *The Elite and the Electorate: Is Government by the People Possible?* (Santa Barbara, Ca.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1963): 8–10.

[34] Herbert Gans, *Popular Culture and High Culture* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

[35] See James Q. Wilson, "The Rise of the Bureaucratic State," *The Public Interest*, 41 (Fall 1975): 77–103.

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ment is now involved directly or indirectly in decisions about such personal matters as smoking, drinking, and drug taking, such family matters as birth control, abortion, and divorce, and such market matters as economic growth and stability, consumer protection, product safety, and the protection of the environment.

Neoconservatives favor reducing the load through a return to much more "limited government" and greater reliance on private initiative and the market place. According to Bell, "we have a lot to learn about the possibilities of the market mechanism to achieve social ends . . . The market [unlike the government] provides for self-adjustment and self-regulation within a framework of rules."[36] If by the market he means an emphasis on for-profit business corporations, it should be noted that they are limited in the kinds of missions they can take on by their very nature as for-profit enterprises. Willingness to support or engage in activities that are not profit-making out of a sense of corporate social responsibility is not wholly absent, but such "public service" missions are of limited size and scope. Health care, one of the few human services in America that has traditionally been the province of the private sector, illustrates the limits of what private enterprise—and even private philanthropy—can do in dispensing a social service. Private insurance, including both commercial insurers and the not-for-profit "blues," have been unable to meet the health care needs not only of the poor; there has been a growing feeling for a number of years that they do not even provide adequate health care for the middle class. And to favor allocation by the market is to favor a system in which people vote according to the number of dollars they can spend, a highly inegalitarian system. Nor has the market shown much concern for consumer protection, worker safety, and environmental protection. In short, cutting the load in this particular manner (occasionally referred to as deregulation) is to favor status, privilege and economic criteria over social justice and social values. But more than a normative judgment is involved; the implied assumption that most people could be prevented from acting on or out their alienation if subjected to pure or nearly pure reliance on market systems—thereby avoiding a vast overload on the system—is questionable.

This is *not* to say that the only alternative is for government to take over and directly run more and more services, such as health care, the way it runs public schools. Government intervention may take the form of subsidizing and seeking to guide the behavior of private and not-for-profit institutions in desired directions through use of financial and administrative incentives and penalties. That is, government intervention may be achieved through market style mechanisms, or by relying on the third (not-for-profit) sector[37] which would lead toward a mixed economy rather than an exclusively private one.[38]

[36] Bell, Rising Entitlements," p. 182.

[37] Amitai Etzioni, "The Third Sector and Domestic Missions," *Public Administration Review*, 33 (1973): 314–323.

[38] Eli Ginzberg, Dale L. Hiestad, and Beatrice G. Reubens, *The Pluralistic Economy* (New

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The main issue, though, is not which government mechanisms one relies upon, but whether one strives to attend to its missions, seeking the best procedures—or whether one prefers to dismantle the government as much as possible.

Those neoconservatives who recognize that even if some human services can be dropped and others handled by the private sector, there would still be much that would be defined as the governmental sphere. They tend to favor not just making government smaller, more modest and more manageable, but also a decentralization of government and a shift of decision-making power from Washington to the state and local governments. Revenue sharing, which over the past five years has disbursed $30 billion in federal tax monies to state and local government, is a policy close to neoconservative hearts.

One's outlook on revenue sharing and other schemes for decentralization of government depends upon whether one prefers to discourage demands for change —in which case greater reliance on governmental structures with lesser capacity for comprehensive action is warranted—or to endeavor to satisfy rising demands by improving the capacities of governmental structures suited to taking action.

Several different but related issues are involved. The first is the extent to which one believes government ought properly to engage in deliberate efforts to change or reform the societal status quo, and if so, which level of government, national, state, or local, is better equipped to carry forward reform. Evidence suggests that local government is much less suited to pursuing reformist goals than the federal government for a number of reasons. First, state and local government has generally been found to be less accountable to the electorate as a whole, more subject to the influence of lobbies, the personal influence of cronyism and outright corruption.[39] Second, the reform-minded electorate tends to be concentrated in the relatively few large urban centers and a few states. Though numerically large nationally it is of less than proportionate influence in most state and local elections.[40] Thus, for instance, conservative, rural and small-town New York State residents wield disproportionately more political power within the state than the more numerous, more liberal citizens of New York City. The same holds for the nation as a whole.[41] Third, on the national level, the very multiplicity of powerful interest groups tends to ensure that they will exert countervailing pressures. This prevents domination by a single

York: McGraw-Hill, 1965); Francis H. Schott, "The New-Priority Problem," *Technology Review* (December 1972): 39–43.

[39] Citizen's Conference on State Legislatures, 1973; Harmon Ziegler, "Interest Groups in the States," in *Politics in the American States*, Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines, eds. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 103–104.

[40] Thomas Dye, *Politics in States and Communities* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Richard Cole and David Caputo, *Urban Politics and Decentralization: The Case of Revenue Sharing* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), pp. 10–11.

[41] Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 114–116.

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interest and leaves more room for the influence of the public at large.[42] In contrast, on the local level in quite a few towns and even cities one racial group, one corporation, or a few ethnic groups may be politically dominant simply because there are no other groups of sufficient size or well enough mobilized to provide political competition.[43]

> Often . . . corporate interests find it more compatible with their goals to advocate the expansion of state jurisdictions at the expense of the national government. Some large corporations have financial resources greater than many state governments. With respect to the regulation of business, many states lack the necessary administrative machinery to provide thorough supervision . . .[44]

In addition, state and local governments compete with one another to better their economies by providing a "favorable climate for business." Business firms, particularly large firms, can take advantage of this competition by playing one locality off against another to obtain more attractive tax rates, less stringent antipollution or environmental safety regulation, and other preferential treatment.[45]

Wilbur Cohen, former Secretary of HEW, in voicing his opposition to revenue sharing, cited the overwhelming political dominance of the "haves" over the "have nots" at the level of local city government.[46] This view is supported by the way revenue sharing funds are used. The funds were provided to state and local governments as of 1972, at the rate of $5 to $6 billion a year, after $16.9 billion were cut out of federal social programs, especially OEO, Model Cities, and other programs for minorities and the poor.[47]

Evidence that most local and state governments are not effective instruments for bringing about social reform is likely to leave neoconservatives unpersuaded, indeed, it may well strengthen their support for decentralization, since they do not believe that much in the way of reform is needed. Neoconservative social scientists in particular do not look upon promotion of greater economic or social equality as a value deserving of increased emphasis, or one which can be pursued actively without unduly undermining others.[48]

But even if one sees little need for reform, one still would favor federal government over state and local governments on two grounds to which neoconservatives do hold: effective and efficient administration and financial ac-

[42] Lester Milbraith, *The Washington Lobbyists* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 345–347.

[43] Frank Trippett, *The States: United They Fell* (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1967).

[44] Harmon Zeigler, *Interest Groups in American Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 44.

[45] Dye, *Politics in States*, pp. 62–63; Demetrios Caraley, *City Government and Urban Problems* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 21–22, 406–422.

[46] See Otto Stolz, *Revenue Sharing: Legal and Policy Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1974).

[47] Robert C. Wood, in testimony before a Senate Committee.

[48] Robert Nisbet, "The Pursuit of Equality," *The Public Interest* 31 (Spring 1974): 103–120.

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countability and integrity. While this cannot be demonstrated here, we suggest that a comparison of Medicare (federally run) and Medicaid (administered jointly by local, state and federal governments); the IRS and local tax collectors; Social Security Administration (federal) and welfare administrations (mainly local); federal and state and local courts; and other such comparisons of services in the same general area (albeit significantly different in detail) will show that federal agencies, while far from free of deficiencies, are more cost-effective, more professional, less corrupt, less open to partisanship and nepotism. While it has been argued that local administration may be reformed, and some progress has been made in this direction, the difficulties in improving the federal agencies suggest that it will take decades before most of the myriad state and local governments are raised to the level federal agencies currently maintain.

Thus, not only must social reforms be advanced if alienation, a main source of overload, is to be overcome, but in order to find the most effective and accountable administrative tools, greater reliance on the federal government, not on state and local government, is called for. Or to put it differently, a reduction of the "load" *is compatible with greater reliance on the more incompetent*, that is, on local levels of government; a heavier load with less reliance on them.

Moreover, a higher level of national management is not incompatible with the preservation of individual rights and freedoms, as neoconservatives frequently hold. First, despite their distrust of centralized power the framers of the Constitution themselves believed that a vigilant citizenry with a deep and abiding sense of the importance of safeguarding individual rights and liberties was far more vital as a bulwark against governmental tyranny than any number of formal Constitutional checks and balances, doctrines of the separation of powers, and the preservation of states' rights.

Similarly, de Tocqueville called for the preservation of "intermediary bodies" to cushion and protect the individual citizen against encroachments and oppression by the powerful modern nation-state, and stressed the activism of a citizenry organized in voluntary associations rather more than the fragmentation of governmental power. What de Tocqueville found attractive about American local community government seems to have been not so much its localism per se as its participatory character. In other words, in contrast to France where government consisted preponderantly of downward-controlling structures, American government emphasized upward, consensus-building channels. Thus, pluralism based on commonalities other than sheer residence within geographical boundaries—specifically, cross-cutting pluralism based on differences and commonalities of occupation, social class, ethnicity, age, etc.—is much better suited than localism to building a more solid and responsive national consensus and protecting individual rights and liberties.

In short, intensification of conflicts within the community may be handled by depolitizing the issues, or reallocating resources unequally distributed, including power itself. Intensification of the government's role may be handled by reducing its missions, dismantling it in part, and decentralizing much of the

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rest—or, by making the national government more indirect and more responsive, without cutting out most of its missions.

Administration

Social scientists of many persuasions are, typically, more concerned with consensus on values and power questions than with matters of administration as largely reflecting other "underlying" factors. There is a widely held notion that where there is a national commitment (that is, a broad consensus among the public on values backed by the support of the strongest power groups) a way will be found to implement a program. The counter thesis, the concept of administrative overload, suggests that while these "underlying" factors may be important, there are genuinely serious administrative impediments to effective social action. To illustrate: citzen participation in Office of Economic Opportunities programs and Affirmative Action ran into difficulties because of disagreements and the opposition of local power groups. It is also true, however, that questions of consensus and power aside, there is nonetheless a genuine tension between the democratic decision making promoted by the administrative mechanism of elected citizen boards running social programs, hospitals, clinics, and schools and the value placed on expertise, which implies professional authority.[49] Similarly, Affirmative Action runs into difficulties not just with opponents, but also with proponents who differ over modes of implementation. For example, what is the proper basis for quotas (or "goals") for hiring and promotion—the ethnic, racial and sex distribution in a particular profession, institution, town, or state, or in the nation as a whole? Are courts or federal agencies, grievance procedures or class action suits the most effective tools? Should Affirmative Action rely chiefly on persuasion, or on fines and jail terms for those not in compliance?

For each social program, an administrative pattern may be worked out, but the multiplicity of decisions that must be made, from the need to develop drug rehabilitation centers to open prisons, from "normalization" placement of retarded children in "normal" classrooms to shift of treatment of alcoholics from police departments to social workers, has generated an administrative overload on *top* of consensus and power difficulties.[50]

The neoconservatives' answer, again, is to take on many fewer missions and thereby resolve the administrative logjam. The alternative answer is that given

[49] Citizen's Board of Inquiry into Health Services for Americans, *Heal Yourself* (Washington, D.C.: American Public Health Association, 1972), chs. 3, 4. RAND, *Citizen Organizations: Increasing Client Control over Services R-1196 (April)*, Prepared by Robert Yin, et al. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973).

[50] Charles L. Schultze, Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin and Nancy H. Teeters, *Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 1 ff.; Fainstein, *The View from Below;* Eli Ginzberg and Robert M. Solow, "An Introduction to this Special Issue," *The Public Interest* 34 (Winter 1974): 4–13.

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sufficient consensus and power, new tools for public administration may be developed. Peter Drucker's point seems well taken; he suggests that government ought to *do* less (that is, act less often as the performing agent) but *guide* more. [51] For instance, by alloting credit at different interest rates in line with social purposes (lower rates for railroads, higher for cars; lower for hospitals, higher for supermarkets) a central bank can reorient aspects of society without necessarily creating massive new regulatory bureaucracies and social programs.

Scores of laws and thousands of regulations now on the books but rarely enforced may well be cancelled, so that those that remain can be more strictly enforced through more frequent inspections and higher penalities for violations. Allowing violation of the environmental protection, occupational safety, and consumer protection laws to go unpunished invites more violations, and creates a situation that is then perceived as regulatory "overload." Tougher enforcement, as in the case of enforcement of the tax laws by the IRS, reduces violations to a manageable number, if the basic laws are legitimate. Hence the need is to prune the law, not simply because of sheer overload, but so as to give attention and resources to laws that are more clearly necessary for social purposes (such as laws for curbing pollution) by weeding out those that are less so (for example, laws for policing victimless crimes).

Finally, the "old-fashioned" mode of developing new programs, which is wasteful and alienating, limits the work that can be done. A program used to be launched, often on the hundred million if not the billion dollar level, on the basis of its political attractiveness and verbal and written arguments that it would work. Such a pattern was clearly evident in the Model Cities program. Once a program was introduced in the field, often in hundreds if not thousands of locations (150 cities participated in the Model Cities program instead of the six originally proposed) major difficulties would arise (problems of coordination and control were particularly acute in the Model Cities) and attempts would be made to modify the program "in place."[52] This is somewhat like mass producing a new automobile model and letting the public discover its defects by driving it and having accidents, then recalling it for major modifications.

The more economical sequence, which results in less overload, is to try out a few small-scale prototypes, develop those and make the necessary adjustments and mass produce only relatively "processed" programs. For this procedure to prove workable the legislature must be willing to allow administrative research and development to take place in a few localities instead of insisting that once a program or policy seems to have potential it be immediately seeded in numerous Congressional districts.

Moreover, social program research and development has to be located where

[51] Peter Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).

[52] Lance Liebman, "Social Intervention in a Democracy," *The Public Interest* 34 (Winter, 1974): 14–29; Bernard J. Frieden and Marshall Kaplan, *The Politics of Neglect* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975).

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the highest capacities are, not where Congressional pull is greatest; nor can it be distributed in small amounts over hundreds of institutions to answer traditional pork-barrel pressures. In short, administrative research and development must be more insulated from politics, especially from localism.

Our purpose here is not to offer a program for administrative reforms, let alone a full list of those needed, but to advance suggestions that will help administration grow to meet future needs (and grow it will have to, even if the list of government missions is curtailed) rather than cut the list to present or expected administrative capacities.

Knowledge

If consensus, power, and administrative tools were held constant, still another factor—knowledge relevant to policy—would bear on the potential effectiveness of various policies. Unlike many social scientists of other theoretical persuasions, neoconservatives ascribe an important role to knowledge in the success or failure of social policy. According to Daniel Bell, the knowledge-power of advanced science and technology, rather than the sheer muscle-power of industrial machinery, is a major feature of the postindustrial era.[53] However, in considering our collective efforts to overcome social problems, neoconservatives emphasize not our increasing knowledge but our comparative lack of knowledge which leads to overload.

Robert Nisbet lays much of the blame for the failures of the Great Society on the doorsteps of social scientists who "oversold" their data, their theories, and their overall capacity to come up with valid programs. Social science, as Nisbet sees it, is still too undeveloped to be of much practical use; social scientists should retire to the Ivory Tower for a good deal more basic research before they again venture to formulate policy.[54]

The main alternative view is to see the availability of policy-relevant knowledge as a continuum from greater to lesser deficiencies, and rank social policy areas by the degree to which lack of knowledge constitutes a principle barrier to effective action. To illustrate: the means by which violent crime, and especially the incidence of death or serious injury caused by violent crime, can be significantly reduced are basically known. Research strongly suggests that domestic disarmament (not merely gun control), freeing of police and courts through decriminalization of victimless crimes, and increased employment for youth (most violent offenders are youthful) would reduce the incidence of *serious* crime by 40 percent.[55] What is chiefly lacking is not knowledge of how to

[53] Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

[54] Robert Nisbet, "Knowledge Dethroned," *The New York Times Magazine*, September 28, 1975, pp. 34–36, 39, 41, 43, 46.

[55] For additional documentation see Amitai Etzioni, "Public Policy and Curbing Violence," *International Journal of Group Tensions* 3 (September 1973): 76–95.

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go about reducing violent crime, but favorable readings on the other variables—consensus, power, and administration.

In contrast, little is known about how to provide effective mass treatment for alcoholics. It is impossible to keep alcohol out of the hands of alcoholics without taking it away from everyone, and experience suggests that prohibition will not work. Alcoholics Anonymous seems to be effective, but it requires a high, spontaneous level of individual initiative, sustained motivation, and small group integration, which is extremely difficult to mass produce. Here a research breakthrough—perhaps in the biochemistry of addiction—might lead to safe blocking drugs.[56]

Instead of pretending that our ignorance is total, we should recognize that our varying degrees of knowledge can guide our action or inaction. Where good or sufficient knowledge is available, we can proceed with greater assurance. Where it is lacking, there is no reason why, in principle, we cannot evolve it, if we invest in the effort, rather than shy away from policy-relevant research on social issues in favor of space, defense or consumer objects.

It should be noted that the knowledge overload explored here results from the increasing *demand* for more knowledge, not, as is often suggested, from an excessive supply. The unmanageable supply, to which reference is made, for instance, in the often cited OECD report which predicts that "in 1985–87, six or seven times the present volume of new information will be produced"[57] consists primarily of information "bits" rather than of synthesized "knowledge." Masses of research findings, like the millions of pictures of cloud formations provided by weather satellites, are collected and stored but neither processed nor analyzed and hence not usable for policy-making purposes. Moreover, most of the findings are in basic research rather than applied or policy research. Growth in knowledge which policy makers can utilize results *indirectly* from developments in basic social research. Just as ream upon ream of basic research studies in chemistry and physiology do not provide medical treatments, so Parsonian sociology and econometrics by themselves do not offer solutions to social problems. Hence, the experience of a knowledge glut among basic knowledge makers and a dearth among policy makers is valid for both and not a contradiction in terms.

To link knowledge production more closely to the needs of societal guidance so as to increase the society's capacities, a number of steps might be undertaken, aside from increasing the investment in the production of relevant knowledge. These include:

—make a somewhat greater investment in applied, policy research than in basic research;

[56] Amitai Etzioni and Richard Remp, *Technological Shortcuts to Social Change* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973).

[57] Georges Anderla, *Information in 1985* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1973).

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—increase efforts to develop cross-disciplinary, "synthesized," policy-oriented (as opposed to abstract analytic) knowledge;
—revise the ratio of data collection to data processing in favor of greater attention to processing (that is, the aggregation, analysis and interpretation of data);
—evaluate knowledge makers who seek to serve as advisors to policy makers or to influence the policy making process not according to their academic credentials, or their reputation in the media, but according to their records as advisers;
—augment mechanisms that assure knowledge pluralism so that no one expert or coterie of knowledge makers monopolizes access to policy makers;
—use "data courts" in which controversial issues could be argued out.

In addition, the size and quality of staff attached to policy-making bodies affect their ability to absorb knowledge. This is particularly true in Congress, where committees not infrequently have three or four staff members at most assigned to oversee the activities of huge bureaucracies.

Similarly, there is a need to promote knowledge-making units either within or without the universities, that are predominantly policy-oriented. The linkages between these units and policy-making bodies should assure knowledge makers sufficient independence to examine policy assumptions critically while providing a relationship close enough to foster regular communication and sensitivity to policy makers' constraints and priorities.

Andrew Shonfield points out that one of the great difficulties in planning during the first half of the twentieth century was that many of the tools, especially computers, computer models, and relevant data were lacking. The irony is that people now despair of planning as these tools become available.[58] Similarly, it would be ironic if we were to despair of social reforms for lack of the knowledge needed, just as the point when recent developments are beginning to make it available in at least some fields.

Mono- and Multivariable Reforms

Macrosociologists are keenly aware that society functions as a system, that changes in any element affect the nature and action of the others. Societal guidance incorporates the possibility, though rather limited, of voluntaristic change: a deliberate reconstruction of the system. Recognizing that some linkages within the system are powerful, societal guidance theory nevertheless assumes that the elements are not "locked in" tightly; that there is a measure of play or maneuverability that allows one unit or variable to be modified within the constraints set by the others, even if the others remain basically unchanged;

[58] Andrew Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).

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and that the entire system may be modified by altering simultaneously several, if not all, of its components.

Concretely, this means a double answer to those who argue that power and consensus are so intimately linked that it is impossible to introduce either a minimum national curriculum or to expand public television because power groups favor localism. Some reforms *can* be introduced one by one. Kennedy and Johnson, through the backing they gave the Voting Rights Act, helped launch an effective voter registration drive which in turn increased the political power of blacks and enabled them to mobilize more effectively. So long as each reform is part of a set tied to an overarching concept of transformation rather than an isolated element, taken together they might serve to restructure the societal system. For example, Congress's new budgetary machinery represents one step toward a general increase in its knowledge-processing capacities, which will bring nearer the overall goal of increasing Congressional capacity to shape national policy.

Transformation, or fundamental changes in the system, can be advanced not only through sequential reforms, each one increasing the likelihood that subsequent reforms will be more successful, but also through a multivariable approach. The Civil Rights movement was able to effect a significant change in race relations because its efforts focused not on one of the levers of change but encompassed several. In addition to mobilizing blacks, the movement heightened its political power during its most successful phase by attracting the support of white groups such as, labor unions; through charismatic leaders such as King, through the churches, media coverage, and folksongs. It also launched a campaign to change the national consensus and thereby overcome race prejudice. It sought legal reform, equality of pay, access to desirable jobs, housing, corporate power, all at the same time.

If these points are applied to the issue at hand, deliberate efforts to deal with the total overload could take one of two forms: either we grossly reduce that which we seek to do in general, collectively or through the polity in particular. Or we take action to create greater capacities for consensus building, for conflict resolution, for efficient and effective administration, and for development and assimilation of policy-relevant knowledge—so that the society is better able to accomplish more of the needs it is seeking to serve, though not necessarily all of them. Our choice between the two strategies for coping with the overload, will be influenced by our societal self-image.[59] Since it is one of the principle functions of intellectuals and social scientists to help shape the society's view of itself, the current flowering of neoconservative political and social thought is one factor that will determine which of the two options will be pursued.

The societal self-image neoconservatives offer emphasizes the folly of bound-

[59] Wendell Bell and James A. Mau, "Images of the Future: Theory and Research Strategies," in *The Sociology of the Future*, Wendell Bell and James A. Mau, eds. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1971), pp. 6–44.

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less optimism about government intervention as the agency of deliberate social change. Many of the problems we ask government to solve are, as neoconservatives see it, fundamentally insoluble; at least they will remain so in the foreseeable future. We have overestimated the availability of material resources; we became overconfident of our ability to reshape society and the future through knowledge, planning and organization; and we allowed our desires and wants for "more" to run out of control. The solution is "less of everything"; government should do less, knowledge makers should advise less, interest groups should demand less, and the public as a whole should expect less.

If American society adopts such a societal self-image, the overload will be dealt with chiefly by retrenchment, while whatever opportunities there are for increasing national capacities for collective business will be bypassed, and perhaps not ever perceived. For many already the "can do" climate of the 1960s seems worlds away and to many who disregard how rapidly a societal self-view can change, it appears almost unimaginable that social activism might regain a substantial following in the near future. However, the urge to reform and transform society has been a deep and abiding one in American society; hence, as I see it, the current neoconservative mood is likely to remain with us only long enough to serve as a much needed antidote to the naive—and at the same time arrogant—overconfidence of the 1960s. Out of a synthesis of the optimism of the previous decade and the pessimism of the present one may emerge a more moderate, more realistic approach to deliberate social change that will proceed not by overreaching but by consciously seeking to create societal capacities adequate to the rescaled purposes we can advance.

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Exploring the 1976 Republican Convention: Five Perspectives

INTRODUCTORY NOTE: The set of five articles published here explores various aspects of the 1976 Republican nominating convention. Although some observers predicted that this would be the first multiballot convention since the Democratic convention of 1952, the 1976 Republican convention turned out to be one more in the long line that made its presidential nomination by the end of the first ballot.

Party nominating conventions may have permanently lost the function of actually choosing a presidential nominee and serve now simply to ratify the winner of the primary campaign. Nevertheless, they are still important. This is because conventions have become the sites where what the authors term "legitimation" takes place. Legitimation is the belief among delegates that the procedures and decisions of the convention were fair and proper and that, as a consequence, its selections should be supported in the general election campaign. Also, delegates may draw some satisfaction from certain divisible prizes that are still allocated, such as platform planks that express their policy views, opportunities to hear their leaders, a vice-presidential nominee who is one of their own, and rules changes that they hope will work to their advantage in the future. Even though those prizes may seem pale in comparison with the prize of the presidential nomination, they contribute to the losing delegates' willingness to support the final outcome. Losing delegates are also given an opportunity at the end of the convention to demonstrate their party loyalty by changing their candidate commitments in the name of party unity.

There is another way in which nominating conventions are still important. They are the sites where, through negotiations over votes on rules, platform, and the vice-presidential nominee, the presidential nominee must make concessions acceptable to groups active at the convention. In fact it is at the convention where members of groups seeking to make claims on the nominee may have their maximum bargaining power. The 1976 convention was a site where, for example, Republican conservatives gathered in large numbers and whose negotiations with the nominee were nationally reported on TV and covered by a press corps of 10,000. Both the nominee and conservatives at Kansas City knew that those discontented with Ford could easily voice their discontent to the nation

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simply by calling a press conference. In these ways, then, the convention, though limited to ratification and legitimation, enhanced the ability of groups to bargain with and constrain the nominee, even though he had the nomination secured. And in so doing, they gained a measure of control over the outcome that may have enhanced the group members' willingness to accept it.

The 1976 Republican convention provided a laboratory to the authors for refining their earlier work on the ways in which conventions contribute or fail to contribute to the crucial function of legitimation and to chart whatever other patterns of decision making still do occur. Furthermore, because Republican conventions, unlike Democratic ones, have received little attention in the scholarly literature, their articles provide important base-line data about the presidential nominating process of the Republican party.

Conventions are difficult to study. In order to avoid an interpretation which because it was limited to one kind of analysis did not do justice to the complexity and diversity of the convention, the authors used three different methods of analysis. First, they sent out pre-convention questionnaires which 300 delegates filled out. Second, they conducted interviews at the convention. A research team of twenty-three faculty members, graduate students, and undergraduates talked with 67 percent (300 of 450) of a randomly drawn sample of convention delegates. Finally, they monitored specific events and organizations at the convention. The authors and their associates observed group caucuses and candidate organizations and also followed the process of platform making. They supplemented these focused observations with interviews of group and organization leaders and political analysts.* The articles that follow represent a preliminary assessment of their data. ED.

* The authors wish to express their appreciation to their interviewers who performed with intelligence, tenacity, and enterprise, often under difficult conditions: Jacqueline Ackerman, Lauren Canning, John Casey, Rob Fein, Patricia Hanratty, Robert Kazdin, Bruce Kelley, Marc Levin, Gail Lopata, Stephen Mandel, Mike McGeary, Jack Moisinger, Jared Parker, Robert Price, Gary Robb, Robert Sholl, Robert Weinberg, and Thomas Wolf.

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Party Unity: Appearance and Reality

DENIS G. SULLIVAN

V. O. Key states the standard criteria by which nominating conventions have come to be judged successful. "The convention provides a means for the contending factions and interests within a party to consult and agree upon the terms on which they will work together in the presidential campaign. The resulting concert of interests exerts a formidable power throughout the nation."[1] The "concert of interests" referred to by V. O. Key represents one end of a continuum or dimension that ranges from complete disunity to perfect harmony. There may be various steps or levels between the two extremes, each with its distinctive consequences. For example, the willingness of rival factions to "come together" at the convention—even though the concert of interests is less than complete—may mobilize the support of attentive partisans whose media exposure to convention events often constitutes their first act of participation in the presidential election campaign. The behavior of candidates, party leaders, and their supporters constitutes an important cue to followers outside. Repudiation of the nominee by the losing faction, a divisive floor

[1] V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York, 1964), p. 431. Much of the framework for the analysis in this paper is taken from our other work on conventions. Denis G. Sullivan et al., *Explorations in Convention Decision Making* (San Francisco, 1976); Denis G. Sullivan et al., "Candidate, Caucuses, and Issues: The Democratic Convention, 1976" in *The Impact of the Electoral Process*, ed. Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1977), pp. 81–132; Denis G. Sullivan et al., *The Politics of Representation: The Democratic Convention 1972* (New York, 1974).

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fight over a platform plank, or the early departure of a disaffected segment of the party elite all serve to show those on the outside there is no effective concert of interests. But as long as such disruptive events are avoided, the resulting show of unity—masking an underlying divergence of interests—may lead attentive partisans to commit their energies to the party ticket. Thus a less than fully legitimating convention that manages to create the appearance—if not the reality—of party unity, may perform an important function in mobilizing the support of the losers.

Delegates can register their support for the party nominee in a variety of ways. The first, and perhaps most interesting from a psychological point of view, is the willingness of the losers to support the traditional motion to make the nomination of the winner unanimous. Approximtely two-thirds of the Reagan delegates reported *before* the nomination that they would support such a motion in the name of assorted values—good sportsmanship, party unity, or because such a motion was basically meaningless. Yet when these same delegates were asked in October after the convention whether they had, in fact, supported the motion, the percentage of those who had dropped from two-thirds to one-half. The delegates who failed to carry out their intention were among the most dissatisfied over the nomination of Ford. Evidently they discovered that their commitment to Reagan made them psychologically unable to support Ford. Second, the losing delegates could express their support for the party ticket by not continuing *public* opposition to Ford after his nomination. Although there were a few outbursts of opposition (and early departures) in the immediate postnomination period, almost all the losers had ceased to oppose Ford publicly by the time of his acceptance speech. Finally, there is the acid test of support for the nominee—the willingness to work for his election in the fall campaign. The Reaganites were energetic campaigners with a wealth of experience in local, state, and national campaigning. Yet in October when we asked the Reaganites how willing they were to campaign for Ford-Dole, only 28 percent told us that they had made the election of Ford-Dole a primary campaign goal (compared with more than 50 percent of the Ford delegates). In fact, 40 percent of the Reaganites said they would not lift a finger to help elect the Ford-Dole ticket even though many were planning to be active in behalf of other candidates.

Although these data show that party unity was less than perfect at the end of the convention, they also indicate that for a large segment of the losers, the convention was legitimating. After all, half the Reaganites did join with Ford delegates in making the nomination unanimous, there were no walk-outs or public displays of opposition after the nomination, and 60 percent of the Reaganites reported a willingness to work for the election of Ford-Dole. Although we lack good comparative data, the 1976 Republican convention was probably a more legitimating experience for the losers than was the 1964 Republican or either the 1968 or 1972 Democratic conventions.

The principal factors responsible for the appearance of unity at Kansas City were, in fact, strikingly reminiscent of the accommodation between winners

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and losers at the 1976 Democratic convention. First, the losers at both conventions—Reagan, Udall, Brown, Jackson, and Wallace—gracefully withdrew and counselled support of the party nominee. Second, the winners—Ford and Carter—used the platform to placate the issue interests of the losers. Third, and perhaps a consequence of the second factor, the losers did not attempt to mobilize support for their cause (either winning the nomination or achieving an issue goal) through a floor fight on a platform issue. Thus issue polarization was kept at a moderately low level. Fourth, both winners selected vice-presidential nominees with the hope of increasing their support among the more ideological losers. Finally, the issue purists (Republicans who had supported Goldwater in 1964 and Democrats who had supported McGovern in 1972) were older and a bit more involved in party affairs. These five conditions helped make the convention a site of apparent party unity.

This article will try to account for the ambivalent sense of party unity at Kansas City—the apparent reluctance of Reaganites to continue opposing publicly the party nominee, and the unwillingness, nevertheless, of many of the same people to work for the election of Ford-Dole in the fall. The relevant factors seem to involve the intensity of commitment to the Reagan organization, the nature of the platform and choice of the vice-presidential nominee, the predominance of issue purist styles among the Reaganites, the belief that either Republican candiate would face an uphill battle to win in November, and the relatively strong identifications of Reaganites with the Republican party.

Intensity of Candidate Commitment

We have argued in our studies of Democratic conventions that the growth of national candidate organizations competing for delegate support in the preconvention period makes them the dominant actors at the convention. It is rational, of course, for candidate organizations to control the slating of delegates so that they share common attitudes and an intense commitment to the candidate. The long preconvention campaign can only serve to increase the psychological investment each delegate has in his/her candidate. These facts, we think, make it even more difficult for losers to accept the convention outcome and recommit their energies to the winner.

It is not surprising, then, to discover that most delegates at Kansas City and New York considered their candidate organization identities to be their most important. We found this intensity of candidate organization identification to be even greater at Kansas City than in either of the Democratic nominating conventions we studied in 1972 and 1976. The Democratic party is far more pluralistic (a mixture of different ethnic, class, and racial groups) than the Republican party. Partly as a consequence, identification with nonparty group caucuses (racial, sex, ethnic) had far more legitimacy for Democrats than for Republicans. At the Democratic conventions of 1972 and 1976 group caucuses competed with candidate organizations for the loyalty of delegates. These competing group

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identifications served to limit the penetration of candidate organizations. For the Republicans, on the other hand, the capacity of the candidate organizations to mobilize their followers was limited only by their loyalty to the state delegations. However, for Republicans this turns out to be a more important limitation because of the high value they placed on identification with their state delegation.

Candidate organizational commitments were strengthened at this particular convention by an issue oriented "conservative movement" led by Ronald Reagan fighting an incumbent whose principal resource was his incumbency and control of the party apparatus. The president could argue quite effectively that the convention's choice of Reagan would constitute a repudiation of the party. Thus the symbols of party loyalty were brought into conflict with those of the self-proclaimed conservative movement. As a result, for most conservatives, the expression of a conservative impulse took the form of identification with the Reagan candidate organization. Thus the ideological line-ups were unusually clear. Eighty-five percent of the Ford delegates thought of themselevs as moderates (77 percent) or liberals (8 percent). And 85 percent of the Reaganites identified themselves as conservatives. The linkage between ideology and candidate organization was far stronger in the Republican than in the Democratic convention. This meant that ideology reinforced and intensified identification with the candidate organization.

One might have expected, possibly as a result of Reagan's choice of the liberal Schweiker, or the failure of the Reagan organization to push for a more conservative platform, the emergence of a conservative caucus for the realization of issue goals at the convention and after. Although social group caucuses based on race, sex, or ethnicity are not legitimate at Republican conventions, ideological proclamations are. But the Republican dislike of group caucuses seems to extend to all nonparty groupings, social and ideological. Despite the Reaganites intense commitment to the conservative cause, they did not attempt to form a "conservative caucus" cutting across state delegations and candidate organizations. Perhaps they realized that such an effort could only weaken the Reagan organization. This was true despite the successful effort of North Carolina Senator Jesse C. Helms and his delegation to make the platform more conservative (an effort which was neither aided nor hindered by the Reagan organization). Yet even the most intensely conservative Reagan supporters did not join Helms to make the North Carolina effort a convention-wide one. In fact, most Reaganites must have thought of Helms and his group as part of the Reagan organization. When delegates were asked in October which groups were most influential in shaping the platform, Reaganites chose the Reagan organization over Helms-North Carolina by a ratio of three to one. Thus until the very end, most conservatives continued to rely on the Reagan organization and even assumed it to be active in the achievement of conservative issue goals (the platform) when, in fact, it was not. Conservatives, except possibly the small Helms group, saw no incompatibility between their commitment to the conservative cause and

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their dedication to Reagan. Thus, at least for the Reaganites, ideology continued to reinforce identification with the candidate organization over the course of the convention.

The intensity of commitment to Reagan was also reinforced by the length of time the delegates had been involved in the conservative cause; about one in six Reaganites had become actively interested in Republican politics during the 1964 Goldwater campaign. And more than a few traced their commitment back to a 1964 Reagan TV appeal for funds to help the Goldwater campaign.

Thus far we have identified a number of factors making the identification with the Reagan organization especially intense. The consequences of this intense identification seem to have been twofold. First, most Reaganites were responsive to the reconciliation display by Ford and Reagan at the end of the convention because they still respected and liked Reagan and the organization. This gave the impression of party harmony for the less involved partisans who followed the proceedings on their home TV screens. Second, the intensity of commitment made it difficult for Reaganites to shift their energies from Reagan to Ford-Dole. More than 55 percent of those most ideologically committed to Reagan said in October they were unwilling to work at all for the election of the Ford-Dole ticket.

Party Platform and the Vice-Presidential Nominee

Most Reaganites thought the platform to be of great significance and took seriously the notion that it ought to be forthright and correct on major issues. They did not conceive of the document as an instrument for placating losers, winning votes, and otherwise avoiding controversial issues. Roughly three-quarters of the Reaganites said that if it came to a choice, they would rather have a "correct" platform than party unity. Ford supporters, on the other hand, said just the opposite. A majority (51 percent) said that if necessary, they would sacrifice a correct platform to party unity.

This difference between Ford and Reagan supporters on the nature and function of the platform made it an ideal instrument for promoting party unity. The desire of the Ford delegates for party unity gave the Ford leadership a certain flexibility in adjusting the platform to placate Reaganites who were intensely interested in writing their positions into the platform. Rarely in politics is there such complementarity of interests. As Robert Visser, the Ford campaign's general counsel said after the convention: "Why have another fight? The platform's not important enough. We appeared to lose one to give these people (Reagan's supporters) something." The irony of all this is that the active agent of the conservative platform interest was not the Reagan organization but, rather, the Helms-North Carolina rump group. A majority of Reaganites saw themselves as the most powerful force in shaping the platform. Even 55 percent of the Ford delegates had the same opinion. The general impression of

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Reagan power on the platform would have made it difficult for conservatives, if they had so chosen, to mount much of a floor fight on a minority plank.

As a consequence of a platform to the liking of many conservatives, the level of issue polarization at the convention was kept quite low. Most Reaganites, when asked at the convention about the platform, expressed satisfaction. One Reaganite told our interviewer on Tuesday, the day the platform was being considered: "Yes, I am satisfied with it overall. I stayed up until 2:00 A. M. reading it. We're trying to change the preamble on the foreign policy article . . . I'm disappointed in the support of ERA." A Ford delegate responded the same day to the same question:

> Platforms are not important. Who here can remember the '72 platform? (Have you read it?) I've read a page or two. Probably will read no more. Neither a source of happiness or unhappiness. Just there. As Lincoln said, "World will little note or long remember what happened here today!"

Second prize at a nominating convention is the vice-presidential nomination. Traditionally, the vice-presidential nominee has been chosen in order to unify the party or to help the presidential ticket in a particular geographical area. As we have shown elsewhere, Jimmy Carter's choice of Walter Mondale for the vice presidential nomination did improve Carter's image among liberals. Ford's selection of Robert Dole was designed to do the same among Reagan conservatives. Though there is no evidence that the addition of Dole to the ticket actally helped Ford, it did not hurt him either. Moreover, our data do suggest that had Ford chosen any of the other front runners for the vice-presidential nomination—Connally, Baker, or Richardson—he would have been even less acceptable to the Reaganites.

Predominance of Issue Purists

In our studies of Democratic conventions (1972, 1974, 1976), we examined the effects of political style on acceptance of the convention outcome. The emergence of the conflict between issue-oriented (ideologically pure) and party-oriented activists has been noted by a number of students of political parties.[2]

[2] For other discussions of purism-professionalism see Denis G. Sullivan, "Winners and Losers: The Impact of Power on Purism-Professionalism" in Sullivan, *Politics of Representation;* Denis G. Sullivan, "The Problem of Legitimation" in Sullivan, *Explorations,* pp. 103–105; Sullivan "Candidates, Caucuses, and Issues," in Maisel and Cooper, *Impact of the Electoral Process,* pp. 115–120. The importance of the distinction was first emphasized in James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat: Club Politics in Three Cities* (Chicago, 1962). It was extended by Aaron Wildavsky in his perceptive analysis of 1964 Goldwater delegates, *The Revolt Against the Masses* (New York, 1971), chap. 14. Other important studies using the classification are John W. Soule and James W. Clarke, "Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the 1968 Democratic National Convention," *American Political Science Review* 64 (1970): 888–898; Thomas Roback, "Amateurs and Professionals among 1972 Republic National Convention Delegates" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, La., September 4–8, 1973); and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, *The New Presidential Elite* (New York, 1976), chap. 5.

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TABLE 1

Distribution of Political Styles Among Reagan and Ford Supporters *

	Professional	*Purist*	*Split*
FORD	42% (36)	20% (27)	39% (33)
REAGAN	14% (12)	51% (42)	35% (29)

*This table is based on a representative subsample of Ford and Reagan delegates taken from the entire sample of 300 delegates. Each delegate was asked, if he *had* to choose, which would be more important? Nominating a winner or party unity? A forthright platform correct on major issues or party unity? Purists were those who chose a candidate correct on the issues and a correct platform, moderates chose either party unity or nominating a winner but not both, and professionals were those who chose nominating a winner and party unity. The questions were asked on a mail questionnaire filled out by the delegates before the convention started.

Purists, by definition, pledge themselves to a candidate on the basis of his stand on the issues. Professionals justify their commitments in terms of the candidate's capacity to unify the party and win elections. In determining his/her view of the writing of the platform, the purist arrives at a platform that is correct according to some conception of the public interest or good. For the professional, the platform is correct if it placates the losers without alienating the winners and, at the same time, increases the chances of winning the general election. To put the matter another way, professionals assume that voters know what they want, and that the task of a political party is to put together a candidate and program that will attract a majority of the votes. Purists, on the other hand, tend to look at parties as instruments for the education and leadership of the voters. If the voters supporting their ideas and candidate do not now constitute a majority, the purist reasons, it is only a matter of time and proper leadership before they will. These contrasting views powerfully conditioned the ways in which the delegates at Kansas City responded to the convention.

The conflict between Ford and Reagan in 1976 was, of course, a matter of issue differences. But the conflict also centered on political style and on the fundamental difference among delegates in views of the nature and function of political parties and one's role in them. In the Republican party conflicts rooted in political style reach back to the Einsenhower-Taft struggle in 1952 and the Goldwater-Scranton-Rockefeller-Romney battle in 1964. Many of the delegates at Kansas City in 1976 had gotten their first taste of presidential nomination politics during those struggles. The 1976 convention was, in some ways, a replay of very old themes in presidential nomination politics. Table 1 displays the distribution of political style among Ford and Reagan supporters. The professionals (concentrated principally in the Ford ranks) value a winning candidate over one correct on the issues and party unity over a correct platform. Purists (concentrated principally in the Reagan organization) value a candidate correct on the issues over a winning candidate, and a platform correct on major issues over party unity.

The typical Reagan purist became a party activist during the Eisenhower or

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Goldwater years. If, perchance, his/her activism began while a late teenager, his/her ideological and moralistic approach to party politics was even stronger. In most cases, the delegates who first became involved in those years report that their activity in behalf of the party has been continuous since then. Almost all the Reaganites had been active in local, state, and national party politics for some years before coming to Kansas City.

Although the Reagan purist delegates did consider themselves strong Republicans, this fact was not reflected in their attitudes toward the party. Their essentially reformist orientation toward the Republican party meant that most had either weak positive, or even negative, attitudes toward the party as now constituted. Their weak to negative attitudes toward Ford reflect the fact that he was the head of an unreformed party. The purist Reaganites stood in sharp contrast to the more professional Reagan supporters whose attitudes toward both Ford and the Republican party were positive and strong. Although there is little difference in the intensity of preference for Reagan among purists and professionals, there is a substantial difference in attitudes toward the party and its leader.

Thus the purist Reagan delegates (about 51 percent of all the Reagan supporters), with a moralistic view of politics, weak attitudinal support for the party and its leader, might be expected to view the proceedings at Kansas City with a jaundiced eye. All Reaganites acknowledged the power of incumbency, with its attendant control of the party apparatus. In fact, 65 percent of all Reagan delegates saw the Republican National Committee as either the first or second most powerful group in determining the presidential nominee. This perception was especially pronounced among purist Reaganites. Moreover, this attribution of power to the RNC by the purists was immediately translated into an intense dislike for the committee (in October it registered −1.20 on a scale ranging from −3 to +3) as the following comments from purist Reaganites indicate:

> It was stacked for Ford by the Republican National Committee.
>
> It was stacked . . . and worst of all the people's choice did not win—it was rotten politics all the way. It was a dictatorship, not a republic in action.

The purists, unlike the more moderate and supportive Reagan professionals, felt they had been victimized in an unfair fight. Their affection for the Republican Party, not strong in the first place, declined precipitously from August to October (from +1.43 in August to .51 on a scale ranging from +3 to −3). This was especially significant because an important factor in predicting whether a Reagan delegate would work for Ford-Dole in the fall was his/her affection for the party in October. This decline in affection was clearly traceable to the purist view of the role played by the Republican National Committee in securing the nomination of Ford. Oddly enough, even though affection for Ford increased between August and October, it did not translate at all into a willingness to work for the ticket in the fall election. In sum, for many Reagan purists the

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convention was not a profoundly legitimating experience, and this fact helps explain why many did not recommit themselves to the effort to elect Ford-Dole in the name of party unity.

Expectation of Victory in the General Election

The energy that fuels the process of mutual adjustment and eventual legitimation is the prospect of winning office. When that prospect is poor, the incentive for party unity is weak. It is clear from reading interviews and talking with delegates that they were deeply affected by a Gallup poll showing either Ford or Reagan running 40 percentage points behind Carter. For most delegates, winning in November was a possible but not a practical goal. When we asked delegates whether their man would win in November, the standard reply was a laconic, "I hope so." Delegates were more forceful in answering the question "who would run the best race aguinst Carter?" Reaganites were far more certain in their views than Ford supporters. Almost 80 percent said Reagan would run a lot better than Ford against Carter. Conversely, only 55 percent of the Ford supporters thought Ford would run better than Reagan against Carter. And Ford supporters seemed much more defensive about their candidate. The scenarios Ford delegates constructed for Ford winning the election dwelt on Carter's weaknesses (peaking too early, that he would be cut by the media when they got to know him better, etc.) On the other hand, Reaganites were loquacious and sometimes inspired in constructing elaborate scenarios in which Reagan would emerge triumphant. Invariably, these scenarios focused on Reagan's strengths as a campaigner. He would attract the disaffected Democrats, appeal to Independents, and would decisively defeat Carter in a TV debate. His skill in articulating the issues would win him converts every day. One delegate had already done a state by state analysis:

> I can tell you the states. All west of the Mississippi River, less Hawaii. The Carolinas, the Virginias, Indiana, Pennsylvania and Ohio. Possibly Iowa, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Louisiana, Tennessee, Florida, Vermont, and New Hampshire.

Many Reaganites gave Ford only a slim chance to upset Carter. Their expectation of defeat in November, their relatively weak support for the party, their feelings that they had been victimized all combined to make many Reaganites less than enthusiastic campaigners for Ford in the fall.

Party Loyalty

Even more than the 1976 Democratic Convention (in which 88 percent of the delegates expressed a strong identification with the party), the Republican convention was a gathering of party activists. Almost 95 percent called themselves strong Republicans. In terms of attitudinal attachment to the party, Republicans and Democrats also differed. For the Democrats (at least in 1968, 1972, 1974

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and 1976), newcomers in party activist roles seemed less committed to the party and more prone to be issue purists than their Republican counterparts. The older party activists were no more strongly identified with the party, supportive of it, or less concerned with issues than the relative newcomers. Although we cannot be sure from our data, affection for the party seems somewhat independent of identification with it. The rather high level of party identification meant, for example, that even the most dissatisfied Reaganites were aware of the value of party unity, and the inappropriateness of continued opposition after the nomination. Roughly 60 percent of the Reaganites who said they would join in a motion to make the nomination unanimous justified their behavior by referring to the need for party unity. But still, it must be said that unless the strong identification with party is accompanied by a sense among delegates of the convention as legitimate, or by reasonably supportive attitudes toward the party, identification with party among the losers does not translate into effective campaign work for the nominee.

Conclusions

If one were to place the 1976 Republican convention on a scale of legitimation, it would most likely fall somewhere in the center. Serious opposition to the nomination of Ford had ceased by the time of Ford's acceptance speech. A large number of the losing delegates did pledge themselves to work for Ford.

In fact, the relatively calm endings to both the Democratic and Republican 1976 conventions seem to challenge some of the established wisdom that the frustrated issue purists are more likely to bolt the convention in response to failure. As the evidence accumulates over the years, it seems that issue purists (on the left in the Democratic party and on the right in the Republican) will publicly oppose their party's nominee after the nomination only if he has refused to satisfy their issue interests. The single case in which issue purists repudiated a candidate occurred in 1968 when the Democratic nominee, Hubert Humphrey, refused to compromise on a Vietnam War peace platform plan. In all other cases, the Republican conservatives in 1968 and 1976 as well as the Democratic liberals in 1976, symbolic recognition of purist interests in the platform and vice-presidential selection seemed enough to keep them in the party.

Recent history suggests, then, that the more professional candidate organizations can satisfy the needs of the issue purists without endangering their own base of support. The converse, however, does not seem to be true. The issue purist candidate of the right or left (Goldwater in 1964, or McGovern in 1972) could not have adjusted the platform to placate the more professional moderates without endangering his base of support. Besides, the moderate professionals are not likely to be taken in by such maneuvers because they do not place much value on the platform anyway. They are more likely to look at the constituency of the nominee then at the party platform.

It may be that the 1976 conventions were as legitimating as they appeared

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to be because the issue purist candidates in both parties lost the nomination. If the issue purist candidate had won, the rigidity of the issue purist candidate organization might have forced the professionals to defect (on grounds that might have made them look like issue purists). Indeed, this may have happened in 1964 when many moderate Republicans bolted the Goldwater convention and again in 1972 when some moderate Democrats refused to support McGovern.

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Impressions of Ford and Reagan

ROBERT T. NAKAMURA

Candidate organizations recruit delegates from among a candidate's committed partisans and this determines the distribution of votes in advance of the convention. This means that the function of the convention has shifted from choosing the nominee—through bargaining among uncommitted leaders and delegates—to deciding how to respond to the nominee, mainly through individual psychological adjustments. When a candidate loses, his loyalists have a difficult time adjusting to the winner. Within this new context, the images delegates form of candidates help to determine whether they accept the nominee as legitimate and worthy of their support.

The images and impressions of candidates are simply what individual delegates think to be the personal characteristics of their man and of his opponent. A favorable impression of an opponent makes it easier for a delegate to adjust to that person as the nominee.

The candidates present themselves as they want to be seen by others and, in so doing, provide the raw material out of which delegates fashion their impressions. Erving Goffman distinguishes between how people want to be seen, revealed by how they express or present themselves, and how they actually impress others.[1]

[1] Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.* For a discussion of how Jimmy Carter was viewed by Democratic delegates see Denis G. Sullivan et al., "Candidates, Caucuses and Issues: The Democratic Convention of 1976," in *The Impact of the Electoral Process*, ed. Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper (Beverly Hills, 1977).

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Watching the candidates can tell us much about how they would like to be seen by convention delegates, but it is more difficult to figure out how they actually impress those delegates.

The 1976 Republican convention poses a useful opportunity to study delegate impressions of candidates. In such a contested convention, individual delegates find it useful and relatively easy to sharpen their impressions. Competing candidate organizations provide an abundance of information about contenders—positive about their own and negative about the opposition's. In this way the candidates' strengths and weaknesses are magnified.

This article is divided into four parts: a brief summary of how the candidates wanted to be seen; a discussion of how the delegates reacted to the candidates' competing presentations; how delegates presented themselves; and a comparison of Carter's presentation with those of Ford and Reagan.

How the Candidates Expressed Themselves

The presentation of Gerald Ford emphasized the fact that he was the president. His organization was called the "President Ford Committee," his youth group was named "The Presidentials," and his family's convention week schedule was posted under the heading of "The First Family's Schedule." The expressions given by his campaign were made as consistent as possible with the general theme of incumbency. Signs, bumperstickers, press releases, and other communications simply referred to him as President Ford. His logo was "President Ford" in white letters against a decorous and dignified Yale blue background. The themes of his literature were experience, incumbency, and dignity.

The presentation of Ronald Reagan, on the other hand, emphasized his citizen-politician role, an appeal he had used successfully in his race for governor of California, and in his drive for the nomination. "Citizen" was selected because he wanted to convey that his beliefs were like those of the ordinary, levelheaded citizen arrived at by reflection rather than political calculation. "Politician" referred to his professional skills of persuasion. He could attract supporters through rhetoric, a point emphasized by his organization in scheduling many personal appearances before state delegations. Other details reinforced the citizen-politician message: his convention organization was called "Citizens for Reagan." His youth group members said that they were volunteers, paying their own expenses unlike the Ford youth who received some minimal allotments. They called themselves "Youth for Reagan." While the "Citizens for Reagan" and "President Ford Committee" were equally funded by the government, the Reagan people cultivated the image of less well-financed outsiders. For example, they avoided the ostentatious use of walkie-talkies in the platform committee hearings that became characteristic of the Ford people. Also, the security organization at Reagan headquarters was looser and much less visible than it was at the Ford headquarters. While it is understandable that the personal safety of the president is a high

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priority, Ford security tended to be tight not only about his person, but also around his whole convention operation.

How the Delegates Were Impressed

In such ways and with such images, then, the candidates expressed themselves. How were the delegates impressed by them?[2] Both Ford and Reagan delegates agreed on the main outlines of both Ford's and Reagan's image. Ford was seen as a rather unexciting figure: his campaign abilities were ordinary; his supporters came to him for practical reasons; in short, he was a stalwart. Reagan, on the other hand, was perceived as a rather charismatic figure, a facile speaker whose supporters were excited (and perhaps excitable). He was seen as a person who could start a crusade and recruit crusaders. Supporters of either candidate were not on the whole hostile to the other candidate. Yet delegates did interpret these commonly held perceptions of each candidate in ways which redounded to the credit of their choice and to the detriment of the opposition.

FORD DELEGATES ON FORD

Since Ford and Reagan were in close competition, Ford delegates tried to rationalize apparent Ford disabilities as basic Ford strengths. This was especially true for the rather dramatic contrast in their speaking styles. Ford was conceded by his supporters to be a less persuasive speaker than Reagan:

> He lacks the ability to inspire people. Today we need a leader who can inspire. (A Puerto Rican for Ford.)
>
> I wish he were a little more spectacular campaigner. Not in his nature. (A Hawaiian for Ford.)
>
> I wish he were more forceful and charismatic. (Indianan for Ford.)

Many Ford supporters saw Ford's slower, more hesitant speaking style as a sign of his sincerity. Reagan's apparent smoothness, some said, came from his "handlers" whereas Ford's statements were his own. Others said they actually liked the style:

> [Ford] does not communicate well publicly but privately he does very well. I heard him speak to our delegation at private occasions at the White House and he was very convincing. (Oregonian for Ford.)

[2] The material for this article was drawn from a preliminary examination of responses to questions asked at the 1976 Republican convention. These included questions about what people liked and disliked about their preferred candidates and opponents. Also asked was a series of rating questions, which required delegates to assess the accuracy of a series of words when applied to each candidate. These words, applied to Ford and Reagan, were *persuasive, principled, honest, uncompromising, open, dull, committed.* Finally, I have used open-ended responses contained in preconvention and postconvention mail questionnaires.

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I like his low key, low profile approach to issues and I for one would like to see what he could do on his own. (Marylander for Ford.)

Many delegates stressed the positive aspects of Ford's solidity and seeming ordinariness:

He's solid, not hot air. (West Virginian for Ford.)

He's a solid citizen with the right instincts. (Indianan for Ford.)

Solid in character, not flashy, or phony, he's consistent and predictable. (New Hampshireman for Ford.)

Others stressed the similar theme of Ford as "average" or "middle" American:

All American boy, no pretense, serious. (Minnesotan for Ford.)

Clean cut, wholesome representative of middle America, not an extremist, average American. (Kansan for Ford.)

He's down to earth. (Oregonian for Ford.)

Some extended their perceptions of Ford to themselves and the convention struggle: "I think from personal observations the people supporting Reagan are more vocal, but those for Ford are not making a clamor; the silent majority." In short, Ford was seen by his supporters as the stalwart candidate. This impression was reinforced by the support Ford drew from the regular Republicans.

Naturally the fact of Ford's incumbency colored the responses of his supporters. When we asked Ford supporters what they liked about their man, most stressed his job as president: rehabilitating the presidency after Watergate, vetoes used to stop the "excesses" of the Democratic Congress, and his general openness in office. Some even used incumbency to explain the tenuousness of Ford's hold on the nomination. They adopted the President Ford Committee's reasoning that the time demands of the presidency had restrained their campaign: "Ford didn't put enough time into the campaign. Reagan had lots of time." (A New Yorker for Ford.) Extending this logic, the chairman of the New York delegation refused to let Reagan appear before the delegation because Ford (who was in Kansas City) would be too busy being president to make a similar visit. Predictably, many delegates said they thought that Ford had a better chance than Reagan because he was the incumbent president.

REAGANITES ON FORD

Most Reaganites, responding to our questions about what they liked or disliked about Ford, were positive in their assessments of him as a person but not as a leader. One typical response came from this Massachusetts Reaganite: "[Ford is] honest, viscerally conservative, not a dislikable man, can't help his weakness." The theme of a basically conservative but weak man being used by his advisors came up repeatedly in a variety of contexts. Some conservatives saw him as a puppet of liberal advisors:

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> If I were a political cartoonist, I would draw a two-headed Edgar Bergen with Kissinger and Rockefeller as the heads, and Ford as Charlie McCarthy. (A Georgian woman for Reagan.)
>
> I dislike Mr. Ford for being controlled by Kissinger, should be the reverse. Strongly opposed to Nelson Rockefeller (too). Helsinki agreement intolerable—that a Republican president voted people into absolute slavery. (A Californian for Reagan.)

This perception was particularly common among conservatives who objected to what they perceived to be Kissinger's insufficiently anticommunist foreign and defense policies. But the importance of advisors cropped up in other places as well, including this response to the Ford administration's capacity to work with women: "He can't even stand up to his wife!" A frequent theme, then, in Reagan delegates' perceptions of Ford is that of a basically good person caught out of his depth and consequently dependent upon bad advisors.

The theme of weakness extended to Reaganites' estimates of Ford as a candidate. Ford, they believed, would be a weak nominee. On the night of the nomination, during Ford's peacemaking visit to the Reagan hotel, Reagan youths taunted him by citing Ford's poor election prospects in their chant: "four more months."

While unflattering, Reaganites' impression of Ford's weaknesses may not have been without its advantages for the President. These supposed weaknesses could be interpreted by the Reagan delegates as resources for themselves. Ford, as a weak nominee, might be forced to rely heavily on the proved campaign effectiveness of the Reagan wing. The price they would extract for their help would be adherence to the conservative platform. Reagan himself made this position quite clear during the subsequent campaign, this reasoning fit into his followers' impressions of Ford.

REAGANITES ON REAGAN

The themes stressed by Reagan delegates about their man were his "charisma" and his issue-oriented style. They made frequent references to their deep personal attachment to his candidacy; Reagan clearly excited them. Many referred to the obvious differences between Reagan and Ford as campaigners, usually pointing out that Reagan's style was far more electrifying.

As insurgents against the incumbent president, Reaganites were primarily drawn from the ranks of conservative issue purists. Not surprisingly, then, many stressed Reagan's positions:

> Terrific depth of knowledge—well articulated political philosophy. Any future problem can be predicted by his philosophy of decision making. (Louisianan for Reagan.)
>
> Reagan's conservatism, his platform, every stand he has come out for: abortion, gun control, balanced budget. (Illinois man for Reagan.)

While Reagan's philosophy appealed to them, his attraction ran deeper than ideological affinity. His supporters believed that Reagan was a conservative who

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could win the election because of his persuasiveness. This comment was typical of many:

> [He has the] ability to reach people; the ability to convince others of his desire and to implement his ideals of conservatism. (An uncommitted Kentuckian who came to Reagan.)

Reaganites considered him to be the most appealing candidate, and they saw themselves as more committed to their candidate than the Ford people were to theirs. The spirit of the Reagan people, seen as fanaticism by some Ford supporters, found expression in their convention hall demonstrations.

The Reagan delegates, unlike those supporting Ford, had to meet two direct challenges to their beliefs. First, Reagan's choice of Schweiker as a running mate challenged their vision of Reagan as the principled, pure conservative candidate. Second, Ford's convention strength (after the test on rule 16C) had to be reconciled with their belief that Reagan was the true choice of the Republican party.

The Schweiker choice was a potential weak spot, many Reaganites expressed dissatisfaction with his liberalism. Yet many found ways of establishing distance between Reagan and his action. Some found a scapegoat in his campaign:

> . . . his campaign strategists—especially John B. Sears—who all along the line right up to the Convention made the wrong decisions (referring to Schweiker and 16-C). (A Californian for Reagan.)

Another delegate distinguished between "minor things not dealing with principles, like Schweiker" and matters of philosophy. Reagan himself, according to Gary Wills, maintained some distance from his own running mate by consistently mispronouncing his name. While many Ford delegates chided the Reaganites about Schweiker, the depth of the Reaganites commitments held them to their man.

Reaganites also had to deal with the challenge to their belief that Reagan was the true choice of the party. Some reacted to Ford's superior delegate strength by arguing that "political reasons" prevented delegates who really wanted Reagan from voting for him. Another popular explanation was that the rules of the convention had been stacked against their candidate by the Ford organization and the Republican National Committee. Here is an example of this sentiment: "The tactics used by the people in power—the Republican National Committee—were ruthless, cold blooded and bordering on the fringe of being unethical." Such ways of reducing dissonance had implications for the ways Reagan delegates, who used them, viewed the legitimacy of Ford's nomination.

Ford Delegates On Reagan

Most Ford supporters felt little animosity toward Reagan as a person. Favorable mentions were made of Reagan's record as governor of California, his conservatism, but most of all of his abilities as a candidate. Even Ford's own supporters

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often contrasted Reagan's ability to speak well and to excite his followers with Ford's style. [Ford] "not full of charisma. Reagan a tremendous campaigner, good speaker, has charisma." (Ford delegate from Florida.) Many Ford people rated Reagan as the more effective spokesman for their issue positions. While Ford delegates conceded these abilities to Reagan, they often interpreted them in critical ways:

> [Reagan] a very attractive candidate—physically.
>
> Reagan is an actor. (New York Ford supporter.)
>
> Comes across well on TV—a good con artist—good looks, but he's crazy. (A Republican Congressman.)
>
> [Reagan] excellent speaker, but I don't like his thinking. (West Virginia official for Ford.)
>
> Slick, to the point of being oily. (An Illinois Ford delegate.)

One particularly hostile Ford delegate took the position that Reagan was really a dull speaker because of his smooth delivery: "He reads the same [expletive deleted] speech every time with different titles. Deadly dull!"

Ford and Reagan supporters saw both candidates as having virtues in different ways, but saw their own candidate as more virtuous. Preferences in some cases were determined by the fit between how delegates thought of themselves and how they saw the candidates. Thus Ford party regulars valued Ford's long service and respected his leadership position in the party. The Reagan issue purists, weakly attached to party and strongly attached to their ideologies, valued Reagan's anti-professional stance and his conservatism. Thus for Ford regulars and Reagan issue purists impressions of the candidates were reinforced by the delegate's conception of his/her own political role.

CARTER, REAGAN, AND FORD

In terms of the presentations of the candidates, the Republican and Democratic conventions are not directly comparable within the scope of this article. In the Republican convention, differences between the parties were less important in shaping candidate presentations than the certainty and uncertainty of the nomination outcomes. Jimmy Carter was certain of winning the Democratic nomination, while the Republican outcome was uncertain until the initial balloting. The problem for Carter and the Democrats was one of reconciliation and the promotion of unity. Ford and Reagan, who were nearly equal in strength, had the problem of gaining additional votes without losing the ones they already had. The management of delegate impressions was part of the solution for convention problems, but impressions were shaped in response to different needs.

The Carter organization managed their presentation to contribute to party unity. Different facets of Carter were shown to different audiences—caucuses, supporters of failed candidates, his own loyalists—in hopes that each would see

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in Carter something of themselves. In making these presentations the Carter people did not have to consider the response of an organized and effective opposition. Delegates, for their part, had a number of incentives to manage their own impressions in ways favorable to the probable nominee and leader in preelection polls.

The presentations of Ford and Reagan were conditioned by the struggle over the nomination. Thus as we have seen, Ford's and Reagan's contrasting presentations heightened cleavages among delegates for whom the candidates symbolized differences in style, commitment, issue positions. A certain symmetry emerges out of the impressions of Reagan and Ford delegates, the same characteristics are interpreted differently. What is seen as a virtue by one side is seen as a fault by the other. Ford's solidity becomes dullness, his responsiveness to party becomes a sign of weakness and lack of commitment. Reagan's charisma becomes demogoguery, his firmness a sign of fanaticism. Reinforcing these impressions of the candidates are the delegates' impressions of themselves and their counterparts. The Ford people see themselves as regulars, the Reaganites see them as hacks. Reaganites saw themselves as principled, the Ford people saw them as fanatics. Each candidate. and each candidate's supporters, expressed themselves in ways that worked to reinforce one another's stereotypes in this divided convention.

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Writing the Republican Platform

MARTHA WAGNER WEINBERG

The Preamble of the 1976 Republican platform begins: "You are about to read the 1976 Republican platform. We hope you will also find time to read the Democratic platform. Compare. You will see basic differences in how the two parties propose to represent you." Comparison of the two platforms yields interesting evidence of the differences between the two major political parties. Though party platforms seldom deal explicitly or in great detail with some of the more salient issues facing the American electorate, they do often point up basic philosophical and ideological differences between the parties. In addition, studying the process by which the parties arrive at their platforms often provides keys to understanding the parties themselves—their composition, their rules and norms, and their leadership and leadership strategies.

The differences between the Democratic and Republican platform-writing processes were pronounced in 1976. Some of those differences reflected events peculiar to that particular election year. For example, by the time the Democrats held their convention, Jimmy Carter had the Democratic presidential nomination locked up. In contrast, the Republican nomination was still closely contested when the Republicans held their convention in August. As a result, it was a clear possibility that the platform might become a battleground between President Ford and Governor Reagan, two candidates of somewhat different ideological bent. At the same time, since it was not clear which candidate would be the nominee, neither candidate's organization wanted to go far out on a limb to battle for specific issues in the platform at the risk of alienating the party or the electorate.

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But the differences in Democratic and Republican platform-writing illustrate some of the basic contrasts between the two parties, both in make-up and in philosophy. The Republicans, for example, tended in 1976 toward a uniform conservatism, and were far more homogeneous than the Democrats. Perhaps because of this relative homogeneity, the Republicans have no tradition similar to the Democrats' of using the platform-writing process as an occasion for pork barrel bargaining over the conflicting demands of diverse groups.[1]

Though organized groups took a hand in drafting the Republican platform, for the most part they were temporary, ad hoc associations, less likely than similar groups among the Democrats to rest on a permanent base of support within the party. There were other differences, too. No group came to the convention armed with a preconceived strategy for capturing or controlling the platform-writing process. Instead of lobbying delegates or relying on hearings, Republican groups with particular interests at stake tried to influence the staff who wrote the most technical sections of the platform. Those, of course, were the sections that the delegates who sat on the Resolutions Committee had the least time and competence to consider.

The Platform-Writing Process

The job of putting together the Republican platform began in earnest in June 1976, slightly less than two months before the convention. Although Governor Robert Ray of Iowa had been selected in April to chair the Committee on Resolutions—the groups of delegates who are responsible for writing the platform—he did not began work until June, when the Platform Committee held regional hearings in Washington, Los Angeles and Ames, Iowa. No full time staff began work on the platform until July 1, when John Bibby of Wisconsin was hired as the staff director. In contrast, the Democrats in 1976 had had a large full time staff working on their platform for six months before their convention.

The Democrats had also given a great deal of publicity to their preconvention hearings and had consulted many constituencies and groups in the party, urging them to testify and to submit statements about what they wanted in the platform. The Republicans made no similar effort to canvass groups and to sound them out on their preferences. As one member of the Resolutions Committee staff put it when questioned:

> That's not the way Republicans handle platforms. We don't have obvious groups whom we have to consult. We didn't invite people to the hearings because that gives you the problem of who to invite and who not to invite. Why should we get into that?

Fifty staff members, almost all of whom held other full time jobs, drew up pre-

[1] For a discussion of the 1976 Democratic platform see Denis G. Sullivan et al. "Candidates, Caucuses and Issues: The Democratic Convention, 1976" in *The Impact of the Electoral Process*, ed. Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper (Beverly Hills, 1977).

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liminary drafts of proposals for each subcommittee. Many of them were members of minority staffs of Congress. They provided information and suggestions to the two principle drafters of the initial version of the platform, John Meagher the minority counsel of the House Ways and Means Committee, and Stephen Hess of The Brookings Institution.

The draft that Meagher and Hess prepared by August 1 was the product of a process not subject to a great deal of scrutiny or pressure from outside the staff. Meagher described how he wrote the draft:

> What I did for three months was to collect material, most often from my fellow minority members in Congress. I didn't get much from the Executive Branch—they're "Hatched" (covered by the Hatch Act, which prohibits partisan political activity by government employees), and besides, we didn't want this to appear to be an inside-the-White House job like the Nixon draft of 1972. I made basic decisions about how to hold the platform right down the middle between the two candidates. Governor Ray said that I should show it to no one, and I didn't.

The Democrats in drawing up their platform had engaged in extensive negotiations with various groups over substance and language. No similar negotiations occurred among the Republicans in the drafting stages. The chairmen and cochairmen of the Resolutions subcommittees, appointed by Governor Ray, were not given any indication of the contents of the draft until they met in Washington, only ten days before the full Resolutions Committee was scheduled to convene in Kansas City to consider the document. Though they were allowed to recommend changes in the drafts, the chairmen and cochairmen of subcommittees were not permitted to have copies of the documents.

The secrecy with which this process was carried out angered many of the platform committee members and led some of them to charge that the draft was a Ford document, to which members of the Reagan camp and those who differed with the president had not had access. Thomas Curtis, a member of the Resolutions Committee pledged to Reagan and a committee cochairman, criticized the closed nature of the process:

> I had seen draft position papers in Washington but when I got to Kansas City and asked for the drafts and the changes I was told there were no such things. Yet when we first met, there was a forty page one on foreign policy, all indexed. I asked for a copy and Ray said no one could have a copy.

Like the subcommittee chairmen and cochairmen, the 106 delegates who were members of the Resolutions Committee had not seen any preliminary drafts of the platform when they arrived in Kansas City on August 8 to begin their week long effort to write a platform. Nor had they received any information about the process in which they were about to participate. Many of the members had not been selected until mid-July and consequently had had little opportunity to familiarize themselves with the issues with which the Resolutions Committee would be dealing or to find out which other delegates shared their views. As one committee member described the process:

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> I'd received no information about what I would be doing. I think I got a one page sheet from the committee staff telling us when meetings would start. But nothing of substance. We hadn't even seen summaries of the regional hearings. We'd had no meetings before. I think most of the delegates were like me—new at the job, with no sense of who we were supposed to turn to for advice or what we were supposed to do.

There was almost no organized communication among members of the Platform Committee before they arrived in Kansas City. The one exception to this seems to have resulted from a meeting of about forty conservative Platform Committee members held in Atlanta on July 24. The meeting was chaired by Tom Ellis, the chairman of the North Carolina delegation. Though Ellis himself was not a member of the Platform Committee, he and Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina had called the meeting to try to plan a way to make a conservative presence felt at the convention. Although many of the delegates who attended were committed to Ronald Reagan and although Lyn Nofziger, an influential member of the Reagan staff was present, the meeting was not the inspiration of or controlled by the Reagan staff. Indeed, two days after the meeting, Reagan announced his intention to select Richard Schweiker as his running mate, and from that time until early in the convention week there was almost no contact between the ad hoc conservative group and the Reagan campaign staff.

Though the conservatives did not come out of the Atlanta meeting with a concerted strategy for influencing the platform or the convention, they did discuss issues on which they had similar views and formed a loose alliance which became the basis for the most influential organized group represented throughout the platform deliberations. Thomas Curtis became the informal leader of the group on the platform committee, largely because as he put it, "we had a group of people who weren't too organized and who were looking for a leader." In addition to Curtis, the group included John East of North Carolina, Charles Coy of Kentucky, Ray Barnhart, the chairman of the Texas delegation, Governor James Edwards of South Carolina, and Sam Tate, the chairman of the Georgia delegation.

The Platform Committee held its first meeting on August 8. Many of the members of the committee, especially that majority who were not elected officials, were not certain about how they were supposed to proceed. Only six of the 106 delegates had ever served on a platform committee before. Many of the delegates were angry that they had not seen drafts of the document on which they were to meet. As a result, they agreed to suggestions put forward by the conservatives that they depose one pro-Ford subcommittee chairman (Silvio Conte of Massachusetts) and have the full committee vote on all subcommittee chairmen. More important, they decided to ignore staff drafts of the platform and to write new drafts in subcommittees. As one delegate put it when asked if his subcommittee had made changes in the original draft: "That's not the correct way of putting it. We ripped up the first draft and then the subcommittee did our own."

During the week before the convention the platform committee met every day to work on the document. All meetings of the full committee and subcommittee

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were public. The decision to open up the process had been made by Governor Ray, who hoped to dispel any notions that the platform was a Ford White House draft rather than the result of the deliberations of the committee members. Sessions of the full committee were held in the mornings to hear testimony. Most of this testimony was from high government officials, although anyone was welcome to testify. Subcommittee meetings began after a brief break for lunch and often ran until late in the evening. Because the subcommittees were in most cases writing their part of the document from scratch, the process of pulling together a subcommittee report was often a confusing one. Since delegates had not received any information about the issues that they would be discussing and since they were not assigned to subcommittees until they arrived in Kansas City, they had little chance to draw together their own resources for analyzing the problems with which they were dealing. The result was what one delegate, Representative Millicent Fenwick, described as "spontaneous chaos."

Despite the problems of writing full reports in subcommittees, in most cases the members of the platform committee neither divided neatly into candidate camps, nor turned to staffs of candidate organizations for leadership. Though each candidate had staff representatives present at the hearings, these representatives confined their activity to providing technical advice to those delegates who asked for it. At the beginning of the week representatives from the President Ford Committee directed by William Timmons appeared at the meetings with walkie-talkies to help them monitor the hearings. This practice was discontinued, however, when several of the delegates complained that monitoring their activities this closely smacked of a "Watergate mentality."

Like their counterparts on the Ford campaign staff, Reagan operatives did not make any attempt to control the platform-writing process. There is no evidence to indicate that even if they had tried, they would have been able to do so. The members of the committee seemed to take pride in the fact that, as Representative Barber Conable of New York put it, "nobody dictated this platform." But the commitment of many of the members of the committee to making up their own minds on issues did not alleviate their difficulty in dealing in a short time with a large number of complicated questions about which they had limited information. On many highly technical issues, the members were forced to fall back on the original draft or on the testimony prepared by knowledgeable interest groups. One delegate put it this way:

> In evaluating issue positions I tried to think through what I knew, to listen carefully to all testimony and to my fellow committee members. But I must confess that on many technical issues like oil company divestiture I would have been at a loss to know what kinds of questions to ask, even if someone had prefaced his statement by saying that "the moon is blue."

The most controversial issues of the week long session emerged from the subcommittees on foreign policy and on human rights. The disagreements over foreign policy focused principally on the strength of language used in the planks, but

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did not reflect a neat split between the Ford and Reagan camps. Instead, the committee more frequently divided among the strongly ideological conservatives, who wanted the toughest possible language, the Reagan supporters who were willing to accept some modification but who still wanted to incorporate Reagan's positions, and the Ford partisans who did not want to take extreme stands but who also did not want to embroil themselves in fights. The result was that no single position won consistently. The language of the Panama Canal plank was toned down to read that the 1903 treaty with Panama gave the United States rights to the Canal Zone "as if it were the sovereign," language disappointing to the Reaganites and conservatives, who wanted a stronger expression of United States sovereignty. At the same time the Ford delegates agreed to accept Reagan language supporting Taiwan and calling for a "superior national defense."

The only issue on which the Ford campaign staff and leadership went to battle was the Equal Rights Amendment. The subcommittee on Human Rights voted 8–7 to delete all mention of the ERA from the platform. Ford publicly called for a reversal and the full committee voted 51–47 to call for the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment in the platform.

Although the nomination was closely contested until the second full day of the convention, and although there were individuals with strong ideological commitments on the Platform Committee, the meetings of the committee did not become battlegrounds. The Monday that the convention opened was the deadline for filing minority reports of the committee, to be voted on by the whole convention. Only two proposals were filed. The first of these was the "morality in foreign policy" amendment supported by the conservatives and drafted by the Reagan staff. Although it mentioned the Helsinki agreement and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, two red flags for the Ford forces, this amendment passed on a full vote of the convention on August 17. The other amendment, a proposal to delete all mention of abortion from the platform, failed.

The Process Worked Out

Though characterized by spirited debate, the platform deliberations did not end in disunity or with delegates or members of the Resolutions Committee bitter or alienated from the process. The committee was almost evenly divided between Ford and Reagan delegates, yet there were no clear losers or winners among those who participated. Several factors help explain why this was true.

As a homogeneous party, the Republicans have traditionally regarded members of the Resolutions Committee not as the representatives of outside interests, but as individuals who require only brief deliberations to reach agreement. It is not considered their primary business to dicker for the satisfaction of particular constituencies. Consequently, it is hard to imagine Republicans exhibiting the same bitterness and contentiousness that divided the Democrats after their struggle over the platform in 1972. As representatives of permanent organizations and

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constituencies, Democratic delegates had to report their failures, not merely their successes.

This is not to suggest that specific group demands are not heard in the Republican Party. It suggests, rather, that they are incorporated into the Republican platform at a different stage than they are in the Democratic platform. Because of the short time allowed in the Republican platform-writing process for deliberation on the issues and because of their complexity, group interests, especially those of well-organized groups with access to the party, tend to get their views written into the platform either in an early nonpublic draft or as a result of testimony. Even the document itself reflects this. As one staff member described it: "In the preamble we try to make it a document of the people. But we don't spend too much time on doing this throughout because nobody reads platforms anyway. The specific sections are the ones read by interest groups, often written by interest groups, and of most concern to them."

A second major reason for the lack of prolonged and intense conflict is that no one in the Republican party—the RNC, the staff of the committee, or the two candidate organizations—tried to control the process. The strategy of the Ford organization, with exception of the issue of the ERA, was to stand still and absorb whatever the delegates decided was appropriate, and not to engage in unnecessary, divisive battles. As one Reagan aide put it, "the Ford strategy was like that of Chiang retreating from the Japanese army. We call it The Great Wall of Fluff." The Reagan organization was similarly unwilling to pursue issues to their ultimate extreme. They had a campaign to run, delegates to win, and, as one said, "saw no point in going for 100 percent when we had already achieved 95 percent."

A third major factor that helps to explain the Republican behavior is that the platform which emerged was a fairly conservative document, quite representative of the conservative leanings of convention delegates.[2] Though there were skirmishes over wording and strength of language, there was agreement among members on the basic philosophy of the document. As John East, one of the leaders of the conservatives observed: "The majority of the people on the committee basically agreed. We didn't want to look like rag-tag crazies who didn't deserve anyone's confidence. Therefore we had to listen carefully to the Ford and Reagan people as well as to the very conservative, and they had to listen to us."

Because the platform was essentially a consistent document, more conservative than the Ford supporters would have written, but basically acceptable to the party as a whole, it helped to unify the party by providing the Reagan delegates and other conservatives with a consolation prize. In his speech after losing his fight for

[2] According to Washington Post survey of delegates to the 1976 Republican convention, 62 percent identified themselves as "conservative," an increase of 10 percent over the number of delegates who identified themselves as liberals, half of the 12 percent who had so labeled themselves in 1972. This sample, with its comparative data for 1972 was quoted by *Human Events, the National Conservative Weekly*, August 28, 1976, p. 3.

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the nomination, Reagan described it as the most important result of the convention, "a banner of bold unmistakable colors with no pale pastel shades."

Finally, to understand the platform and what it signified for the party, it is important to look at the delegates who sat on the Resolutions Committee and to understand what they thought they could and should do. Many of them felt that they were operating as a grass roots group, and that they were beholden to no one. Delegate Joan Lipsky of Iowa, in describing the importance to her of making up her own mind said, "the Ford-Reagan people may only understand the platform as a Ford-Reagan split, but the delegates don't see it that way at all. They have strong feelings on lots of specific issues, and they're not about to let other people make up their minds for them." Another delegate put it this way: "I was sent here to put together a document, to vote my conscience, and that's what I'm going to do."

The candidate organizations and the staff recognized this trait as well. One Reagan aide described the delegates as "stubborn cusses—you don't try to push them around." One of the leaders of the conservatives echoed this sentiment: "The Resolutions Committee is not a platoon of soldiers. They should be allowed to talk and think, not just be led around." And a staff member of the committee commented:

> These people aren't like the Democrats, you know. They're not manipulable by outside groups. They can only be elected to the platform committee after they've become delegates. They're made delegates because they're good Republicans—and good Republicans don't get famous for being able to be pushed around.

Finally, one can argue that the process by which the Republican platform is put together is not as susceptible to expression of group interests shared by members of the committee as that of the Democrats. In 1976, members of the Resolutions Committee had no access to the staff draft or to any advance information. They met formally for only a week. Most members of the committee did not know each other at the beginning of the process. One delegate, despairing of her ability to push on several issues about which she felt strongly, lamented: "So when was I supposed to rally everybody around the case? Between 2 a.m. and 5 a.m.?"

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Strategies and Tactics of Candidate Organizations

F. CHRISTOPHER ARTERTON

The 1976 Republican Convention, like its Democratic counterpart, confirmed the growing force of candidate organizations in national party politics and the consequent decline of traditional party groupings—state delegations and party regulars. It is the purpose of this article to describe the nature of candidate organizations as convention participants and to show how they have altered the strategic environment. The paper concludes with some observations on the future of a nominating process dominated by candidate organizations.

Candidate Organizations: Ford's Tactical Advantage

In 1976 the Reagan and Ford organizations sought to extend their influence into every sphere of delegate activity. Campaign operatives maneuvered to structure the preconvention debates on party rules and platform resolutions, having given considerable thought in advance to the mechanics that would enable them to do so. The political movements of state delegations were meticulously charted by "delegate monitors" before they arrived in Kansas City. Information on the opinions and personal history of each delegate was obtained and elaborate communication systems were designed to keep track of delegates at the convention, both on the convention floor and at the hotels.

Practically, these organizational measures provided the means by which campaigns could observe actual delegate behavior and thus check to see whether bargains had been kept. At times, even the physical movements of delegates became a concern. Wherever possible the Reagan and Ford organizations penetrated or

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subsumed other organizational competitors: state delegations, the Republican National Committee (RNC), delegate groups (such as women and blacks) and other interest groups. Thus candidate organization "coordination" devices became instruments of surveillance and control.

The Reagan campaign involved the least degree of formal articulated hierarchy. Its leaders assumed that their delegates could be counted on to vote in Reagan's interest without a great deal of monitoring. "Our conservatives don't like to be told what to do, and they don't need to be. The Ford people need all that hardware because they can't count on their delegates to vote with them consistently," stated Loren Smith, the campaign's general counsel.[1]

Thus, relying more on purism and candidate commitment to mobilize their votes, the Reagan campaign strategy of coordinating votes on preconvention committees, on the convention floor, and in delegation meetings was to designate a few individuals to speak authoritatively for the Reagan position. Once they made clear what was in the best interests of Ronald Reagan, the campaign leadership assumed their delegates would follow without too much buttonholing and cajoling.

The campaign's high degree of personalism dictated an important organizational strategy. Throughout the primary campaign and postprimary hunt for delegates, both campaigns were organized by region. But coordination of delegates on the convention floor posed a separate problem since the seating of delegations was not according to geography. Andy Carter, chief of the Reagan floor operations, expressed their problem as follows:

> You've got a real dilemma. You can divide the floor into quadrants, and then you don't have the problem of getting around in a crowded hall. But, you take away those who have been working with the people in those states, and you put others in there. It might not work as well; they don't know each other. So basically, we kept the geographical breakdown.

At crucial moments, however, as when the Mississippi delegation decided to caucus on the convention floor just before the critical test vote, the Reagan campaign was handicapped by key coordinators having to fight their way through jammed aisles while attempting to coordinate delegations at different ends of the hall.

The President Ford Committee (PFC) had a highly developed communications system. Instead of relying totally on leaders of geographical areas left from the preconvention delegate monitoring operation, the PFC added an overlapping organization for floor and committee operation.

The Convention floor was divided into zones each coordinated by a floor leader wearing a red hat for easy visual identification. In communicating upward, each floor leader had phones tied to the Ford trailer. The chain reached downward into the delegations through assistants responsible for the states in their zone. These

[1] Personal interview with Loren Smith, August 15, 1976. Unless otherwise noted, quotations in this article are drawn from personal interviews conducted in Kansas City, August 14–20, 1976.

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assistants could communicate either with the Ford leader in their states or with designated coordinators ("whips") of four to eight delegates. Thus, wavering delegates might be contacted by one of three separate means: by the operatives from the primary floor structure of zones, by a designated Ford "delegation monitor," coordinated by phone on the old geographical desk system, or, by a backup system of eight "floaters" roving the floor, wearing yellow hats, and using walkie-talkies to connect them with the trailer. The Ford committee went so far in their preparations as to have repairmen standing by to replace sabotaged phonelines.

The convention apparatus, or "implementation operation" as PFC operatives called it, was coordinated by William Timmons in the Ford trailer. So far as possible, strategic decisions were made in advance by a committee of twelve. But for important questions encountered while the convention was in progress—as, for example, what to do about a major Reagan challenge on the platform—Timmons was in touch with the key Ford decision-makers in a "sky box" overlooking the convention floor and in the presidential suite at the Ford hotel.

From a technical or mechanical standpoint the PFC simply outorganized the Reagan campaign. It is not ascertainable, of course, whether the imbalance in organizational readiness made any difference to the outcome. Though the Reagan organization was efficient in organizing committed delegates, at the margins (that is, in reaching uncommitted delegates at crucial junctures), it may well have been at a disadvantage. Reagan's convention manager, Lyn Nofziger, analyzed their loss by saying "they [the Ford committee] had no strategy. They had no finesse. They just flat outmuscled us."

Strong national candidate organizations, aided by communications technology, have reshaped the pattern of bargaining evident at nominating conventions. Instead of being a transaction between hierarchically controlled state delegations, bargaining is now dominated by candidate organizations. This meant that all questions were compressed into the nomination struggle. The two campaigns did not bargain with each other over significant matters. Instead, their organizational efforts had the effect of cleaving both intraparty issues and other delegate organizations along candidate lines. The construction of the communication structures enabled campaigns to penetrate state delegations and deal directly with individual delegates. Consider, for example, the pivotal Mississippi delegation. It would be a mistake to think of Clark Reed, its chairman, as controlling that delegation and bargaining on its behalf with the two campaigns. Rather, while Reed's influence on some members of his delegation was tangible and recognized by both campaigns, Ford and Reagan leaders did not hesitate to go directly to individual delegates in attempt to tip the balance of power in their favor. This changed pattern of bargaining is both a stimulus to and a consequence of the construction of strong centralized candidate organizations with hierarchical communication systems.

At the Democratic Convention bargaining patterns differed sharply from those of the Republicans. With the nomination question resolved, the Carter organization negotiated with all organized groups of delegates, trading access and sym-

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bols in exchange for the support of important elements within the Democratic party. Yet these negotiations occurred between decidedly *unequal* bargaining partners, as the Carter campaign did not need to bargain for convention votes. In addition, the Carter leadership sought to isolate each group by negotiating with it separately, a strategy that served to reinforce their position.

Manipulation of the Strategic Environment

In Kansas City, the Ford and Reagan campaigns each confronted a strategic environment that was the mirror image of the situation facing their opponent, each forming the major actor in the environment of the other. The President Ford Committee, ahead in all the delegate polls, sought to maintain its tenuous grip on uncertain delegates by minimizing every potentially divisive issue. As explained by one organizer of the Women's Task Force who had strong ties to the Ford committee, "I'm afraid they're going to let [the platform plank] ERA go down the drain. They just wish we'd go away and not bother them. Why? Because they're petrified we'll cost them one uncommitted delegate from Mississippi." The Reagan campaign sought to create uncertainty in the short run, and, in the long run, to find some means of luring delegates away from Ford.

THE REAGAN STRATEGY

The Reagan camapign came to the Kansas City convention critically in need of a few delegate votes. The strategy employed to achieve the nomination was first, to create uncertainty in the minds of delegates (especially the uncommitted), and, second, to devise the means for generating movement among those delegates toward Reagan.

Past convention research has stressed the high level of uncertainty among delegates at the convention site.[2] Uncertainty exists as to which delegations or delegates will support which candidates and for how long, what significance should be attached to declarations of support by key party leaders, which candidate might perform better in the general election months after the convention, what will be the consequences of a given national ticket for local and state party success, and so on. At the 1976 convention, however, much of this uncertainty had been reduced by the efforts of the major news organizations to poll the delegations and predict both the convention outcome and the probable general election results. Since Ford was widely perceived as being close to the needed majority, increases in uncertainty worked to Reagan's advantage.

A month before the convention, the naming of Senator Richard Schweiker as

[2] Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections*, 4th ed. (New York, 1976); Polsby and Wildavsky, "Uncertainty and Decision-Making at the National Conventions," in *Politics and Social Life*, ed. N. W. Polsby, R. A. Dentler, and P. A. Smith (Boston, 1963).

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Reagan's running mate had served to create confusion, forestalling an effort by the Ford Committee to close off the nomination question before the convention.[3] Senator James Buckley's name surfaced temporarily as a compromise candidate in the week before the convention with the same effect. Reagan's aides shifted ground several times, raising a number of issues on which the convention vote could not be predicted with precision. The shifting of the platform draft toward a much more conservative document was touted as evidence of Reagan's command over delegate loyalties. While all of these may not have been part of the strategy to create uncertainty, the effect was there. The Ford campaign was forced to go to the floor of the convention to fight for the nomination, on grounds staked out by the Reagan campaign.

Having stalled foreclosure of the nomination until the convention opened, Reagan's campaign strategists searched for some means of convincing delegates to vote for Reagan; devising that leverage point became their chief strategic problem. The presumption of political strategists and political scientists is that being on the winning side is a preeminent motivation for local party leaders. Accordingly, the Reagan campaign maneuvered for issues on which to persuade enough delegates to vote their way, and thereby signal uncommitted delegates that they could construct a coalition sufficient to carry the convention. In the face of claims by the Ford campaign that they were close to the needed number of votes for a nomination victory, claims supported by major news organizations, Reagan's campaign manager John Sears raised the possibility of "Trojan horse" delegates, delegates publicly pledged to Ford but who would, in the end, vote their preference for Reagan. A test vote would enable them to show their true preference.

However, as Roger Moore, Reagan's special counsel, pointed out, "the trouble with a test vote is that if you tell people it's a test, most of them will vote it as a test." The votes of the genuinely committed delegates could be counted even before the issue was joined. The Reagan campaign, therefore, had to frame a question which met two essential criteria. First, they needed an issue on which enough of the uncommitted and Ford-leaning delegates could be persuaded to vote the Reagan position on the merits of the issue. Second, the test vote required a question that would genuinely disadvantage the Ford campaign. For reasons to be discussed later, a trivial issue would not suffice. As a secondary consideration, Sears was mindful that the test vote should not exacerbate cleavages in the party to a degree that jeopardized the prospects for a Reagan victory in November. The dilemma is implicit in Peter Hanaford's, Reagan's issue coordinator, remarks:

> The goal is to persuade a critical mass of delegates to change its position on an emotional matter in a short period of time in an already charged environment. It's really hard to do. Especially when it's an emotional hot house down on the floor.

[3] CBS News, for example, was planning to project Ford as over the needed 1130 delegates the evening that Reagan announced his choice of Schweiker, an announcement which made a recount necessary. Martin Plisner, CBS News, interview December 4, 1976.

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The week before the convention, the Reagan campaign managed to raise a number of questions which could have evolved into a test vote. First, negotiations between the Reagan campaign and their own conservative supporters on the Resolutions Committee produced an omnibus foreign policy minority position, rather than a welter of specific amendments to the majority document. On rules questions, a list of potential issues surfaced, but they ultimately boiled down to a single question: John Sears proposed that presidential candidates be required to name their vice-presidential choice in the morning *before* the presidential balloting took place (Rule 16c).

From Reagan's point of view, each of these had advantages for him and disadvantages for Ford. The foreign policy minority plank was overtly critical of administration policies and would be an embarrassment to Ford. At the same time, the plank was probably closer to the thinking of most Reagan and many Ford delegates than were Ford's actual policies. For Ford, the naming of a vice-president in advance could only serve to lessen the zeal of disappointed hopefuls, to alienate liberals if a conservative were chosen, and vice versa.

On the critical Tuesday night of the convention, both questions came to a vote. The Reagan campaign lost the rules question (16c) on a roll call vote, 1069 to 1180, a vote that tested their ability to carry the convention.[4] Subsequently, the Reagan "Morality in Foreign Policy "amendment was accepted by a voice vote which the Ford organization chose not to challenge.

THE FORD STRATEGY

While most of the initiative in mounting the battles at the convention lay with the Reagan campaign, it would be inaccurate to characterize the Ford organization as totally on the defensive. They were aggressive in their pursuit of delegate votes, effectively using both the aura of the presidential office and its capacity to offer real rewards to political supporters. They communicated frequently with wavering delegates, and they exuded confidence while avoiding circumstances in which Ford-leaning delegates would differ among themselves.

The Ford campaign, however, faced a major strategic dilemma. To win a test vote, they needed to keep the convention divided between Ford and Reagan. They needed to persuade their delegates to ignore the substance of Reagan's proposals by making it clear how each issue would bear on the nomination. Yet they could not allow the division over candidates to become so deep as to weaken general election support within the Republican party. Thus, the costs of each strategic initiative were readily apparent to the Ford decision makers. Perhaps for this

[4] The vote was probably a good deal closer than the final count indicated. That afternoon the Mississippi delegation voted (16 to 14) to follow the Ford position and to cast its votes by unit rule. Upon this news a number of uncommitted delegates went to Ford. Sears maintains that Reagan would have won by a similar margin if Mississippi had broken their way.

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reason they left the initiative to the Reagan campaign, while searching for a mechanism that would surmount divisiveness.

The Ford organization pursued its strategic objective of avoiding disputes that would divide its ranks by yielding on most secondary issues, especially, platform questions. When, for example, delegates favoring Reagan pressed for ever more conservative platform planks, the Ford committee continually gave up the language it preferred.[5] The Reagan organization countered the Ford strategy by offering its own "Morality in Foreign Policy" amendment which was explicitly critical of the conduct of foreign affairs under Ford and Henry Kissinger. It was, in fact, so critical that they believed the Ford campaign could not retreat on the issue and would be forced to stand their ground. Yet, after attempting in the minutes before a final convention vote to work out some compromise language that Reagan would accept, the Ford campaign decided to swallow even the explicitly critical language.

The PFC was able to avoid a fight over foreign policy principally because they had just demonstrated their control of the convention by winning the rules fight (16c). Otherwise they might not have been able to back down gracefully on a challenge to established administration policies. That raises the question of why the Reagan campaign, a highly issue oriented movement, allowed its success to depend on a matter of party rules. The answer to this question illuminates the nature of candidate organizations.

Campaigns as Organizations

What we have said thus far lends support to the view that candidate organizations are rational, goal directed, and hierarchically controlled. And it is true that they are organized around a single, unambiguous goal: the nomination. Yet for all their apparent singleness of purpose, candidate organizations are often beset by major internal struggles. The resolution of those struggles may lead to policies that bear the appearance of rational formulation, but mask underlying contradictions.

The Reagan organization's choice of Rule 16c for a test vote is a case in point. John Sears, the director of the Reagan campaign, was evidently worried about the possibility that Ford might cave in at the last minute if a foreign policy plank were chosen (he did), but he felt that Ford would fight on 16c because of its effects on the Ford coalition. Thus from the viewpoint of the campaign leadership, the foreign policy plan was never intended as a test vote, but rather as a means of defusing the conservative delegates.

[5] The plank on ERA was an exception to this strategic retreat, but the Ford organization was able to pass the initiative for defending the majority draft favoring ERA over to the Women's Task Force. The ERA dispute never became a Reagan versus Ford conflict. In its preconvention planning the Ford committee drew up a list of approximately 250 issues on which Ford and Reagan differed and drafted compromise language. However, the final language resembled the Reagan positions more closely than those suggested by the Ford organization.

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But at the same time, the issues section of the Reagan organization (Hanaford and Martin Anderson) was negotiating the language of the foreign policy minority plank with a group of conservative delegates (the Helms group). While these delegates supported Reagan, they had their own ideas about both appropriate issue positions and how the campaign should be pursued. After negotiating the language of the foreign policy minority plank, the issues section of the Reagan organization began pressing the Ford organization into a role call vote on the plank. When the final moment came, Hanaford was on the floor, and the chairman of the North Carolina delegation sought recognition to ask for a roll call vote. As Hanaford recalled:

> We felt we had the votes and the more they pressed for a compromise, the more certain we became that we had it. Then, we sensed that what they would do was swallow hard and take the whole thing on a voice vote. Then, they gaveled down our motion for a roll call . . . That was a violation of the rules. We had the eight states needed, but they wouldn't turn on Ellis's [chair of North Carolina delegation] microphone.

But when the podium called the Reagan trailer to inquire whether indeed they did want a roll call, members of the political section intentionally delayed long enough for Rhodes to gavel the measure adopted by voice vote.[6] Having lost the test on their chosen grounds, the political section of the campaign believed the nomination was lost. As a result, the issues section never had the chance to force *their* test vote on the foreign policy plank.

Conclusions

Conventions are no longer best conceptualized as gatherings of important party members to select a candidate. With the passing of control over delegate selection processes from party to national candidate organizations, conventions have become meetings of individuals with a primary, though varying, commitment to a particular candidacy. The evolution toward candidate-centered conventions suggests the need for a re-examination of much of the established thinking about conventions.

First, consider the relationship between delegates and the constituencies they represent. To the extent that conventions have become arenas for competing candidate organizations, the question of the correspondence of delegate attitudes on public policy issues to the attitudes of party voters becomes a tangential matter. Rather, as delegates come to resemble mere instruments of their campaign, the germane issues involve mechanisms for insuring delegate loyalty and the cor-

[6] As reported to me by Moore, the events were as follows: "I talked to Clifton while in the Ford trailer. He said they were going to roll over dead. Then I talked to the podium. They said they were going to fast gavel it. I didn't want a roll-call, what's the point, it had passed by acclamation. But we didn't want to let our people know we had agreed, so I said, 'Hold on.' Then I yelled to Sears. While I was checking, it happened."

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respondence in *candidate preferences* between voters and convention delegates.[7] Second, in a candidate-centered convention, platform writing and party governance issues will naturally and inextricably become linked to the nomination question. Although the platform and rules issues do provide real and symbolic prizes, useful for unifying the party around the nomination outcome, we need to consider the consequences of having all party business determined by the nomination struggle. Such a system is tantamount to parties being no more than areas for candidate competition.

[7] Recent changes in national Democratic party rules have moved in both these directions: the requirement that candidates have the right to approve delegates running in their name and the push toward proportional representation of candidate preference.

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Groups and Group Caucuses

JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN

Recent Democratic conventions have seen the emergence of active caucuses based on demographic groups. At the nominating conventions of 1972 and 1976 and at the charter conference in 1974, blacks, women, latinos, and youth formed caucuses. The Black and the Women's caucuses showed marked organizational development during this period. In 1972 they existed largely as forums to hear speeches by their own members and by presidential candidates. But by 1976 these two caucuses had established stable leadership structures and sophisticated communications networks. They still held large meetings for caucus members, whose votes ultimately sanctioned caucus actions. But their leaders also engaged in a series of concrete, specific negotiations with the presidential nominee.

Organized groups at Republican conventions have received far less attention from scholars and the media than have their Democratic counterparts. But our research at the 1976 Republican convention provided us with an opportunity to begin to correct this imbalance. This article will examine a variety of groups at the convention—some composed of delegates, others composed of people trying to influence the actions of delegates, still others composed of both delegates and nondelegates.

Although these groups did not receive a great deal of publicity, and although they were not systematically consulted in the platform-writing process, a study

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of their behavior is useful for a number of reasons. First, such an examination increases our understanding of some of the constituent elements of the Republican party. Second, because patterns of group behavior reflect a party's norms and representational styles, a study of groups provides us with insights into these underlying characteristics of the party. Finally, the examination of groups can shed light on the dynamics of convention decision making. In an uncertain, complex, and rapidly changing environment, which organizations are able to make claims on their members and influence convention decisions? What are some of the recurring organizational problems facing convention groups, and how do groups deal with those problems?

Blacks at the Convention

Although the number of black delegates at the Republican convention was small (76 delegates, compared with 342 at the 1976 Democratic convention), these delegates held several meetings and receptions during convention week—including meetings with President Ford and Ronald Reagan. During the weekend before the convention, a national meeting was held by the National Black Republican Council, a group affiliated with the Republican National Committee. This council, which included a number of delegates, devoted much of its conference to preparation for the upcoming convention. The black Republicans discussed platform planks, candidates, and convention procedures.

Black delegates and alternates were concerned about a number of issues—for example, the appointment of blacks to top-level administration posts, the high level of unemployment among black youth, and the platform's antibusing plank. But they were never able to formulate a unified strategy for dealing with those issues. Because many of the black delegates were officially uncommitted, some suggested that they might withhold their votes until they received satisfactory responses on various issues. A young man from Detroit discussed this strategy: "It won't happen, but we still want the president to know we're here. There was some sentiment that some wanted to hold out . . . use that as a tool to bargain with. Vote in a bloc, assembly line votes, to throw it either way." Others wanted to nominate Senator Edward Brooke for president or vice-president, as a way of symbolizing issues of concern to blacks.

As it turned out, none of these aggressive strategies was employed. One member of the black delegation remarked: "I feel it would be irresponsible to toy with something as large as the presidency." He also discussed the general position of blacks at the convention:

> The black delegation took no position on anything. There was some loose talk of getting committed delegates to withhold votes until they could be used more advantageously. . . . They had the strategy but they didn't know what to do with it. No one said this is it, this is what we want. Let's wait for 1980—we'll be better organized.

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Although Senator Brooke gently chided black delegates for not asking harder questions of President Ford in their meeting, he also urged them not to do anything that would hurt the president's nomination. Brooke's sentiments were widely shared by blacks at the convention, and talk of independent strategies soon died out.

Women's Groups at the Convention

Women's groups at the Republican convention[1] did not hold large caucus meetings and generate extensive publicity, as they have done at recent Democratic conventions. But they were able to make their presence felt in a number of ways. Two very different women's groups—the Republican Women's Task Force and the National Federation of Republican Women—appealed to different constituencies but cooperated with each other on the issue of the Equal Rights Amendment. (Another group of women, led by Phyllis Schlafly, fought hard against the ERA.)

The Republican Women's Task Force, an affiliate of the National Women's Political Caucus, was founded in 1975 to attract more women to the political process through the Republican party. The 1976 convention became the first important test of the new group's organizational skills.

Although there were a number of issues in which members of the Task Force were very interested—including delegate selection rules, discrimination-related credentials issues, and the abortion plank of the platform—Task Force leaders decided to concentrate their energies on one goal: securing a platform plank supporting the ERA. When a platform subcommittee voted to recommend that the party take no position on the ERA (whose underlying principle had been supported by every Republican platform since 1940), it was clear that the Task Force would have a fight on its hands. Leaving aside other rules and concerns, Task Force leaders spoke to members of the Platform Committee on behalf of the ERA and urged Ford platform aides to work to keep their delegates in line. Their efforts were successful; the full committee voted 51–47 to support the ERA.

The battle was not yet over, however. Some conservative delegates hinted that a minority plank might be filed on ERA, and it appeared that the Reagan forces might use such a plank as a test vote to embarrass the Ford forces. The Task Force set about preparing itself organizationally for the possibility of a floor fight. State delegation tally sheets were compiled and contacts in each state were briefed on their use. Several vote counts were conducted by these state contacts. If there was a doubt as to a delegate's vote, the Ford staff was to be used as reinforcement. Prodded by the Task Force, President Ford had issued a strong statement on behalf of ERA and had directed his staff to see that all Ford delegates voted on behalf of it. (To broaden the ERA supporters' base, the Task Force had also encouraged the formation of a group of pro-ERA Reagan delegates.)

[1] I am grateful to Patricia Hanratty for her insightful observations of women's groups at the convention.

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In any event, an anti-ERA minority plank was never filed. Although the role of the women's floor organization in influencing this outcome is impossible to assess with precision, Task Force leaders congratulated themselves on a victory.

It is important to note that in waging the battle for the ERA the Task Force limited its focus and kept a low profile. Task Force members were particularly careful to separate the ERA from the explosive abortion issue. No Task Force member who was associated with the ERA lobbied on abortion. The Republican Women's Task Force name was never connected with the effort to liberalize the platform plank on abortion. And no staff or other resources were allocated to the abortion effort, although most of the activists supporting abortion were also members of the Task Force. (One such activist had two telephones in front of her. She used one for official Task-Force-ERA business, and referred abortion issue callers to the other line.)

In order to maintain a low profile, the Task Force did not hold Democratic party-style caucus meetings. Indeed, the word "caucus" was never used. At the one general meeting held at the convention by the caucus, about 100 women attended. No votes were taken, and no issues or controversies were raised. Task Force leaders discussed the purposes of the group and dispensed information. The differences between this organizational form and the freewheeling, debate-filled Democratic group caucus are enormous.

The Task Force was aided in its ERA fight by leaders of the National Federation of Republican Woman (NFRW), a group affiliated with the Republican National Committee. Founded in 1938, the NFRW is the largest women's political organization in the United States; its membership in 1975 was 230,000. The NFRW has traditionally functioned as a volunteer organization for staffing Republican campaigns. But in recent years, particularly under the leadership of Mrs. Patricia Hutar, the organization has taken the lead in urging women to run for office themselves.

At the convention the NFRW acted as a support group to the Task Force in the ERA fight. Mrs. Hutar issued strong statements backing the ERA and supporting the efforts of the Task Force. The NFRW also held a number of well-attended events during convention week, including various social receptions and a seminar on running for office. As in the Task Force meeting, the seminar was very structured, with no debate and little interaction between speakers and audience. Each speaker was limited to a certain amount of time and when the time had expired a bell was rung, regardless of where the speaker was in her presentation. (It is difficult to imagine a Democratic Party Women's Caucus speaker like Bella Abzug or Shirley Chisholm yielding to a bell!)

Organizational Factors and Party Differences

Although women's groups at the Republican convention were far more active than blacks (having, among other things, a much larger pool of potential mem-

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bers), neither set of groups bore much resemblance to the strong Black and Women's caucuses in the Democratic party.

Some of the interparty differences stem from organizational factors. The Republican Women's Task Force and the National Black Republican Council are both new groups, and they have not had time to develop organizational strength. It must also be kept in mind that the closeness of the Ford-Reagan race made black and women's groups unwilling to take actions that might harm their favored candidate, President Ford.

Beyond these specific organizational and tactical factors, it appears that the Republican party's informal norms about representational styles are not favorable to convention group caucuses—particularly those based on demographic categories. As one leader of the Republican Women's Task Force observed:

> Republican women are more conservative than Democrats. They're more fearful of getting involved with people they don't know. I think if we tried to get everyone to attend a Women's Caucus, we would have been less successful. . . . My personal feeling is that it's a lot easier to operate as individuals, rather than as an organization. I just think it's more effective.

Commenting on differences between Democrats and Republicans, this woman said that the two parties are

> as different as night and day. Republicans resent—even the most progressive Republican, who is a state chairman or a Republican National Committee member—resents someone coming from *x* organization and saying, we want you to do something. The concept has always been that you worked your way up to being a delegate and it's an honor.

Because the composition and style of the two parties differ, we should not expect to discover the same kinds of groups and patterns of group behavior at conventions of both parties. Let us therefore move from an examination of black and women's groups to an exploration of other varieties of group life at the 1976 Republican convention.

Other Inside Groups

Besides the National Federation of Republican Women and the National Black Republican Council, other Republican National Committee affiliate groups had an organizational presence at the convention. These groups were represented by members who served as delegates and alternates, by staff people who operated information booths and administered other group activities, and by members who served as volunteers for candidates or for the affiliate groups themselves. These groups operated at the convention as support units for delegates, offering a range of information and other services. Although they generally maintained a low visibility, they did take advantage of the convention to try to get their oganizations better known.

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One such group was the Republican National Hispanic Assembly of the United States, an organization designed to appeal to Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Mexican-Americans. There were no general meetings of Hispanic delegates, but the assembly did hold two informal meetings. In addition, the assembly worked through member delegates to lobby for certain positions on the Rules and Platform committees. Saying that "we have less clout than anyone in America," one assembly leader saw the 1976 convention as a very early stage of Hispanic organization building:

> This convention laid the foundation for future political activism. We got people from various regions together, swapped ideas, and so forth. This convention was basically an educational effort, laying out plans for the future.

At a similar stage of organizational development was the National Republican Heritage Groups (Nationalities) Council, designed to make Republican appeals to the foreign-born and children of immigrants. Like the Hispanic Assembly, the Heritage Groups Council did not call a formal meeting but instead sponsored a series of receptions for delegates and alternates from ethnic groups. Council leaders and staff asked the Platform Committee to take a strong anticommunist stand on Eastern Europe, expressing some dissatisfaction with Secretary of State Kissinger's policies. But much of the council staff members' effort in Kansas City was simply devoted to meeting delegates and party activists, in order to increase recognition of their group. As one staff aide remarked: "The Heritage Council is new, not very well known. We've tried to get ourselves better known, and we really got greater recognition. We're better known by both ethnic delegates and party groups."

Also active at the convention were representatives of the Young Republican National Federation and the college Republican National Committee. Both organizations listed members who were delegates and alternates, and members of both served in a number of capacities for the Ford and Reagan campaigns—manning headquarters, doing staff jobs, helping to set up floor operations, and leading "spontaneous" demonstrations. (The Young Americans for Freedom, a conservative youth organization not affiliated with the Republican National Committee, provided much of the manpower for the Reagan campaign at the convention.)

The Young Republicans and College Republicans also carried on a number of activities designed to make the convention environment more comfortable for their members. The Young Republicans sponsored receptions and inexpensive parties, and the College Republicans ran a locator service to help organization members find each other. Looking toward the fall elections, the College Republicans also devoted some of their effort in Kansas City to recruiting young people into specially targeted congressional campaigns.

It is interesting to note that although the Republican platform process was not centered around appeals to organized groups, some leaders of RNC-affiliate groups did view certain planks as organizational "victories" for themselves. Hispanic Assembly leaders were happy about the platform's strong stand against

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Castro (which they had urged), and College Republicans referred to the platform's support of regional presidential primaries as one of their "inroads" into the platform. In these cases, leaders could interpret these planks to followers as organizational successes.

Outside Groups

Going outside the inner circle of RNC affiliates, we can identify other groups at the convention who did not have continuing and unbreakable Republican ties, but who were mainly interested in the party's endorsement of certain stands and candidates. One such group was the Pro-Life Impact Committee, an ad hoc affiliate of Missouri Citizens for Life, which devoted its energies to securing an antiabortion plank in the party's platform.[2] Committee members began writing to state party leaders in January to get information about delegates. Although in most states the committee restricted its activities to finding out which delegates supported their position, in others—such as Texas and Missouri—the group was able to influence the selection of delegates.

Having built a file of sympathetic delegates, the group turned to intensive lobbying of the Platform Committee. And its efforts were successful; an antiabortion plank won 13–1 in subcommittee and was ratified by the full committee and the convention. A satisfied leader of the antiabortion group ascribed his organization's success to its specific focus and grassroots intensity:

> The key to it was we didn't spend all of our time organizing great, fantastic campaigns. We just went out and did it. We didn't speak out on other peripheral issues. We stayed out of the candidate thing. In some states, we went after active pro-life committees. We made an impression . . . . None of this at the national level could have been possible without activity at the state level.

If antiabortion activists were satisfied with the convention's outcome, other conservative spokesmen were not.[3] After it became clear that Reagan would be defeated, some of these spokesmen—like *National Review* publisher William Rusher, former Office of Economic Opportunity director Howard Phillips, and publisher-fund raiser Richard Viguerie—intensified their efforts to lead conservatives into a New Majority party. Conservative activists and writers met often with each other in Kansas City, and on the morning after the nomination vote, Viguerie held a press conference to announce his candidacy for vice-president on a third party ticket.

[2] For a discussion of this group, see Dom Bonafede, Michael J. Malbin, and Robert Walters, *Politics, Parties and 1976, National Journal* reprint series, 2d ed. Washington, D.C. (1976), p. 1209. I am particularly grateful to Michael Malbin for his insights (in postconvention discussions) into the group process.

[3] For further discussion of conservatives at the convention, see Christopher Lydon, "Conservatives Deny Plan to Walk Out of Sessions or Work for Third Party," *The New York Times*, August 17, 1976.

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It would appear that these national conservative spokesmen might have interests in common with some of the Reagan delegates who were most bitter in defeat. But, somewhat surprisingly, the third-party advocates seem to have made little effort to contact Reagan delegates in Kansas City. One leading advocate of a new party said:

> We've been having meetings. . . . It's not the type of thing that's been organized by elected officials—mayors, senators, governors. Those people have a stake in the maintenance of the Republican Party. The Buckleys—they won't take the first step. Once we pull it off, like the French Revolution, they'll come ahead.

Another prominent conservative spokesman put it this way:

> We haven't had meetings of delegates. To the extent that people would have bolted the Republican Party, they would already have bolted. These people have vested interests at stake—prestige, power, influence at stake. What is left is a structural problem: How can you get conservatives most organized against the Democrats? The conservatives are the bedrock of the Republican Party. We did have a series of meetings, not of delegates, but of people interested in this all along. It was suggested that we invite delegates, but . . . .

Throughout the convention, there was noticeably little contact between national conservative spokesmen and conservative delegates.

Not all of the outside groups present in Kansas City were conservative. Staff members of Common Cause, for example, were actively pressing for platform planks endorsing various governmental reforms. But Common Cause had other organizational reasons for being present at the convention. As one staff member put it: "The biggest line you get is—'You're out there working for Democratic candidates.' " Common Cause representatives hoped that their presence in Kansas City would underscore the nonpartisan nature of the organization.

An Ad Hoc, Internal Issue Group

One of the most interesting groups at the convention was the relatively independent band of conservative delegates that played such an active role in the platform-writing process. Its organizational characteristics were noteworthy: it was quickly formed, designed for a specific limited purpose, transitory, and lacking close ties to outside groups. For a party whose representational style appears to prefer independent decision making to the open advocacy of outside group interests, it seems fitting that such a group could play an important role at the convention.

Candidate Organizations

At a closely contested convention, it is perhaps inevitable that the activities of a wide range of groups will be strongly affected by the competing candidate orga-

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nizations. We have already seen how black and women's groups designed their activities in ways that would not harm their favored candidate, President Ford.

The concentration of delegates' (and outside volunteers') energies in campaign organizations sharply limited the claims that other groups could place on their members. As a College Republican leader observed:

> People are staying in the diverse [candidate] organizations. The big youth gatherings are centered around one or the other organizations . . . . Also, housing is limited. The only way people could get housing was through the candidates. The candidate organizations had housing. . . . Also, with the split, we can't get people to go to our training seminar. . . . The Reagan people said they didn't have time for training and seminars.

When a presidential nomination is at stake, competing group activities tend to be forgotten.

State Delegations

One set of groups—the state delegations—did not find its importance reduced because of the nomination struggle. This was because the candidate organizations reached delegates through state caucuses—giving them interpretations of rules, instructions for voting, and further arguments for supporting their preferred nominee. And certain state delegations (like California and Texas for Reagan and New York for Ford) continually served as key floor cheerleaders for their candidates.

In split delegations, political and social life reflected candidate divisions. When Massachusetts delegates checked into their hotel, a desk clerk asked if they were Ford or Reagan delegates and assigned them roommates accordingly. Ford and Reagan delegates from that state attended different parties (as well as different caucuses), which led to some tensions.

After the nomination was settled, certain state delegations (including Florida, Wyoming, South Carolina, and Louisiana, among others) became important organizational forces in building support for drafting Reagan for the vice-presidential nomination. A series of delegation meetings, lasting until 5:00 A.M. on nomination night, planned strategy for a possible floor draft. State delegations provided a fast, efficient arena for gathering delegates and locating people from other states.

Outside the realm of national politics, state delegation meetings also provided a forum for discussing local issues. For example, at a Colorado delegation meeting on the day before the convention opened, a bitter debate took place over a conservative group's endorsement of a Democrat for county commissioner in the state.

Finally, state delegations performed a number of crucial housekeeping functions, such as passing out credentials and guest passes. (As we have observed at other conventions, the distribution of guest passes can be a very divisive issue. At

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the same Colorado meeting mentioned, a half-hour was devoted to an angry debate over guest passes.)

Conclusions

Various groups played a role at the 1976 Republican convention. Some played a part in the nomination process, others concentrated on issues, and still others appeared content to provide services to delegates and make themselves better known.

In comparison with group caucuses at recent Democratic conventions, the Republican groups in 1976 were less participatory internally and less aggressive in stating their positions and pursuing their goals. One reason for the low visibility of the Republican groups was logistical. State delegations were staying in hotels scattered widely throughout the Kansas City area, and it was hard to bring delegates together for central meetings. A leader of the Republican Women's Task Force observed that her group had hoped to visit state delegations but had found that "moving from place to place is impossible." A College Republican activist, noting another obstacle to group organizing—the crowded convention week schedule—commented that "there was so much to do that we couldn't do much."

Another factor inhibiting group organization was certainly the closeness of the presidential nomination race. As was the case at the Democratic convention of 1972, other group activities were largely subordinated to the business of choosing the nominee.

But going beyond these logistical and strategic explanations for group behavior we should also note the informal norms of Republican activists. A Republican Women's Task Force organizer observed that the Republican Party is not "an interest group party. And consequently the Republican Women's Task Force is viewed with skepticism. Party regulars have a hard time adjusting to the presence of an organized interest." Republicans are not accustomed to nonstate caucuses meeting during conventions, and group organizers are wary of breaking this tradition. Thus even in the absence of a close nomination contest, and even given a growth in organizational experience on the part of various groups, we should expect to find group behavior at Republican conventions relatively restrained. For party convention behavior reflects broader party norms for political style and appropriate political action.

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Independent Jamaica Enters World Politics: Foreign Policy in a New State

WENDELL BELL

Of all the changes in the international system since World War II, few have had more impact on world politics than the dismantlement of European colonial empires and the creation of what today are about eighty new states. The number of nation-states in the international system about doubled, increasing the complexity of the system and creating alternative subsystems of associations. Three more or less overlapping, newly emergent and articulate groups of nations appeared, the "less developed," the "nonaligned," and the "Third World."[1]

The increase of cordiality and trade that came with détente between the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and between the United States and China on the other, prompted other countries, especially the new and small states, to question the value of alliances with superpowers. It sent them seeking new networks of interactions with a diversity of countries—within both Western and Communist spheres—that would serve their own interests. It also sent them seeking new world views and theoretical explanations to serve as organizing principles to challenge the old international order that had permitted the rich nations to become richer and intercountry inequality to

[1] For concise summaries of the changing international system, see Richard A. Brody, "The Emerging International System: Policy Implications," *International Interactions* 1 (October 1974): 217–22, and Alastair Buchan, "The Emerging International System: A European Perspective," *International Interactions* 1 (October 1974): 195–206.

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increase. And it sent them toward new international economic relations in which there would be, if they had their way, equity in international trade, increased local control over multinational corporations, and a limitation on the foreign exploitation of local natural resources.[2]

Although they are receiving more attention than before, the foreign policies of the small states, which constitute roughly 70 percent of all the nation-states in the world, invite further study.[3] This paper is a descriptive case study of the foreign policy of a small, new state from the time it entered world politics as a politically independent actor up to 1976. Additionally, this paper pays special attention to the ways in which internal and external policies interrelate. For a small state with a "penetrated economy," dependent on imports and exports, and host to multinational corporations, some aspects of foreign and domestic policies may simply be two sides of the same coin.

Jamaican Independence, 1962

The new state under consideration is Jamaica, an island of nearly two million people situated in the Caribbean Sea just south of Cuba. A British colony since 1655, Jamaica became a politically independent state on August 6, 1962. With the end of World War II in Europe, Jamaica began what was for a new state a relatively long transition to nationhood under British control. In November 1944 limited self-government was inaugurated based upon the Westminster model of government and, for the first time in the history of Jamaica, upon universal adult suffrage. From that time to full political independence in 1962, periodic constitutional changes—each carried out with the cooperation of the British and under the eye of a British governor or governor-general—granted more and more self-government and required less and less formal political control by the British. For a few years, from 1958 to near the end of 1961, it appeared that Jamaica would achieve full political independence as part of the West Indies Federation which included other island territories in the British Caribbean. A referendum held in Jamaica in September 1961, however, resulted in a "go it alone" decision for Jamaica. The federation collapsed and Jamaica became fully independent as a separate nation-state.[4]

[2] See Basil Ince, "The Caribbean in World Politics," in *International Relations in the Caribbean* (Trinidad: Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies and Curaçao: Hogeschool van de Nederlandse Antillen, 1974), pp. 28–43; and Vaughan A. Lewis, "The Commonwealth Caribbean Policy of Non-Alignment: A Note," in *International Relations of the Caribbean*, ed. Basil Ince (Trinidad: Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, 1977).

[3] Patrick J. McGowan and Klaus-Petter Gottwald, "Small State Foreign Policies," *International Studies Quarterly* 19 (December 1975): 469–500.

[4] One view of the complex events leading to the break-up of the West Indies Federation can be found in Hugh W. Springer, *Reflections on the Failure of the First West Indian Federation* (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, July 1962). See also Wendell Bell, "Attitudes of Jamaican Elites Toward the West Indies Federation," *Annals of the New York*

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Jamaica's population is largely black; 90 to 95 percent of the Jamaicans have African origins. The correlation between racial origin and social class remains high, although eighteen years of provisional self-government and fourteen years of nationhood during which nonwhite elites came to political power has eroded the correlation to some degree. Poverty is widespread (71.5 percent of income earners had weekly wages under $20 in 1973), the rate of unemployment is high (22.4 percent in 1973), and economic inequality is considerable (the highest 5 percent of income earners in 1974 accounted for 24 percent of the total income).[5]

Although sugar exports are still important, the mining and processing of bauxite, which began in the early 1950s, accounted for about half the value of domestic exports by 1968. Bananas and tourism are among the small number of commodities that Jamaica exports, mostly to the United States and Britain.

Classified by economic function or end use, consumer goods constituted by far the largest percentage of imports. In 1968, for example, food for human consumption accounted for 16.2 percent of the value of imports and other consumer goods accounted for 26.0 percent.[6] Jamaica does not produce enough food for its population.

The past several decades have seen considerable growth in national income and product. For example, the per capita national income in constant (1956) prices went from J$124.8 in 1950 to J$211.0 in 1960 to J$266.1 in 1968.[7] In the last few years, however, despite the increase in revenue from bauxite to be discussed later, the Jamaican economy has gallen on hard times. Although the percentage change in real output of goods and services was 8.2 in 1972, it declined to −2.6 in 1973, 1.3 in 1974, and −2.3 in 1975, or a total increase in GDP in real terms over these four years of 4.3 percent. This was more than offset by an estimated population growth of about 7 percent during the same period.[8] A number of factors were involved: drought, low level of sugar production, cutbacks in bauxite and alumina output as a result of a worldwide reduction in demand, and higher costs of fuel. Additionally, the tourist trade was poor in the 1976 season, at least in part as a result of reports of political violence in Jamaica, and foreign investment had practically ceased because of current political uncertainties. By December 1976 foreign exchange reserves hit a

Academy of Sciences 83 (January 18, 1960): 862–879; F. A. Hoyos, *The Rise of West Indian Democracy* (Advocate Press, 1963); Jesse Harris Proctor, Jr., "Britain's Pro-Federation Policy in the Caribbean: An Inquiry into Motivation," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 22 (August 1956): 319–331; and a special federation issue of *Social and Economic Studies* 6 (June 1957).

[5] George E. Cumper, "The Distribution of Incomes in Jamaica" (Jamaica: Department of Statistics, 1975), unpublished; "The Labour Force, 1973" (Jamaica: Department of Statistics 1974), pp. 4–5, 14.

[6] Owen Jefferson, *The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica* (Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1972), p. 197.

[7] Ibid., p. 53.

[8] *The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner*, June 15, 1976, p. 10.

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new low of −$183 million. Yet by 1976 the world aluminum market was improving and, though it may be delayed because of accumulated inventories, its impact should be felt in Jamaica in the near future. The fate of the tourist industry and future foreign investment, however, remain in some doubt and contingent upon political developments.

The bare facts of much of independent Jamaica's foreign affairs can be briefly stated. At the end of 1972, Jamaica had thirteen missions or embassies abroad. These were to the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Trinidad and Tobago, Ethiopia, West Germany, the Dominican Republic and Haiti (joint), the United Nations (New York), the United Nations (Geneva), Switzerland, Mexico, the Bahamas, and the European Economic Community. In addition, the consulates numbered fifteen, four of which were in the United States. Also, there were a number of multiple accreditations.[9]

Diplomatic relations had been initiated with thirty-eight nations, including the People's Republic of China and six Black African states in the following sequence: Ethiopia (1968), Ghana (1968), Sierra Leone (1968), Tanzania (1970), Zambia (1970), and Nigeria (1970).[10] Twenty-four countries had consular missions in Jamaica.

After 1972, embassies were established in France and Belgium, and diplomatic relationships began with Cuba, Australia, Bangladesh, and in March 1975 with the Soviet Union.[11] Jamaica joined the United Nations after political independence and the Organization of American States in 1969. It remained a member of the Commonwealth.

Jamaica's Foreign Policy: Three Stages

The specific details of Jamaica's foreign policy since independence in 1962 can be conveniently divided into three stages in terms of Rosenau's four types, especially as modified by McGowan and Gottwald,[12] a fact that lends additional validation to the generality of Rosenau's formulation. From 1962 through 1967, Jamaica's foreign policy was largely *acquiescent*, at least to the extent to which it was oriented toward creating the conditions favorable to foreign investors and perpetuating "inherited ties of economic and political dependence." From 1968 through 1971 it was *transitional*, becoming more venturesome in seeking new diplomatic relations and exploring a widened conception of alternative possibilities within the context of a growing sense of national identity. This

[9] *Statistical Yearbook of Jamaica, 1973* (Jamaica: Department of Statistics, 1974), pp. 117–22.

[10] *The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner*, February 27, 1974, p. 9.

[11] Ibid., February 27, 1974 and March 18, 1975, p. 1. For an account of the first few years of independent Jamaica's foreign relations, see Martin Ira Glassner, "The Foreign Relations of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago," *Caribbean Studies* 10 (October 1970): 116–153.

[12] James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as Adaptive Behavior," *Comparative Politics* 2 (April 1970): 365–387; McGowan and Gottwald, pp. 474, 485.

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was symbolized by the beginning of diplomatic relations with Ethiopia in 1968. From 1972 to the present it has been largely *promotive*, aimed at creating "a new equilibrium between domestic and international demands by changing both environments."[13]

Jamaica has two major political parties, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People's National Party (PNP). Although the JLP was in power from 1962 to 1972, after which the PNP came to power, the move from acquiescent to transitional and then to promotive foreign policies was very much a continuous process. Thus, the three stages are somewhat arbitrarily demarcated in time. One might, for example, question just when the transitional stage began, since some aspects of it go back at least to the 1966 visit of H.I.M. Haile Selassie I to Jamaica.[14] The 1972 date for the beginning of the promotional stage, however, seems firmer. Jamaican diplomacy clearly became more active after the PNP returned to power.

Jamaica's foreign policy behavior supports the general proposition that "small . . . states will follow either promotive or acquiescent foreign policy strategies" rather than policies that are intransigent or preservative.[15] Additionally, Jamaica's behavior appears to support a second proposition: "Small . . . states will tend toward promotive foreign policies to the extent that their leadership is inner-directed."[16] The internalized norms that constituted the "inner-directedness" of Jamaican leaders included a large portion of self-interest which rejected the dichotomous cold war view of the foreign policy options open to small states. The same self-interest accepted both a regional (Caribbean) and a Third World view of the international system, clearly focused on the nature of the world economic order, and on Jamaica's proper role in it and fair share of it.

Jamaica's Foreign Policy: Five Features

Five interrelated features of Jamaica's foreign policy behavior since achieving independent statehood standout above others:

Perpetuation of the Colonial Past. In the early years of political independence, Jamaica's foreign policy was to some extent a carry over from the colonial past. It ". . . consisted mainly in petitioning the British, U. S., Canadian and other Western governments for commodity price-supports and markets, outlets for surplus populations and for steady supplies of capital with which to develop its economy."[17] A major diplomatic focus, for example, was on "Britain's

[13] McGowan and Gottwald, p. 474.

[14] Locksley G. E. Edmondson and Peter D. Phillips, "The Commonwealth Caribbean and Africa: Aspects of Third World Racial Interactions, Linkages and Challenges," in Ince, *International Relations of the Caribbean.*

[15] McGowan and Gottwald, p. 477.

[16] Ibid., p. 480.

[17] Edmondson and Phillips, ms. p. 17.

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TABLE 1

Jamaica's Domestic Exports by Country of Destination (percent)

	Year		
Country of Destination	*1938*	*1962*	*1973*
United Kingdom	59.2	26.5	23.1
United States	3.7	38.9	41.2
Canada	26.6	18.0	5.1
Norway	–	6.7	10.6
Other	10.5	9.9	12.3
Commonwealth Caribbean			7.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCES: The data for 1938 and 1962 are from Owen Jefferson, *The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica* (Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies 1974) pp. 202–203; the 1973 data are computed from *Statistical Abstract, 1973* (Jamaica: Department of Statistics, 1974): 174–177.

entering the European Common Market," which threatened to disrupt Jamaica's traditional relationships, "unless Britain succeed[ed] in persuading the E. E. C. members to grant favourable concessions to Commonwealth members."[18]

Pro-Western, Christian, and anticommunist was how the then Prime Minister, Alexander Bustamante, described the new state of Jamaica, and on August 7, 1962, the day after Independence Day, he announced that the United States was free to establish a military base on the island without offering any aid in return.[19] A pro-Western view was stated again, along with his confidence in "the Commonwealth and the United States of America" to come to the defense of Jamaica if need be.[20]

With respect to patterns of trade, Jamaica's relationships had been changing from dominance by the United Kingdom to dominance by the United States several decades before political independence, a trend that continued afterwards. As can be seen from tables 1 and 2, the United Kingdom was Jamaica's strongest trading partner in 1938, taking 59.2 percent of the domestic exports of Jamaica and supplying 32.5 percent of the imports. Canada ranked second, taking 26.6 percent of the exports and supplying 15.6 percent of the imports. The United States took only 3.7 percent of the exports, but supplied 21.0 percent of the imports.

This pattern was disrupted by World War II, but by 1950 returned to approximate the 1938 percentages, although there were increased imports from the United Kingdom at the expense of Canada and the United States, largely

18 Ince, "Caribbean in World Politics," p. 37.

19 Edward W. Chester, *The United States and Jamaica* (forthcoming).

20 Bernard Coard, "The Meaning of Political Independence in the Commonwealth Caribbean," in Ince, *International Relations in the Caribbean*, pp. 8–27.

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TABLE 2

Jamaica's Imports by Country of Origin (percent)

Country of Origin	*1938*	*1962*	*1973*
United Kindgom	32.5	9.4	16.7
United States	21.0	27.8	38.6
Canada	15.6	10.4	6.8
Netherlands and possessions	2.4	5.7	3.3
Other	28.5	26.7	29.2
Commonwealth Carribbean			5.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCES: same as Table 1.

resulting from British policies restricting dollar imports and from the devaluation of sterling in 1949.

After 1950, however, dramatic changes took place and by 1962 the United States had surpassed the United Kingdom in share of exports and nearly equalled the United Kingdom in share of imports. By 1973 the United States was Jamaica's chief trading partner, taking 41.2 percent of exports and supplying 38.6 percent of imports compared with 23.1 percent and 16.7 percent for the United Kingdom. Canada showed a *relative* decline in its share of exports and imports, but had an *absolute* increase in both. The growth of the bauxite and alumina industry, of course, was responsible for the shift away from the United Kingdom, since it was owned by American, and to a lesser extent Canadian, interests and linked to those markets. Furthermore, the United States assumed even more importance if the invisible foreign earnings of tourism are included, since 80 percent of the tourists were Americans.[21] The United Kingdom retained importance, however, in the traditional Jamaican exports, such as sugar and bananas.[22]

Thus, with political independence from the United Kingdom, there was relatively little effect on changes in patterns of trade already set in motion before 1962. Although the relative importance of the United Kingdom and the United States had changed from 1938 through 1962 to 1973, the total of the two in percentage terms remained about the same for both exports and imports.

Yet there were signs of independent change. For example, the percentages of both exports and imports with "other" countries increased and will increase

[21] Jefferson, p. 204.

[22] If we take a longer view, we can conclude even more firmly that increased trade with the United States in some sense simply continued the patterns of the colonial past. For example, in 1891 two-thirds of Jamaica's exports were marketed in the United States, while around one-third of its imports came from the United States. In 1927 "foreign investments in Jamaica were largely American or Canadian rather than British." Although the commodity itself was new, the American ownership and development of Jamaica's bauxite reserves since the mid-1950s was not the first large-scale economic relationship between the two countries. Chester, ms. pp. 13, 34.

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still more if current government actions—involving regional cooperation, organizations with other Third World countries, and trade agreements with Communist countries—are successful. By 1973, Venezuela, West Germany, and Japan with respect to imports and Ghana, the Soviet Union, and Sweden with respect to exports stood out among the "other" nations. And, of course, other Commonwealth Caribbean countries entered the picture.

Caribbean Integration. Although the Jamaican referendum in 1961 was responsible for ending the West Indies Federation, Jamaica nonetheless pursued policies after independence aimed at regional cooperation and integration, primarily of an economic nature.[23] Jamaica's view of the region has become a broad one, including all countries whose shores are washed by the Caribbean Sea and the Guyanas and Bahamas, countries of cultural and historical affinity.[24] Thus, it includes, in addition to the islands, Mexico and the states of Central America such as Panama and Costa Rica as well as Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana and Surinam on the north coast of South America.

As was to be expected, formal association proceeded most rapidly among the Commonwealth Caribbean states themselves that already shared a number of regional institutions, such as the University of the West Indies and the Caribbean Development Bank. The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) was established in 1968. It aimed to remove tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and other limitations on trade among the participating countries.[25] By 1973, exports to other Commonwealth Caribbean countries were 7.7 percent of Jamaica's total while imports were 5.4 percent, although there was an unfavorable balance of visible trade with nearly J$5 million excess of imports over exports. Jamaica's exports to CARIFTA countries increased nearly threefold since 1969 when they amounted to J$7.6 million. By 1973 they had reached J$20.1 million.

A Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was formed in 1973 between Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Jamaica to establish a common market and to go beyond CARIFTA in pursuing economic integration. CARICOM was enlarged when some of the less economically developed territories joined, including the new state of Grenada in April 1975. Wider links with Latin American countries, especially those of the circum-Caribbean, were also being explored. For example, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, and Mexico cooperated in establishing a Caribbean shipping line.[26] Additionally, a number of exchanges and agreements between Jamaica and Mexico, as well as between Jamaica and Venezuela, took place, including joint

[23] For a review of factors for and against political integration in the Commonwealth Caribbean, see R. Stephen Milne, "Impulses and Obstacles to Caribbean Political Integration: Academic Theory and Guyana's Experience," *International Studies Quarterly* 18 (September 1974): 291–316.

[24] Vaughan A. Lewis, "Thinking about Jamaican Foreign Policy: A Primer" (Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, n.d.), unpublished.

[25] Ince, "Caribbean in World Politics," p. 40.

[26] *The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner*, June 10, 1975, p. 3.

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plans for aluminum smelters in Mexico and Venezuela. Jamaica took Panama's part vis-à-vis the United States in the Panama Canal dispute, General Omar Torrijos, president of Panama, paying an official visit to Jamaica in the spring of 1976 to talk about increasing trade with Jamaica.

Of particular interest, both because of possible implications for internal developments within Jamaica and because of its impact on other Caribbean countries, is Cuba's reach south. In late 1972 diplomatic relations opened between Cuba and Jamaica as well as between Cuba and three other states of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. Relationships between Cuba and Jamaica have grown since. Jamaica's prime minister visited Cuba on July 9, 1975 and Castro was supposed to visit Jamaica but as yet has not done so.[26a] A number of technical exchanges and reciprocal visits of delegations occurred. For example, by the end of March 1976 a total of 83 Cubans were assigned to official projects in Jamaica: 20 were engaged on a micro dams project, 55 (with 195 more to come) on a school construction project, and 8 (with 12 more expected) on a housing project.[27] Also of note was the fact that one delegation from Jamaica with expenses paid by the PNP attended the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba held in December, 1975.[28]

In 1974 we asked eighty-three of Jamaica's top leaders[29] the following question: Do you think that Jamaica should make any changes in its economic relationships with other countries *in the Caribbean*? Eighty-two leaders responded:

Responses	Percent
Yes, increase relationships	67
No, they should stay about the same	32
Yes, relationships should be decreased	1

Two-thirds of the leaders wanted to increase economic relationships with other countries in the Caribbean, but a rather sizeable minority, nearly a third, did not. Considering that the Jamaican leadership, with a few notable exceptions, had

[26a] In mid-October 1977, after this article had gone to press, Fidel Castro did visit Jamaica where he was praised by Prime Minister Michael Manley for being a giant in the struggle against imperialist intervention and aggression. The timing of Castro's visit had symbolic significance, for it came on the heels of a public power struggle within the PNP that the radical left wing of the party had lost. Manley's expulsion of the left means, I think, that his commitment to the *democratic* aspect of his democratic socialism is genuine. But Castro's visit may also signal that Manley's commitment to his Third World role and to *socialism* is equally genuine.

[27] *The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner*, March 23, 1976, p. 9.

[28] *The Daily Gleaner*, January 12, 1976, p. 2.

[29] The leaders were selected by a combined positional and reputational method; then, the "snowball" procedure was used until no new names were uncovered and closure was achieved. The persons interviewed were the top political, economic, educational, mass media, religious, and other leaders on the island. For a complete description, see Wendell Bell and J. William Gibson, Jr., "Independent Jamaica Faces the Outside World: Attitudes of Elites After Twelve Years of Nationhood," *International Studies Quarterly* 22 (March 1978).

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been largely against federation with the other Commonwealth Caribbean territories and that even more culturally different territories, such as Haiti and Cuba, are included "*in the Caribbean*," it is noteworthy that this many top Jamaican leaders were now prepared to strengthen ties in the Caribbean.

To a degree, Jamaica's regional strategy manifests one of the same principles found in its strategies toward Third World and Communist countries: strength through organization. As Lewis says, the existence of regional order and coherence supports state autonomy, it offers the possibility "of concertation of national strengths through the process of regional diplomatic community-building, such that alienation of one unit within the community has as its consequences the estrangement of the whole community."[30] An example is found in the fact that three of the founding ten members of the International Bauxite Association who played a leading role were from the Caribbean—Jamaica, Guyana, and Surinam—as were two others, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, though they played lesser roles.[31]

For the Commonwealth Caribbean countries and for foreign policy in particular, considerable unity was being created in 1976, and a persuasive case was being made for still more. As Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago wrote at the end of his recent history of the Caribbean:

> . . . the real case for unity in Commonwealth Caribbean countries rests on the creation of a more unified front in dealing with the outside world—diplomacy, foreign trade, foreign investment and similar matters. Without such a unified front the territories will continue to be playthings of outside Governments and outside investors. To increase the 'countervailing power' of the small individual units *vis-à-vis* the strong outside Governments and outside companies requires that they should aim at nothing less than the creation of a single centre of decision-making *vis-à-vis* the outside world.[32]

On June 9, 1976 at a summit meeting in Trinidad, the prime ministers of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago gave further evidence of their commitment to Caribbean integration. They decided to expand regional trade, planned enlargement of regional sea and air services and, in addition to other joint ventures, agreed on a loan of J$80 million to Jamaica—J$70 million to come from Trinidad and Tobago—to ease Jamaica's foreign exchange difficulties. These acts, they jointly stated, should demonstrate to the outside world "that these four small countries recognised that they could, through mutual

[30] Vaughan A. Lewis, "The Commonwealth Caribbean and Self-Determination in the International System" in Lewis, ed., *Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean* (Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1976), p. 245.

[31] Locksley G. E. Edmondson, "Bauxite Diplomacy in the Caribbean and in International Relations: A Preliminary Exploration," paper read at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada (February 24–28, 1976).

[32] Eric Williams, *From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean 1492–1969* (London: André Deutsch 1970), p. 514.

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co-operation, contribute to the stability and development of their Region by the pooling of their own resources."[33]

Black Africa, Anticolonialism, and Antiracism. Consciousness of Black Africa, anticolonialism, and antiracism are linked in the Jamaican mind and were manifest in Jamaica's foreign policies after independence.[34] There was a "recognition of the relationship between different racial elements in the country's social structure, and the need to have foreign policy reflect a proper balance between these elements. Thus, the policy began to reflect an emphasis on Jamaica's connection with Africa and international questions with which Africa was closely involved."[35] Jamaican leaders began linking themselves to the African origins of the Jamaican lower classes. Not only had diplomatic relations been opened with Black African states in 1968, but also in 1969 both the then Prime Minister of Jamaica, Hugh Shearer, and the then Leader of the Opposition, Michael Manley, took extended tours of the African continent. "Both included a visit to Haile Selassie I in Addis Ababa in an effort to identify themselves with a figure who is venerated by some Jamaicans."[36]

Such Jamaicans, mostly members of the Rastafari Bretheren, a millenarian group, had smothered the late Haile Selassie with adulation on his 1966 visit to Jamaica. "[T]he scenes of enthusiasm and joy . . . were a revealing, if surprising, measure of the extent and depth of feeling Jamaicans have for Africa, Ethiopia and the Emperor."[37] The Rastafarians, who look "to Africa where a Black King shall be crowned" and believe that He would lead them out of bondage, as Marcus Garvey told lower class blacks in Jamaica more than forty years ago, have had a major influence on the recent rise of Jamaican interest in Africa.[38] Haile Selassie, in their view the "Black King," would never have been invited to Jamaica nor would Ethiopia have been chosen as the first black African country with which to open diplomatic relations if it had not been for the desire on the part of the Jamaican government to recognize the political importance of the Rastafarians. Thus at least part of the Jamaican foreign policy initiatives toward Black Africa must be viewed as an effort to influence the domestic political scene, to incorporate the Rastafarians into Jamaican polity and society.

In his study of voting in the United Nations from the seventeenth through the twenty-fourth sessions, Matthews found that Jamaica and other new states in the Caribbean, compared with non-Caribbean Commonwealth members, were

[33] *The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner*, June 22, 1976, p. 1.

[34] For a discussion of the importance of Africa and race in Caribbean nation-building, see Locksley G. E. Edmondson, "Caribbean Nation-Building and the Internationalization of Race: Issues and Perspectives," in Wendell Bell and Walter E. Freeman, eds., *Ethnicity and Nation-Building: Comparative, International, and Historical Perspectives* (Beverly Hills, Calif. and London: Sage 1974), pp. 73–86.

[35] Lewis, "Commonwealth Caribbean Policy of Nonalignment," ms. p. 8.

[36] Edmondson and Phillips, ms. p. 19.

[37] Rex M. Nettleford, *Identity, Race and Protest in Jamaica* (New York: William Morrow, 1972), p. 72.

[38] Claudia Rogers, "What's a Rasta?" *Caribbean Review* 7 (Jan./Feb./March 1975): 9.

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part of the pro-African and nonwhite cluster of countries on four racial, African, or colonial issues: apartheid in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, and African territories under Portuguese administration.[39] Jamaica in the United Nations "placed much emphasis upon race as a fundamental question of human rights" and took a fairly radical stand on such issues, spearheading, for example, the designation of 1968 as International Year for Human Rights.[40] In 1976 Jamaica signed the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. In general, Jamaica supported African aspirations, decolonization, and antiracism. And it did so in the early years of its participation in the United Nations, while it was still being cautious on economic issues so as to maximize the chances for private foreign investment, loans and aid from Western capitalist countries, especially the United States, and while it was still leaning to the U.S. view on admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and on cold war issues generally.

Growing Independence on Cold War Issues. Based on its roll call votes in the Eighteenth General Assembly of the United Nations, which commenced in the autumn of 1963, Jamaica received a relatively high, pro-Western, factor loading (.59) on cold war issues, the most important factor in a factor analysis.[41] This compares, for example, with .81 for the United States and —.42 for the Soviet Union. In 1965 Jamaica for the first time moved out of the U.S. camp on the issue of admission of Red China to the United Nations and abstained from voting. In 1971, Jamaica voted for China's admission.

According to Schneider and Russett's analysis of alignment on cold war issues put to a roll call vote in the United Nations from 1946 through 1970, Jamaica became visibly less pro-West in 1965–66, but somewhat moreso after 1966. Jamaica's average score on the cold war factor for all years it was in the United Nations through 1970 was .36, less than the .59 for 1963 alone. The average for the United States was .95 and for the Soviet Union it was —2.09. Sixty-one countries had higher averages, meaning more pro-U.S. voting records, and 62 countries had lower averages, meaning less pro-U.S. voting records.[42]

Jamaica's decline in pro-Western voting on cold war issues was prompted in the first instance by a growing opposition to the "politics of hegemony," that is, by opposition to domination by either the United States or the Soviet Union.[43] But it was accelerated by détente which not only reduced the priority of the cold war for smaller states such as Jamaica, but also underscored the perceived

[39] Harry G. Matthews, "Racial Dimensions of United Nations Behavior: The Commonwealth Caribbean," *Studies in Race and Nations*, vol. 3, no. 2 (Center on International Race Relations, University of Denver, 1971–72).

[40] Ibid., p. 10.

[41] Bruce Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 70.

[42] P. R. Schneider in collaboration with Bruce M. Russett, "Alignment on the Cold War Issue: A Longitudinal Analysis of United Nations Voting," paper read at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C. (February 19–22, 1975).

[43] Lewis, "Commonwealth Caribbean Policy of Non-Alignment," ms. p. 15.

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need among smaller states to act in concert in order to serve their interests and preserve their autonomy against possible superpower agreements that might negatively affect smaller states.[44] Thus the "nonaligned" movement, which began in response to American-Soviet bipolarity, continues as a countervailing power to peaceful coexistence among superpowers. Furthermore, Jamaica increasingly sought new relationships of trade, technical assistance, loans, and direct aid from Communist countries in the mid-1970s. Jamaica, like other small states, no longer felt that it must stay in one superpower's orbit or the other's.

Nonaligned and Third World Policies. Jamaica's move to a more activist and promotive diplomacy can clearly be seen in its increased participation in the nonaligned and Third World groups of states. Jamaica was merely an observer at the Heads of States Conference of nonaligned countries in Cairo in 1964. By the time of the Belgrade Conference in 1968, Jamaica was a full member. In 1973 Jamaica sent high-level representatives to Algiers with Prime Minister Michael Manley himself attending, traveling by air with Fidel Castro of Cuba. This is significant, since, as Lewis says, active involvement in the nonaligned group requires the adoption of radical postures toward Western domination of the international economic system.[45]

Jamaica was one of the forty-six African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries to negotiate participation in the European Economic Community. In 1974 Donald O. Mills, Jamaica's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, signed the Declaration of a New World Economic Order, which favored, among other things, full compensation for colonialist exploitation for all countries, regulation of multinational corporations, more active producer-nation associations, and encouragement by the United Nations of nationalization of the means of production.[46] Furthermore, Prime Minister Manley stated that Jamaica must push the Third World case in order to get reasonable returns from industrial countries. The avowed aim of government was to widen and deepen Jamaica's relationships with Latin America and Africa.

In May 1976 Jamaica's Minister of Industry, Tourism and Foreign Trade attended the fourth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Nairobi where the Jamaican delegation played a key coordinating role. Jamaica gave vigorous support for action to implement the aims of a "new international economic order" including "indexation" whereby prices of exports from developing to developed countries would be made contingent on prices of imports from developed to developing countries.[47]

Bearing on both cold war and Third World policies are the results of three surveys of Jamaican leaders. In the first, done in 1958, four years before

[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] *The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner*, May 12, 1974, p. 9.
[47] Ibid., May 11, 1976, p. 7; May 25, 1976, p. 9; June 1, 1976, p. 14.

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political independence, I asked 238 middle-level and top political, economic and other leaders the following question:[48] As you understand the general positions taken by the Soviet Union and the United States with respect to the world situation, which do you feel has been morally right more often in recent years? Two hundred twenty-seven leaders responded:

Responses	Percent
The United States has been right more often	83
Both about the same	16
The Soviet Union has been right more often	1

Responses were overwhelmingly in favor of the United States, with a meager 1 percent saying that the Soviet Union has been right more often. The open-end responses showed a generally favorable image of the United States as being democratic at home—with a few caveats about racial discrimination—and seeking to preserve the integrity of other countries and to aid them economically. In contrast, the Soviet Union was viewed as undemocratic and inhumane in methods of exercising control, both at home and abroad, and as trying to dominate and to impose its ideology on other countries.

Although the question and the data are not comparable to those for 1958, interviews with twenty-four top leaders in 1962, just prior to independence, provide some basis for seeing what changes, if any, had taken place. Twenty-four Jamaican leaders were asked:[49] When Jamaica becomes fully independent, with which group should Jamaica align itself: the Western nations, the Communist countries, or the neutralist countries?

Responses	Percent
Western nations	71
Neutralist countries	25
Communist countries	4

Despite the dissimilarities between these two sets of data, the data for 1962, compared with those for 1958, may reflect some slight shift away from the United States and the West, and the emergence of a neutralist sentiment.

By 1974, however, attitudes of Jamaican leaders had changed drastically. The data for 1974 are comparable to the data for 1962, since the samples of leaders were drawn in identical ways, and the questions, given the changed circumstances of twelve years of actual nationhood, for all practical purposes are the same. Eighty-three leaders were asked:[50] Looking at the world situation today with respect to international relations, with which group do you think Jamaica

[48] Wendell Bell, "Images of the United States and the Soviet Union Held by Jamaican Elite Groups," *World Politics* 12 (January 1960): 225–48.

[49] Charles C. Moskos, Jr. and Wendell Bell, "Attitudes Toward Global Alignments," in Bell, ed., *The Democratic Revolution in the West Indies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1967), p. 89.

[50] Bell and Gibson.

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should be associating itself, the Western nations, the Communist countries, or the neutralist countries? Eighty-two leaders responded:

Responses	Percent
Western nations	36
Neutralist countries	7
Jamaica's self-interest	27
Third World countries	29
Communist countries	1

Preference for Western alignment or association was reduced from 71 to 36 percent among the leaders responding. Two additional categories were introduced as a result of volunteered responses of the leaders, "Jamaica's self-interest," that is "Jamaica should associate itself with any country as long as its self-interest is served," an answer given by 27 percent of the leaders; and "Third World countries," an answer given by 29 percent of the leaders. Those leaders preferring the "neutralist countries" had reduced from 25 to 7 percent, indicating a reduction of cold war thinking and the reactive nature of "nonalignment" to it as the new and less economically developed states began to formulate goals and interests generated out of their own needs and world views. Only one of the leaders interviewed in 1974 preferred alignment with the Communist countries.

Domestic and Foreign Affairs: Socialism and Foreign Ownership

Domestic and foreign affairs are, as many students of international relations have pointed out, deeply interrelated:[51] Intrasocietal differentiation and domestic policies are frequently local manifestations of a country's distinctive participation in the larger international system. This is especially true of small and economically penetrated states. Multinational corporations, of course, offer a prime example. Such corporations rival or exceed in wealth, power, expertise, and maneuverability the governments of many of the states in which they operate. For example, Tate & Lyle, specializing in sugar and related products and activities, had annual sales in 1967–68 totaling US$549.2 million while the entire national income of Jamaica for the same period was US$787.2 million. Moreover, Tate & Lyle, like other such companies, had diverse holdings that, in this case, included sugar refining, land transport and handling, shipping, molasses trading, engineering, farming, technical consultation and other miscellaneous activities ranging over more than twenty-five countries throughout the world. When leaders of underdeveloped countries do business

[51] For example, see James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. B. Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27–92.

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with such corporate mammoths they are often at the mercy of the world views and self-interest of the multinational executives.[52]

Today in Jamaica it is not sugar but bauxite that offers the best example. By 1956, Jamaica became the leading bauxite producer in the world and remains today second only to Australia, accounting for 20 percent of world production in 1974.[53] Bauxite and alumina exports in 1973, for example, totaled US $252.2 million and together were the largest item (about 65 percent) of Jamaica's total visible exports.[54] Thus relations with the multinational bauxite and alumina companies operating in Jamaica became a major part of Jamaican diplomacy, a diplomacy that necessarily involved both internal and external aspects. Involved were six companies which controlled directly or indirectly 76 percent of the free world's aluminum production in 1974 and were the sole buyers in Jamaica.[55] These were Reynolds, Alcoa, Alcan, Kaiser, Anaconda, and Revere.[56]

In January 1974 the prime minister announced that the government would renegotiate current contracts with the bauxite and alumina companies. Part of the impetus was the increase in oil prices that presented the country with a crippling fuel bill of J$177.4 for 1974, nearly triple the J$65.4 million paid in 1973. But this was more a precipitating event than a cause, because "one of the first acts of the new PNP regime in 1972 was the creation of a National Bauxite Commission" whose functions included making recommendations to increase the contribution from bauxite to the country's development.[57]

The prime minister traveled to Canada and the United States in March, 1974 to explain Jamaica's problems and the objectives of the renegotiation to Pierre Trudeau, the Canadian prime minister, and Henry Kissinger, the U. S. secretary of state. In the same month talks began with the bauxite and alumina companies which lasted until May 14, 1974. In April 1974 the leader of the opposition had written to each of the bauxite and alumina companies in Jamaica saying that the government had the full support of the opposition in seeking to obtain a higher rate of royalty. When the talks failed, the government decided, according to Prime Minister Michael Manley, "to exercise its sovereign right and declare, unilaterally, a production levy on all bauxite mined in Jamaica."[58] Before the end of May 1974, the deputy prime minister announced that earnings from the new bauxite levy would finance the budget and allow relief of import restrictions that earlier had been applied. It was then "anticipated that such earnings would

[52] George L. Beckford, *Persistent Poverty: Under-Development in Plantation Economies of the Third World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972).

[53] Edmondson, "Bauxite Diplomacy."

[54] *Statistical Yearbook of Jamaica, 1974* (Jamaica: Department of Statistics, 1975), pp. 794–95, 906.

[55] *The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner*, April 10, 1974, p. 9.

[56] Alumina Partners of Jamaica also functions in Jamaica, but it is a consortium composed of Kaiser, Reynolds, and Anaconda. Revere has since ceased operations in Jamaica, at least temporarily.

[57] Edmondson, "Bauxite Diplomacy," p. 15.

[58] *The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner*, March 30, 1976, p. 29.

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be increased from J$24.4 million in 1973, to some J$170 million for the fifteen-month period from January 1974-March 1975," although, in fact, earnings turned out to be more.[59] The House of Representatives passed the bauxite levy act in June 1974.

The new levy was only part of the government's intentions concerning the bauxite and alumina operations. It was reported in October 1974 that Jamaica wanted 51 percent interest in new bauxite development and "participation" in existing operations. In November 1974 the governor of the Bank of Jamaica publicly said that the government had been buying shares of Kaiser and Reynolds on the New York Stock Exchange. A few weeks later the Jamaican government proposed to purchase at J$20 million 51 percent of Kaiser Bauxite Company,[60] and the next month a new mining company was announced in partnership with Revere Jamaica Alumina, Ltd., which is partly Japanese owned. Government was to buy the land. Revere and a consortium were to finance a J$100 million expansion of alumina production. Since then, the government has announced a plan to acquire a 51 percent interest in Reynolds Jamaica Mines for J$22 million and acquisition of the land and agricultural operations; Reynolds has agreed to increase output.[61] The government also completed negotiations with Alcoa to buy 5 or 6 percent of the company's equity shares and the right to purchase a majority interest, if it is willing to finance expansion of the present plant to a proportionate degree. Jamaican rights to bauxite land and mining were also involved.

This brief account of some of the initiatives taken by the Jamaican government in the case of bauxite revenue illustrates some of the ways that foreign and domestic policies are intertwined. First, there was the international context within which Jamaica negotiated with the bauxite and alumina companies. As early as 1972 at a meeting in Surinam Jamaica took a leading role in organizing the bauxite-producing countries of the world. In 1973 another meeting was held in Belgrade which was attended by most of the major bauxite-producing countries. After that, in the early spring of 1974, another meeting was held in Conakry where Australia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Surinam, and Yugoslavia agreed to the formation of the Internationl Bauxite Association (IBA). It was formally launched in July 1974 with headquarters in Jamaica and with two additional founding countries, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Indonesia was admitted in late 1975.[62]

The model, clearly, was the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, although without some of the geopolitical overtones. Although how successful the IBA will be in aiding the bauxite producers in increasing their revenues remains to be seen, its emergence strengthened Jamaica's hand in dealing with the bauxite and alumina companies in Jamaica.

[59] Edmondson, "Bauxite Diplomacy," p. 1.
[60] *The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner*, November 26, 1974.
[61] Ibid., April 22, 1975, p. 1.
[62] Edmondson, "Bauxite Diplomacy," p. 1.

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Some of the companies countered with threadbare announcements of expenditures to discover and develop sources of alumina other than bauxite. Three of the companies took the dispute to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and, apparently, their cases will be heard, although Jamaica withdrew from any proceedings in the Centre,[63] an act formally protested by the United States.[64] One company, Revere, took legal action in Jamaica challenging the constitutionality of the bauxite production levy. On May 30, 1977 the bauxite levy was ruled constitutional by the Chief Justice.

Jamaica's return from the local bauxite and alumina operations hardly seemed excessive. Between 1971 and 1973 "Jamaica's take off in the value of aluminum ingot produced . . . ranged from 1.4 to 1.7 percent." Even after the new 1974 levy came into effect, Jamaica's revenue earnings ranged from only 7.5 to 8.5 percent.[65]

Second, there was the domestic political context provided by the official announcement, also in 1974, that Jamaica would become a Democratic Socialist country. At its formation in 1940, the People's National Party had been identified informally as the Socialist party in Jamaica and had publicly stated its socialist commitment in 1942. But the PNP retreated from its socialist aims and expelled a left-wing group from its ranks in the 1950s. It was not until 1974 that the PNP government proclaimed in a series of widely publicized statements and acts that a democratic socialist era had arrived in Jamaica. Although compensation for socialized assets substituted for expropriation, government ownership and participation, not only in the bauxite and alumina operations, but in other economic activities as well began to take place. Amid the many proclamations, fearful responses and criticisms, clarifications and elaborations, and full and double page advertisements, Jamaicans received the message that the system of capitalism—which presumedly was at the root of slavery and colonialism—was to be abolished, but that entrepreneurism, private business, and free enterprise would continue. There was no reason, so it was said, why the private sector of the nation should not thrive as well or better under socialism as under laissez faire capitalism.[66] Although this may have been confusing to some people, the militant and radical parts of the rhetoric fitted Jamaica's new role as an active Third World country.

The visit of President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania to Jamaica in the fall of 1974 was the kickoff for the public announcements and campaign. The use of Nyerere's visit for this purpose was sociologically meaningful. Nyerere, no doubt more so than Castro, heads a state that many Jamaican leaders admire and in many respects wish to emulate. Nyerere is black, African, apparently incorruptible, and a socialist. His country's symbolic significance as an image of Jamaica's future is great.

63 *The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner*, December 9, 1975, p. 14.
64 Edmondson, "Bauxite Diplomacy," p. 24.
65 Ibid., p. 9.
66 *The Sunday Gleaner*, November 24, 1974, p. 10.

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But Nyerere had been invited to come to Jamaica in 1973 and couldn't. Although the proclamations had awaited his arrival, the policies had not. The Jamaican government's purchase of controlling shares in private companies began well before, and continued at an accelerated rate after, his visit. The economic activities so entered into, involving more than bauxite and alumina operations, included: a flour mill, some sugar plantations, Jamaica Omnibus Services, Radio Jamaica, the Jamaica Public Service Company (electricity), and some hotels. One might take PNP spokesmen at their word: state control eventually would include education, health, and social services; infrastructure, including public utilities, communications, and the more vital elements of public transportation; natural resources; financial institutions; basic elements of food and shelter; some private companies that needed salvaging from insolvency; and clearly identified areas of industry and trade where the private sector is either hesitant or unwilling to undertake development itself.[67]

In the summer of 1974 we asked eighty-three top Jamaican leaders the following question: Do you think that foreign-owned enterprises, such as the bauxite industry, should be nationalized or brought under more stringent local control by the Jamaican government? Eighty-one leaders responded:

Responses	Percent	
No	12	
Yes, there should be:	88	
Partnership with private Jamaicans		2
More local control		37
Partnership with government		26
Limited nationalion		14
Major nationalization		9

Eighty-eight percent of the leaders agreed, and only 12 percent disagreed, that there should be "more stringent local control." Yet opinions about how much local control there should be varied greatly, only 14 percent favoring limited nationalization and 9 percent favoring major nationalization. In fact, of course, "more local control" and "partnership with government" fairly accurately describe many of the acts government has since taken, although the degree of managerial involvement varies from some activities to others.[68]

[67] *The Jamaican Weekly Gleaner*, October 22, 1974, pp. 6, 14.

[68] These findings can be compared with a study done by Carl Stone, *Electoral Behaviour and Public Opinion in Jamaica* (Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1974) just after the 1972 elections. He selected 724 respondents so as to include a wide range of people from the general Jamaican electorate. He sampled areas that were "centres of tourism, sugar cane, bauxite, banana, urban commercial and manufacturing and rural domestic-agricultural economic activities" (p. 8). He asked, "Do you think that the Jamaican Government should take over the Bauxite industry and the other big companies owned by white foreigners?" Forty-seven percent of his respondents said yes, and 38 percent said no, with apparently 15 percent undecided (p. 74). It's not entirely clear how these compare with our 1974 elite survey data. Although his "white foreigners" in the question may not have invited any more favorable attitude toward "nationalization" than

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Nationalization is in part a domestic question and in part a foreign policy question for Jamaica, since its penetrated economy forces it to face the outside world not only abroad but also at home. Furthermore, the question is linked by the policy preferences of Jamaica's leaders to other aspects of foreign policy: attitudes toward alignment with the West tended in 1974 to be inversely related to attitudes toward the control of foreign corporations within Jamaica. The relationship was quite clear among the eighty-one leaders surveyed. Of the ten who did *not* want any more local control of foreign-owned enterprises 70 percent preferred alignment with the West; of the seventy-one who wanted *more* local control only 30 percent preferred alignment with the West. Moreover, except for the two leaders who wanted partnership with private Jamaicans, there was a steady reduction in preference for Western alignment as the preference for local control became more pronounced. None of the leaders who wanted major nationalization preferred alignment with the West.

Summary and Conclusion

Changes in the first fourteen years of Jamaican foreign policy comprise three stages: *acquiescent* from 1962 to 1967, *transitional* from 1968 to 1971, and *promotive* from 1972 to 1976. In the third stage Jamaica entered a period of active and innovative diplomacy.

Jamaica's foreign policy was characterized by five major features: the perpetuation of the colonial past, especially in the early days of independence, but continuing up to the present, for example in trading patterns, even though new elements were being added; regional integration, based especially on increasing economic relationships among Caribbean countries and, from an initial nucleus of Commonwealth Caribbean countries, further economic cooperation within the wider circum-Caribbean region; an intensification of support in the United Nations and elsewhere for antiracism and Black African countries, especially for the purpose of bringing about decolonization and an end to racial discrimination; growing independence with respect to cold war issues, diminish-

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our "foreign-owned enterprises," where does his "should take over" mesh with the various types of responses to "more stringent local control" used in our question? He interprets his question, however, to mean "nationalization," and, if that's correct, then only 23 percent of the leaders in our study, compared with 47 percent of the electorate in his, favored it. Yet another 26 percent of the leaders wanted "partnership with government" and 37 percent more wanted some kind of increased "local control."

Another rough comparison with elite attitudes in another new Commonwealth Caribbean state, Barbados, is possible. See Ronald G. Parris, "The Chen-Young Report on Foreign Investment and the Opinions of Barbadian Leaders: Myths and Realities," *Social and Economic Studies* 24 (March 1975): 96–116. He found in an interview study of Barbadian leaders in 1971 that 76 percent felt "that foreign capital should be admitted (into Barbados) only if it is controlled by restricting it to certain industries or by reserving majority control for local capital" (p. 113). Also see P. L. Chen-Young, *Report on Private Investment in the Caribbean* (Jamaica: Atlas, 1973).

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ing importance of cold war ideology in defining Jamaica's world views, and increasing diversity and intricacy in dealing with the international system, including the establishment of new international ties with Third World and communist countries, but without breaking relations with Western countries; and increased participation in the nonaligned and Third World groups of states and the emergence of a robust Third World identity.

Participation included not only a new militancy in relations with other countries in efforts to create, among other things, a new international economic order, but also included a new and vigorous effort to reduce and control foreign ownership within Jamaica itself. The advent of democratic socialism in 1974 was to an important degree an effort of the Jamaican government to control Jamaica's resources and their exploitation by foreign multinational corporations, especially by the bauxite and alumina companies. On this, as well as on other issues, domestic and foreign policies merged as one.

Democratic socialism, however, did not as yet reflect the final arrival of an ideology but rather a response to domestic dissatisfaction with inequalities of income and wealth within Jamaica and foreign ownership of national resources. Additionally, it was a response to a substantial increase in the number of demands placed upon the political system for the satisfaction of material needs and wants by newly assertive segments of the population. This is at least in part an instance of an effort by a government to enhance its extractive and distributive capabilities with a view to responding more abundantly to those perceived by it to form part of its "constituency of accountability."

Although Jamaica's Third World identity involved practical elements of common circumstance, such as with other bauxite-producing countries, there was also an emergent ideology linking Jamaica to other countries that were formerly dependent politically, are still dependent economically, sources of raw materials, and whose peoples tend to be nonwhite.*

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Book Reviews

Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State *by Daniel Yergin. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977. 526 pp. $15.00.*

Although it covers much familiar ground for the period 1945 to 1948, this is not just another book on the origins of the cold war. It is an exceptionally well-written study based on the literature, interviews, oral history transcripts, and research in archives. It provides an explanation of American policy and the origins of the cold war, and it contains interesting insights into Byrnes's foreign policy; Kennan's long telegram of February 22, 1946; American policy in Germany; and the spring crisis of 1948.

Yergin emphasizes the relationship between the cold war and the American interservice competition for funds, power, and preferment that accompanied the unification of the armed forces. According to Yergin, war planners need an enemy and the American postwar planners chose the Soviet Union for that role, in part because the Russians were the only ones who could possibly challenge the United States militarily after the war, but also because of "growing and genuine fear about Soviet intentions and capabilities" (p. 209). Eventually, "the problem of Russia was linked to the future of the services in an expansive definition of national security" (p. 217). Yergin admits that it is impossible to determine whether real fears or bureaucratic interests caused the parties to the unification debate to posit the Soviet Union as the enemy, and he concludes that the historian cannot be sure when they "spoke sincerely and when they spoke cynically" (p. 209). Furthermore, neither the Army nor the State Department fits neatly into Yergin's conception of things. "The Army did not perceive Russia as a threat," but the State Department did (p. 211). Indeed, State Department functionaries were greatly put out by the Army, especially by General Clay, and to some extent by Secretary of State Byrnes, for not having the right attitude toward Russia (ch. vii). One of them went so far as to compare Clay's optimism with belief in fairies (p. 258).

Another feature of Yergin's book is his use of the terms "Riga axioms" and "Yalta axioms" to identify two poles of opinion that affected American policy

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in the immediate postwar period—until the policy of containment (Riga axioms) triumphed over coexistence, great power cooperation, and reciprocal recognition of national interests (Yalta axioms). Yergin's is essentially a bipolar analysis in which the nature of certain policies is deduced from the assumption that if they do not reflect the Yalta axioms they must reflect the Riga ones, or vice versa. Neither does the new terminology make old problems disappear. Yergin's own discussion of the point at which the Yalta axioms gave way to the Riga ones is illustrative. At one point he says the Yalta axioms "lingered on" until January, 1946 (p. 105). Later he notes that at Moscow in December 1945 Byrnes "proved that the Yalta axioms were still viable, but they were no longer acceptable to the American government" (p. 162). A few pages later, we note that Kennan's long telegram of February 22, 1946 "was meant to, and indeed did, make a complete repudiation of the Yalta axioms" (p. 170). Later still, we find Byrnes going to Paris in April 1946 "closer to the hard line of the Riga outlook," but obviously still inclined to be James F. Byrnes (p. 222). Later we read that Henry Wallace's removal as Secretary of Commerce in September 1946 ended "the debate over the basic ideological outlook" and "the Yalta axioms were to be ignored for a generation" (p. 255). But finally we learn, from Yergin's own attempt to be precise, that the Yalta axioms died "at Moscow in the spring of 1947," and that they were buried in London in December of the same year (p. 334).

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The Military and Politics in Modern Times *by Amos Perlmutter. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977. 335 pp. $15.00.*

The comparative analysis of the military in politics comes of age with the publication of this impressive book, which will surely become as influential as the works of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz were for an earlier phase. Serious inquiry in this field goes back no more than three decades; unlike his predecessors, Amos Perlmutter can build a comprehensive theoretical statement upon a now substantial base of monographic literature, as well as on the cumulating experience of military intervention in politics in many parts of the globe.

Only in the late 1950s did it become clear that the praetorian state (defined as one in which the military tends to intervene and has the ability to dominate the executive) was more than a curious Latin American excrescence, attributable to the pathology of Hispanic political culture and tradition. Now few would challenge the author's forecast that the spread and institutionalization of the praetorian state is likely in many areas. Thus one can only applaud a study which so comprehensively examines this crucial phenomenon. Perlmutter is well suited to the task; he departs from a solid base of his own research on the military in Israel and the Middle East, to which has been added a careful inventory of secondary materials concerning Western Europe, the Soviet Union, China, Africa, and Latin Amer-

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ica. He has close intellectual ties to Huntington, yet differs with him in important respects.

Perlmutter offers a parsimonious typological framework of military roles. Armies may be classified as professional (noninterventionist service to the state), praetorian (permanent disposition to intervene), and revolutionary (participant-servant of national liberation). The historical dynamic for the model lies in the steady professionalization of the military, joined in a related crystallization of corporatist identity. Corporatism is first observed in the newly professionalized European armies of the nineteenth century; however, these remain firmly in the service of the state, whether it be aristocratic-monarchical (Prussia-Germany) or republican (France). Praetorian corporatism emerges initially in Latin America, as the caudillos give way to the interventions of the newly professionalized national military forces, first as arbitrators, more recently as rulers. A comparable process is observed in the Middle East and Africa since the war. In the revolutionary army, corporatism is contained by the shared ideological commitments of the military and political leadership. The revolutionary army pursues professionalization, but not intervention.

The author then builds upon this frame a globe-hopping discussion of the interactions between regime type, professionalism and corporatism in many settings. For example, he offers explanations for the apolitical corporatism of the French army in the service of a regime disliked by many of its officers, in contrast to the assertive and ultimately disastrous praetorian role of a modernzing Japanese army. Latin America is suggested as an "advanced modern praetorian model," which delineates the probable future shape of civil-military relations in nonwestern states.

Few will agree with all of a study so wide ranging in time and space, so replete with provocative statements ranging from the lapidary dictum (for example, "the Cultural Revolution signified the desire to abandon all that was not Maoist about Chinese communism," p. 218) to the macrotheoretical ("An instrumental or mechanical subordination of the military has characterized the status quo powers . . . but in China, North Vietnam and Israel the subordination of the military to a higher political authority has not been instrumental but organic." p. 291).

Despite his disclaimers, "the military" generally appears as a reified element in politics; the aimless, accidental, often purposeless causes of intervention, so skillfully documented by Samuel Decalo in his recent *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, acquire for Perlmutter a historical logic not apparent in the known facts about such events as the Olympic assassination, the Amin takeover, the endless chain of coups in Benin. Praetorians are said not to be revolutionaries, yet half the dozen old African regimes currently claiming fidelity to Marxism-Leninism are of military origin. Classification of the Israeli military in the same revolutionary/national liberation category as China or Vietnam is unconvincing, and not useful analytically; the PLA and the Israeli citizen army are really not very comparable, nor do Moshe Dayan and General Giap belong to the same genus.

To each reader his own list of points to debate with the author; what makes this

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excellent book indispensable reading for all is the analytical framework Perlmutter has developed. He has provided the categories which will shape the debate in this field over the coming decade.

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG
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American Democracy and World Power *by Robert A. Isaak. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1977. 216 pp. $12.95.*

To many observers the most important legacy of Vietnam, Watergate, and monetary collapse is an overdue consciousness that American power is finite. Born of its past excesses, the new caution guiding U.S. foreign policy offers them hope that American will not soon again blunder into regions that strained the moral and economic resources of our nation. Anyone so persuaded will find Robert A. Isaak's *American Democracy and World Power* a disturbing book, for it is the author's thesis that not only democracy within the United States but "the best of Western democratic institutions" will become dangerously compromised without a new—and benign—assertion of American power abroad (p. 3).

Isaak is an idealist in realist's clothing. If his broad purpose is to establish the guidelines for an ethical foreign policy (one that is sensitive to the needs and aspirations of the world's poorest nations), he does so because he believes America's own well-being requires it. From this vantage point he finds the Kissinger/Nixon policies of détente—"the strong man's club"—and Brzezinski's trilateralism—"the rich man's club"—sorely wanting. Both are expressions of the limits of power thesis. To succumb to their blandishments is to contract the European disease. In the extreme, "America could end up as decadent as the Old World with its passive acceptance of a rigid class system and barriers to social mobility" (p. 4). By doing so, moreover, the United States concedes the game of world influence to Russia and China, both of whom would be able to marshal a more coherent and appealing ideology for the consumption of the Third World.

Isaak sees a direct relationship between U.S. policies at home and abroad. Nixon's war against permissiveness is reflected in Kissinger's Metternichean foreign policies, and vice versa. Hence, "to change this country's foreign policy, its internal structures must change" (p. 3). The basis for domestic change lies in adopting a program which the author calls "social liberalism." Social liberalism would encourage the gradual emergence of policies designed to "gear individual incentives to social needs" (p. 3). The result would be a more perfect balance between the competitive vitality of capitalism and the distributive justice of the welfare state. The policies would not attempt to eliminate all socioeconomic differences. Indeed, inequality of reward is seen by the author as a fundamental requirement for economic growth. Over time, however, these necessary inequalities would be rendered legitimate only to the extent that they served broader social goals.

Isaak draws extensively on traditional and nontraditional sources to advance his arguments. The results are mixed. One of the book's strongest chapters, "Education

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for What?" describes a reformed educational system to undergird social liberalism, and integrates writers as disparate as Rousseau, Illich, and Piaget with considerable success. Others, for example, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Liberalism," seem encumbered with an excess of scholarly models. Isaak's style is epigrammatic and with few exceptions, for example, "the critical question . . . is not whether capitalist acts among consenting adults should be permitted" . . . it serves him well (p. 83).

On the whole, the author's analysis is more convincing than his specific programs for reform. Few, perhaps, would quarrel with his view that the market economy has been a less-than-perfect arbiter of social needs. But fewer still might agree with his solution: "a National Social Needs Research Center . . . established in Washington, D.C., to centralize all empirical social needs research in the nation and to develop acceptable criteria for setting social needs priorities" (p. 183).

In a book which argues that knowing one's limits and accepting them is decadent, there should be no surprise in finding more proposals for "worthwhile" reform than could ever be achieved serially, much less simultaneously. The author, to give him his due, is aware of the problem: . . . "As difficult as it is to actualize the possibility of independent sovereign states that promote equal rights for all citizens in a world of increasing scarcity and a population explosion, the ideal may well be the only coherent basis for an American policy that seeks to serve the free world" (p. 9). For America's is the task of Sisyphus, ". . . to push states (including our own) toward democracy while knowing full well we will fail, more or less, in the end" (p. 10). This is an important book, despite its shortcomings, and deserves a wide readership.

BENJAMIN M. ROWLAND
Salomon Brothers

Offense and Defense in the International System *by George H. Quester. New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1977. 219 pp. Cloth, $10.95; paper, $6.95.*

One of the enduring questions of military strategy is the relationship between the offense and the defense, and in particular, the extent to which the weapons of the day favor offensive or defensive forces. Professor Quester seeks to answer such questions in a study encompassing the conduct of warfare from ancient times to the late twentieth century. Historically, Quester contends, technologies that enhanced mobility have strengthened the offense, just as the erection of walls and other fortifications has encouraged the defense. The modern state came into existence after the cannon made indefensible the smaller fortification, as symbolized dramatically in the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453.

In the early nineteenth century, the development of mass mobilization—the levee en masse—enhanced the offense for several reasons. For example, no economy could long endure with its labor force conscripted for war service. Hence mobilizations had to be followed by an offensive thrust, if possible while the enemy had not yet begun or completed his own mobilization. After 1871, advances in trans-

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portation technology dictated the taking of the offensive in land warfare as quickly as possible, so strategists of the time believed. Correctly, however, the author points out that, in retrospect, the advantage accruing to the offense by World War I had made it possible for defending forces to inflict enormous casualties on offensive forces. Thus before World War I the machine gun was underrated as an instrument of defensive power, while the advantages allegedly accruing to the offense were overrated.

As the author himself acknowledges, there is in his analysis a bias toward the defense based on the premise that peace is more likely when defenses seem to be more formidable than offensive weapons: "Offenses produce war and/or empire; defenses support independence and peace" (p. 208). When he discusses nuclear weapons, Professor Quester questions the morality of a deterrence system dependent on retaliatory threats against civilian populations, especially in the case of the Soviet Union composed of "people who might well have voted for a noncommunist leadership if they had been given a choice" (p. 160).

Yet he shrinks from the full implications of this question by embracing the logic of mutual assured destruction which has been so widely espoused by other members of the U.S. strategic community, but which is rejected in Soviet literature on nuclear strategy and in Soviet planning both for strategic-nuclear and general purpose forces. Supposedly, war is more likely to be deterred, the author suggests, if the civilian populations of both the Soviet Union and the United States are held hostage to their respective nuclear forces (p. 160). This leads the author to a preference for offensive strategic missiles as stabilizing and to opposition to ballistic missile defense of civilian populations as destabilizing—all of which is part of a now conventional wisdom in the United States on nuclear strategy. In keeping with his preference for countercity, or finite deterrence, as opposed to counterforce, or the targeting of enemy weapons and other military installations, Quester is apprehensive of the increase in missile accuracies, which might "pose a distinct threat that shooting first might again make sense in some future missile vs. missile duel" (p. 201).

Missing from Professor Quester's analysis is the Soviet conception of strategy and nuclear weapons. Nowhere does he consider asymmetries between Soviet and American strategic doctrines. Soviet planners hold views, both about the nature of nuclear war and the methods by which it is to be waged, that vary widely from those so widely espoused in the United States. In the American model, mutual deterrence in the nuclear age depends upon willingness of both sides to accept certain assumptions about damage levels. We assume that the destruction inherent in nuclear war would outweigh the potential gains, that the strategic nuclear balance is relatively stable, and that both the United States and the Soviet Union have an equal interest in, and responsibility for, reducing the likelihood of nuclear war.

As the author so ably points out in earlier sections of this volume, seldom, if ever, historically have there been large-scale political and military symmetries on both sides. At least one party—and perhaps both protagonists—have striven to achieve breakthroughs in strategies, tactics, and weapons that might provide de-

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cisive, even if momentary, advantages. It is not unreasonable to assume that the Soviet Union views offensive and defensive weapons as integral to its military strategy and force levels, just as it has eschewed made-in-America conceptions of deterrence in favor of a concept that might be stated as follows: what it takes to deter war is what it takes to prevail in war. Until the academic ethnocentrism of much of the American strategic affairs community is leavened by a greater understanding of the strategic thought of the Soviet Union, our appreciation of the relationship between the offense and defense in the late twentieth century will be inadequate to our needs both as students of defense and as policy makers.

ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR.
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

The Arms Bazaar: From Lebanon to Lockheed *by Anthony Sampson. New York, The Viking Press, 1977. 352 pp. $12.95.*

This is a well-written and interesting account of today's arms traffic around the globe, together with chapters on the earlier arms trade dating back into the nineteenth century. It presents material the author has obtained in personal interviews around the world combined with an obviously adequate and extensive reading of published materials on the subject. It will thus serve very well as an introduction for students or readers wanting to put the conventional arms trade in perspective.

There are nonetheless some partial drawbacks to the book. The author is very good at putting the flow of events into macroscopic perspective as his account rolls along, bringing major trends to the surface, keeping forests from being mistaken for trees, and vice versa. Yet he is curiously reticent about expanding on this to present and tabulate any major theoretical points about the sales and transfers of conventional arms, indeed toward the end almost deliberately watering down any conclusions he seems to be reaching. For example, one encounters no systematic discussion of the kinds of impacts arms transfers have in one area and another, the difference between such sales to factions in Lebanon, or to Israel and Egypt, or to Iran, or to Peru. The book thus reads, more than it needs to, as a simple chronological commentary, abruptly terminating to meet a press deadline, in February of 1977.

The book, moreover, is footnoted in a style almost suggesting a late response to some critical reader; the notes repeatedly water down or reverse a perhaps too boldly stated factual point in the main text.

The readability and liveliness of the book, moreover, exact some price in making it less than reliably definitive as a catalog to all that is happening; for this one would thus have to turn to the various publications of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), to which Mr. Sampson admits his own indebtedness.

If Sampson is slow to advance many general conclusions of his own, one perverse conclusion nonetheless comes to mind on the basis of the overview he so ably pre-

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sents: nothing seems to be very new about the arms traffic. The earlier days of Krupp and Vickers and Zaharoff saw extensive use of bribery, and extensive confusions of interest and conflicts of interest between the military and the industrial, just as today. The beginning of this century saw world-wide interdependencies in the production of steel or machine guns—that is, saw all of the "challenges to sovereignty" and "transnationalism" that are so often described as a new phenomenon of the current scene. The period immediately before World War I thus saw the armaments manufacturers of virtually all the major powers selling to the armed forces of each of the others; this confusion of motives, this compromise of patriotism, did not prevent World War I, and it did not cause it either.

Other authors may introduce other evidence. Someone else's account might indeed identify some qualitative difference, or quantitative jump, to differentiate the present from the past. Yet the implication of Sampson's book is that we should be neither less dismayed, nor more dismayed, now that Lockheed has replaced Krupp in this process. Above all, we may have reinforcement for the traditionalist conclusion that only "countries" like Germany and the United States can fight wars; Krupp and Lockheed cannot. If "merchants of death" have been above patriotism in selling to one and all, this has not yet meant that they are rivals to, or substitutes for, the state, in the political role sovereign units play.

GEORGE H. QUESTER
Cornell University

Storm Over the Multinationals: The Real Issues *by Raymond Vernon. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1977. 260 pp. $12.50.*

Are multinational corporations a good thing? Prominent defenders of their behavior like Senator Daniel P. Moynihan and former Undersecretary of State George Ball perceive them as instruments of global improvement in living standards and implicit opponents of narrow economic nationalism. Their legions of critics focus either on the general damage multinationals inflict upon poor societies, after the fashion of Richard Barnet and Ronald Muller in *Global Reach*, or proceed industry by industry to identify alleged price rigging, political meddling at home and abroad, and abrogation of national sovereignty. This was the tack taken by Anthony Sampson in his unloving chronical of ITT and by Robert Engler in his more recent dissection of the energy giants.

Raymond Vernon, Director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs, has served as adviser to the governments of various developing nations in their dealings with the multinationals and is, perhaps, this country's closest student of multinational business. His is testimony worth heeding, particularly because it is couched in the most temperate tones of sweet reason. Although this is a mercifully concise study, the civilized text is solidly founded on a large number of specialized studies, many of them supervised or initiated by Dr. Vernon.

Vernon's broadest conclusion is agnostic. Sometimes multinationals have pro-

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moted economic development, at other times they have slowed or distorted desirable growth paths in poor countries. His other judgments are equally temperate. In some respects, the multinationals may be said to have increased the competitiveness capitalism, in others to have sabotaged competition by an ingenious variety of market sharing and price setting devices. A fair example of Vernon's calm judgment is his evaluation of the impact of OPEC on the international energy companies: ". . . the capacity of the industry's leading enterprises to manage the distribution of oil in foreign markets remained a necessary—though perhaps not a sufficient—element in protecting the profit margins of the oil companies and the countries. Without OPEC those margins might well have shrunk" (p. 87). Which is to say that OPEC and the Seven Sisters needed each other rather more, possibly, than the world needed OPEC and the Seven Sisters.

Have the multinationals become supranational governments? Their undoubted power to shift operations from one country to another weakens the bargaining power of national unions and the capacity of political authorities to regulate and tax corporations equipped with such powerful means of retaliation. Vernon identifies powerful countervailing forces, among them the growth of international cooperation among trade unions, rivalries among the multinationals which on occasion permit astute politicians to play one business monster off against another, and the beginnings of efforts to define international codes of good conduct for global enterprises.

At the moment, argues Vernon, the best prospects for civilizing the multinationals are agreements by the industrialized countries where the multinationals are chartered on such major topics as common taxation policies, allocation of central administrative costs, and transfer pricing. Further down the road, ". . . some nations, even developing nations, may be persuaded to face the problem of uncoupling and remeshing their national jurisdictions in order to handle multinational-enterprise problems" (p. 215).

In the meantime, labor unions in high-wage countries have good reason to worry about job loss and governments everywhere will be well advised to keep close watch on these huge agglomerations of capital and expertise, which are even more difficult to live without than they are to live with.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN
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The Control of Oil *by John M. Blair. New York, Pantheon Books, 1977. 442 pp. $15.00.*

This data-packed volume has been hailed on the one hand as "the definitive book on oil," and on the other as "a recitation in which there is not much particularly new." The book reflects clearly the author's history and activities during the thirty-two years in which he served in the federal government. Mr. Blair served as co-author of the Federal Trade Commission's Staff Report on the International Petroleum Cartel published in 1952 by the Senate Small Business Committee, and later

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as assistant chief economist of the Senate Sub-Committee on Antitrust and Monopoly. In this volume (which was released only a few days after his death), the author shows his great knowledge of the petroleum industry. The book also reveals his prejudices, for he is clearly among those who believe in the devil theory of history, and especially in the deviltry of the great oil companies, the famous "seven sisters."

The book is a study of the control of supply and markets in the petroleum industry, and so of the ways in which oil prices have been determined in the years since William d'Arcy, an Australian mining speculator, first discovered oil in Iran. Much of the history of how controls by the oil companies developed and have been strengthened has been written before, but Dr. Blair traces it once more as part of his study of the modern sharing of control among the large oil companies and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Of particular importance is Dr. Blair's discussion of the increasing quantity of oil produced by smaller marketeers and independent refiners during the 1970s, and the ways in which they themselves came under control. His discussion of Enrico Mattei and the growth of ENI is not only accurate but particularly enlightening. In view of the ill-informed state of public opinion, even after the mid-1970s, perhaps most important of all is the volume's clear explanation as to why the so-called "Arab embargo" was not, as is frequently believed, the determining factor in the amount of oil supply since 1973.

Keenly aware, however, that a real energy crisis does exist, Dr. Blair makes a valuable contribution to knowledge of the oil industry today and in the future in his clearly argued suggestions for coping with the technological aspects of that crisis, and for developing other sources of energy and energy-saving techniques. These include the utilization of the large supplies of oil shale, abundant particularly in the United States; the development of solar energy; greater use of electric cars, now capable of traveling much longer distances than before; and—most important—the increased use not only of smaller vehicles, but use of more lightweight materials in car manufacture because "the simplest and best way of reducing the demand for gasoline would be to lighten the weight of motor vehicles" (p. 342).

Like his discussion of the "seven sisters", his suggestions for remedies at law are also prejudiced. Nowhere does this come out more clearly than in his stated belief that it is necessary to take advantage of the "oil industry's potential for competition by a sophisticated use of the three thrusts of antitrust against collusion, against monopolistic acts and practices, and against existing concentration" (p. 372). Any conclusion that antitrust can break up the monopoly of the oil industry smacks too much of oversimplified remedies. Nor is his point made more telling by his style of writing, which is illumined only occasionally by well-rounded and telling phrases, and which has the ponderous quality of many government reports. But for all its faults, the volume is full of useful data, and can by no means be dismissed as an unimportant contribution to the field.

JANE PERRY CLARK CAREY
New York

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The Origins of the Cold War in Asia *edited by Yonosuki Nagai and Akira Iriye. New York, Columbia University Press, 1977. 448 pp. $20.00.*

This book, a collection of seventeen individual essays, represents the first major collective effort to examine the cold war in Asia, a topic accorded less attention than its European counterpart. The book grew out of a 1975 international symposium held in Japan as part of a larger project funded by the Japanese government. The contributors examine with varying degrees of success the major actors involved in the Asian cold war: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, the two Koreas and Southeast Asia. While some essays skillfully focus on how the relations among these actors and their domestic politics contributed to the cold war, others are more concerned with the cold war's development and consequences than its genesis. Hence the book's title is somewhat misleading. Like many conference proceedings the book lacks a coherent framework; it even contains a lengthy paper on the Polish question. From the large variety of interpretations and views presented in the essays, it is obvious that the study of the Asian cold war is a wide open territory and that little consensus exists among students of this important area.

D. C. Watt provides a introductory essay analyzing the major schools of thought among students of the cold war. In another contribution the British historian gives a lucid analysis of the British dimension of the Asian cold war. Coeditor Nagai Yonosuke provides a thought-provoking essay on "the symbolic interaction between the esoteric doctrine of Cold War, which stems from what might be called 'epidemiological geopolitics,' and public opinion" in the United States (p. 18). Walter LaFeber describes America's Asian decision making as monopolized by a small elite of "executive policy-makers," with public opinion, congressional elements, interest groups, and bureaucrats playing no major roles. Aruga Tadashi looks at the cold war in terms of the conflict between America's obsession with "morally" justifiable principles" and Moscow's "ruthless" pursuit of its interests (p. 66). Perhaps one of the book's lightweights, the Aruga paper is sprinkled with such controversial and contradictory statements as: "the Cold War with the Soviet Union ended" in 1963 (p. 82), and "the acceptance by the public and by Congress of military involvement in Vietnam indicated the complete routinization of the Cold War in the American mind" (p. 82).

Robert Slusser's essay, based largely on speculation, depicts Moscow as vigorously pursuing its expansionistic aim in Asia and as the chief villain responsible for the Asian cold war. Nakajima Mineo argues the United States failed to recognize that Sino-Soviet relations from 1945 to 1950 were far from friendly, but readers may find his "documentation" highly inadequate. The weakest section of his paper is "China and the Korean War" which is nothing more than an exercise in intellectual guesswork. Okabe Tadashi takes issue with the conflictual view of early Sino-Soviet relations, arguing that Mao's "Lean to One Side" was dictated by China's "image of the Soviet Union as the 'fatherland of socialism' " (p. 246). Allen Whiting persuasively argues that "Mao's words . . . acquit him of contributing to Cold War confrontation through depicting the United States as either an overriding threat or a permanently implacable enemy" (p. 269).

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Two contributors on Korea, John Gaddis and Okonogi Masao, add much to our knowledge of that cold war issue. Gaddis feels that prior to 1950 Korean policy was a "blind spot" for American policy makers who lacked a strategic view which saw Japan and Korea together as a set. In Okonogi's view, Seoul and Pyungyang were far more significant contributors to the tension there than were Washington and Moscow. Turning to Southeast Asia, Yano Toru sees the cold war there originating from "unilateralism" on the part of the major powers, which led to the collapse of the Yalta system. The roles of these powers are further examined by George Mct. Kahin and Tanigawa Yoshihiko. Yano attributes much of the "responsibility for the emergence of unilateralism to the Soviet Union" (p. 328).

The American-Japanese component of the Asian cold war is analyzed by Yamamoto Mitsuru and Akira Iriye. The former discusses how the "international structure of the Cold War" shaped Japan's postwar foreign relations. He correctly focuses on the important role economics played in close American-Japanese relations. Iriye attempts to dispute the popular belief that the close American-Japanese relationship was a response to the emerging American-Soviet cold war. To him, "the groundwork for U.S-Japanese relations after 1945 had been laid during the war, i.e., before the extension of the Cold War to Asia" (p. 379). His conclusion, however, is derived mainly from an examination of the thinking of the State Department's Japan specialists. As Nagai, Iriye's coeditor, puts it, "When Franklin D. Roosevelt was president, he would pay little regard to the functions of the State Department and would let America's foreign policy be executed by a small group of aids who were amateurs in the matter of diplomacy" (p. 19).

Many of the conclusions and theses mentioned above will provoke strong rebuttals from the "revisionistic" scholars of the cold war. Nevertheless, the book is a valuable addition to the literature on the cold war. It has provided answers to many questions, corrected some of the major misconceptions, and generated many hypotheses for future investigation.

YUNG H. PARK
Humboldt State University

Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations *by Edward L. Morse. New York, The Free Press, 1976. 203 pp. $10.95.*

This is a book about the changes that modernization has wrought in the international system and in the behavior of states. The author, starting from the premise that international relations have been fundamentally transformed, makes no effort to balance his analysis by considering continuities along with changes; one is simply invited to assume the overpowering significance of the latter. He sets out the theme that "our traditional paradigm for understanding international politics" has become obsolete. This rests upon the view that our thinking is Westphalian; we bring a seventeenth-century body of thought to bear upon twentieth-century international relations. Since the serious study of international relations began

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with the Peace of Versailles, not with the Peace of Westphalia, it is arguable that the deficiencies of our thinking in this field are attributable less to its being rooted in a past that has been superseded than to its being developed in the midst of the very changes that Morse thinks render it obsolete. Fortunately, this theme fades into the background, and the book is devoted primarily to discussion of changes that the author regards as especially significant.

Morse is particularly alert to the rising importance of economic factors in international relations. He insists that modernization has moved economic concerns to the level of high politics; "the politics of wealth and welfare have overshadowed the politics of power and position" (p. 86). I think he exaggerates the slippage of security, status, and territory as objects of the concern of governments and peoples, but he is clearly correct in noting that both the achievement of modernization and the urge to achieve it produce strong political demands for economic welfare that tend to make societies turn inward and give reduced attention to the traditional goals of statecraft.

Interdependence, the intensification of which is surely one of the major results of modernization, is given sound and sober treatment in this book. Morse places heavy emphasis on the *dependence* aspect of the concept, noting that it implies loss of autonomy, incapacity to control events, and vulnerability to pressures from outside. But the other side of dependence is *dominance;* in the interdependent relationship, states can have an impact—perhaps cannot avoid having an impact—upon each other. Morse points out that, in the era of interdependence, a state may effectively intervene in another society merely by altering its own domestic policy! On balance, he sees the growth of interdependence as a factor making for instability in international affairs.

The effort to identify and assess the significance of the great sweeping changes that have occurred in the international system is both worthwhile and perilous. A good example of the latter aspect is provided by the author's confident assertion that the transformation of values has included the revocation of the legitimacy of the use of force. There is much in the twentieth-century record to support this claim, but Morse himself notes that "anticolonialism and national self-development have assumed equal status with self-preservation as legitimate justifications for the use of force in the contemporary world" (p. 168). What he fails to note is that these justifications have, in recent years, effectively reversed the earlier trend toward the "outlawry" of aggressive war. The newest shift, in short, is toward the sanctification of violence in alleged furtherance of causes that have multilateral endorsement.

The considerable merits of this book are shadowed by bad writing and atrocious proofreading. Everyone connected with the issuance of such a carelessly produced work should feel heartily ashamed.

Inis L. Claude, Jr.
University of Virginia

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Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Volume I *by Giovanni Sartori. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976. 370 pp. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $10.95.*

This work, many years in preparation, is a major effort to redefine a whole field of study within political science—the comparative study of political parties and parties-in-systems. (Volume I, with which we are concerned here, deals very largely with party systems, and with parties-in-systems. We are promised that Volume II will concentrate its focus upon party types, party organizations and underlying cleavage structures.) *Parties and Party Systems* is a work which is in the tradition of such comparative classics of the past as Maurice Duverger's *Political Parties*. Like Duverger's study, this work seems certain to be one of those rather few books which no scholar of the field can omit from his working library. By the same token, it requires any serious reader to become engaged intellectually to an exceptional degree, and to evaluate it in terms of his own political views and philosophical orientation. Once can scarcely be neutral about Sartori's work.

It is very hard work to define a field of study, and efforts to do this are very rarely unopposed. This may in part account for the fact that *Parties and Party Systems*, while truly a great effort, is also a curious composite. It is in part a penetrating analysis of basic political phenomena, and in part a manifesto. It is a taxonomy, and it is also a call to arms. Indeed, this book has at least three agendas —what may be called a philosophical/epistemological agenda, an operational/research agenda, and a political agenda, one which particularly concerns the legitimate role, if any, of left-wing Marxist parties in Western politics. Clearly, then, this is a book of extraordinary richness and density. Its discourse operates at all these levels, but is aimed in the first instance at a single professional audience. At all these levels the tone of the work is irritably polemical: the brilliance of the analytic-taxonomic effort at verbal specification is matched by an even greater brilliance in abrasive criticism of scholarship in the field. This tone reminds one more of Marx than of any other major writer in the social sciences. But, it is necessary to add at once, the content is passionately anti-Marxist at all levels from the epistemological to the operational.

The underlying philosophical position which Sartori assumes is specified quite clearly toward the end of this volume: it is conceptually empiricist, classificatory, perhaps one might say nominalist. It is militantly anti-Hegelian, anti-Marxist, anti-"process logic." The primary fault of such "dynamic" epistemologies, Sartori argues, is that they lead to intellectual confusion, especially through the underspecification of definitional categories. Obviously, such shortcomings are likely to be even more extreme when dealing with quantitative-behavioral work which rests on fuzzy definitions, especially when it implicitly accepts single ordinal-scale continua where in fact there are vitally important breaks or discontinuities in the phenomena studied. But the chief philosophical enemy, without question, is the dialectic. As Sartori comments: "Anyone having passed through the experience of Hegelian dialectics, or of its Marxist follow-up, knows where this leads. Soft-

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pedaling of analytical thinking is dangerously close to confused (and confusing) thinking, just as 'process logic' is dangerously conducive to dialectical obscurity" (p. 294).

Criticisms of this work, like the work itself, can operate at a number of levels. On the face of it, there are quite a few significant anomalies which follow in the wake of assigning specific party systems to the conceptual boxes the author has set up. Thus, in order to maintain his argument that there is a discontinuous passage from noncompetitive to competitive structures, Sartori has to deal with the Turkish case; for here, an apparently smooth transition to competitiveness occurred in 1945. Sartori attempts to explain this away by claiming exogenous intervention: "Whatever Inönü had in mind, his switch to a standard-type democracy was a vital requirement for a small country that desperately needed the protection of the Western democracies" (p. 277). This is profoundly unconvincing. We note, for example, that neighboring Iran even more desperately needed such protection in 1945–46—just, for a start, to get Soviet troops out of Azerbaijan. Yet neither then, nor certainly since then, has Western protection of Iran been contingent on the Shah's producing a Western-style democracy. Similarly, a great deal of Sartori's discussion of the United States—and his critique of Key's analysis of Southern politics in particular—is defective both structurally and historically. Among many other things, this analysis commits a very European error: it makes altogether too much of the juridical fact that the United States was (say between 1890 and 1940) sovereign and that its subunits were not. Domestically these subunits were *de facto* sovereign in the period covered by Key's analysis to a degree for which a European *droit publique* legalism would hardly prepare us. That, of course, was precisely what the Southern white drive for "home rule"—which led to the degenerate system Key described—was all about.

But there are more fundamental issues than these. Sartori's argument that the PCF and PCI were "blackmail" parties—and "relevant" in his calculus solely because of their potential in that regard—raises very serious questions. It is well known that they were forced from government in 1947, substantially at American insistence, as the cold war hardened. They left peacefully and entered a true political ghetto (along with the millions who voted for them) in which they have since remained. Secondly, the "conservative" role of the PCF in refusing to join the May 1968 rebellion against De Gaulle's government is well known, and may well have prevented its overthrow. Thirdly, the PCI has been pursuing a policy of *compromesso storico* vis-à-vis the Christian Democrats the past few years, complete with an insistence that it has no intention of "bolshevizing" the government which it might enter. Since the elections of July 1976, the incumbent regime has been kept in power solely because of the PCI's "statesmanlike" acquiescence, and it is now notorious that this Eurocommunist party has paid a significant price among its supporters for pursuing this course. All of this does not sound very much like "blackmail" in any very obtrusive sense of the term. One problem with taxonomic classifications is that they may only too easily turn into name-calling under the nominal aegis of "clearheaded thinking." Whatever one may think of the merits

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of Eurocommunism, that seems to be the case here, and not here alone, it may be added.

Instead, we may well want, at some stage, to begin accounting for things which disquiet us. Is it true that a kind of "romantic dialectic" is gaining ground in Western social science? Is it true that there is a Eurocommunism which claims that it does not want to participate in state-party fusion; continues to grow in popular support in important countries; and plays, from time to time, an explicitly *system-maintaining* part in political life? What might these and other developments—including the soured liberalism which is found in the pages of this volume, and which is becoming very much in vogue among American scholars—suggest to us about problems of legitimacy in Western late-capitalist political economies? But this line of inquiry brings us to the verge of that "process logic" against which Sartori warns us throughout this book. Perhaps this should suggest why it is so difficult to avoid taking sides when confronted with this argument.

One may well agree with the author that taxonomic analysis has an indispensable place in a field of scientific study, and yet insist that too much of this *particular* taxonomy serves a specific and controversial political purpose. For what it is worth, it is my judgment that "process logics" of various kinds have found some favor in current political science because older orderings have lost their power to convince. If so, this loss may well have occurred because the intellectual problems presented to many scholars of politics in the present late-capitalist epoch cannot fully be resolved within a static classificatory epistemology.

However that may be, it is only fair to stress again that *Parties and Party Systems* is an extraordinarily stimulating and important work. It is quite impossible to do it justice in so short a review—for example, to the discussion in Chapter 10 of Downs and spatial competition, which is the most illuminating analysis of the subject to appear in the literature thus far. We urge those interested to buy it and see for themselves. For Carl Friedrich's observation, quoted by Sartori, is preeminently to the point: "an issue in typology is an issue about the structure of the reality concerned' " (p. 299). Those who disagree with this particular typology had better be prepared to do some hard thinking themselves.

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Toward A Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887–1914 *by David S. Patterson. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1976. 339 pp. $15.00.*

Professor David S. Patterson has transformed a fully researched dissertation into a valuable survey of the organized American peace movement between 1887 and 1914. This is a book that will be useful to peace researchers for many years to come.

The difficulties and complexities of a variety of antiwar visions at the height of international rivalry for colonial possessions are precisely presented. Patterson's

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theme is careful and correct: the history of the organized peace movement is one of "travail," failure really. So many peace movements failed, Patterson explains, because too often what they meant by peace was an Anglo-American rulership of the world.

Patterson explores the work of such organizations as the American Peace and Arbitration League, the American Peace Society, the department of peace and arbitration of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, The League to Enforce Peace, and the World Peace Foundation. The visions of Garrisonian and Tolstoyan nonresisters, free traders, "left wing" pacifists, internationalists, legalists and world federalists are all pursued. The meetings of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Lake Mohonk Conferences on International Arbitration, the various commissions of inquiry, the major arbitration conferences, the Hague Conferences, the many activities on behalf of a league of nations and a world court are impressively detailed. And the contributions of those who labored against international violence are recorded: Andrew Carnegie, Nicholas Murray Butler, Ernest Crosby, Belva Lockwood, Frances Willard, Alfred Love, Lucia Ames Mead, Jane Addams, Edwin Mead, Benjamin F. Trueblood, William Howard Taft, and that "embodiment of the conservative's reverence for law," Elihu Root (p. 151). The activities of Carl Schurz, Moorfield Storey and the antiimperialists are also cited. Unfortunately the section on America's acquisition of the Philippines is one of the least satisfying in the book.

From the Civil War to the Great War of 1914, America's conventional peace movement was dominated by wealthy nationalists who reflected the emerging "business culture" and who sought to expand America's foreign economic interests. The pre-1914 peace people were "elitists." Moreover, Patterson concludes, they were elitists who failed to make contact with other "movements for social and political change" (p. 258).

Ironically, where such contact was made, as by the women suffragists who worked arduously for peace, Patterson bemoans the association. Such women as the "septuagenarian Julia Ward Howe" were responsible, we are told, for the repetition of that "monotonous motto: 'Woman Suffrage Means Peace'" (pp. 57–58). Since Patterson never tells us the ages of the many men he mentions it is hard to ignore the quaint bigotry reflected in such observations as "Lucia Ames was no beauty and in fact was 42 when she married Edwin Mead" (p. 69).

Such lapses of chivalry aside, this work is flawed by Patterson's neglect of other points of contact between the peace movement and the great movements for political and social change that were shortly to rock all the ruling houses of Europe and to change markedly the map of our resource-rich planet. That the peace advocates Patterson selected to emphasize were elitist is obvious. Patterson's criticism of them for failing "to probe deeply into the material and imperial rivalries that fostered the arms race" is just (p. 259). But to conclude that they "lived in an age removed from the intense ideological conflicts" that marked the post-1914 generation is simplistic (p. 260). By including all those nineteenth century radical and socialist antimilitarists here ignored, by analyzing all those radical and socialist

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critiques of imperial rivalry and warfare here omitted, would go a long way toward explaining the travail of those elitists internationalists, legalists, and world federalists represented by men like Lyman Abbott who maintained: "In another hundred years we will make the American people the greatest, most potent empire in the world. . . . Together, England and America may wrap the world round with liberty and fill it with peace" (p. 33).

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Illusions of Choice: The F-111 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform *by Robert Coulam. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977. 432 pp. $21.50.*

Robert Coulam has written a thorough autopsy report on the demise of the F-111 (TFX) program of the 1960s. The author uses Steinbrunner's cybernetic model of organizational behavior to demonstrate how and why Robert McNamara's ingenious plan for a new aircraft that would serve both the strategic interest of the Air Force and the tactical needs of the Navy, was doomed from its very conception. Coulam's work, however, is not simply another case study of an abortive government program. Rather, by comparing the development of the F-111 with that of other major systems, such as the Navy's F-14, the author draws a series of generalizations about the problems he sees as inherent in the American weapons acquisition process.

Two central arguments concerning weapons development in the United States emerge from the analysis. The first is that the design flexibility necessary to correct major problems tends to erode soon after the development process begins. The author shows that once a general proposal is accepted, design tasks are decomposed and parceled out to small groups who work on their assignments in relative isolation. One result of this fragmentation is that overall system flexibility is lost. The F-111 was a completely new aircraft encompassing a number of complex and interdependent subsystems. However, when problems arose—such as excessive weight, engine-inlet incompatibility, and wing box fatigue—they were attacked individually, without regard to total system performance. Consequently, the ultimate goal of integrating the various components into a weapons system of optimal performance characteristics was never achieved.

The second major argument is that the suborganizations responsible for implementing a program retain significant control over the development process. As a result, the final outcome may deviate substantially from what high-level decision makers originally envision. McNamara saw the F-111 as a biservice, multimission aircraft that could respond to a wide range of military contingencies. However, Coulam shows how the Air Force, which had primary responsibility for supervising design and construction, had General Dynamics develop an aircraft that was

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best suited for the unique Air Force mission of nuclear interdiction. The Navy, for its part, is shown to have subverted and finally killed development of its version (F-111B) because it was convinced from the outset that the plane would never be able to provide the air fleet defense the Navy was seeking.

Coulam is pessimistic about the prospects for improving the weapons acquisition process. He believes the organizations responsible for implementing any ideas or policies would either consciously or unconsciously resist them. As long as these organizations believe that they and the system are functioning tolerably, they will continue to abide with the production delays, cost overruns and technical deficiencies that so often plague major weapon systems. The author believes meaningful changes will occur only if there is an extended period of financial shortages so disruptive to production that even those most wedded to existing acqusition practices will be forced to recognize the need for change.

A reader is likely to find Coulam's characterizations most convincing if he accepts the assumptions of the cybernetic framework which undergirds the analysis. The cybernetic model borrows a number of notions from cognitive psychology concerning how the human mind operates, and applies these ideas to explain how organizations behave. For example, it is argued that all humans—and organizations—have a core set of beliefs that help structure external reality. Once these beliefs are established, the human mind will seek to keep these basic beliefs both simple and stable. Both individuals and organizations are assumed to ignore information which challenges existing beliefs, and to avoid making trade-off calculations among contending values whenever possible.

What evolves from the cybernetic approach is a psychoanalysis of organizational behavior. Thus the Air Force supposedly wanted a new aircraft so badly it was blind to the major problems that surfaced during development; while the Navy, embittered over its subservient role in the process, was unable to recognize any positive features in the aircraft. Whether organizations, and the men who run them, actually behave this way is problematic. Although Coulam struggles to demonstrate the explanatory dominance of the cybernetic model, he is repeatedly forced to fall back on the contending "analytic" model, which posits consciously calculating actors rationally pursuing their self-interests, to explain the actions of various participants. In the end, those readers searching for the key to understanding organizational behavior are likely to find little solace in the conclusion that actors only sometimes behave according to the assumptions of the cybernetic model, while at other times they appear to conform to the tenets of the conventional analytic paradigm.

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War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The Origins *by Abraham D. Sofaer, Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1976. 533 pp. $15.00.*

Imagine what our form of government would be like if the first presidents had behaved like their modern counterparts—if, say, a Jefferson or a Madison had withheld vital public documents requested by Congress and the courts, or had covered up wrongdoing by subordinates, or had engaged in covert activities and made payments to foreigners in order to overthrow foreign governments from within, or if they had tried to justify violating the Constitution in an emergency. Imagine if the first Congresses had begun by delegating vast power to presidents to fight undeclared wars and take actions leading to war, to carry on foreign arms sales, to make Congressionally unauthorized military expenditures, to reallocate unitemized budgets.

Well, they did. In a major piece of historical and political research, Abraham Sofaer has dug into the record of the pre-Jackson years and struck a rich vein of material dealing not only with presidential war-making power but also with presidential-congressional relations, executive decision making, information and secrecy, and the conduct of foreign policy. *War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power* is a meticulous compendium of original historical research on the presidency and Congress. The book devotes a major section to each administration, organizing the material with a common set of serviceable categories—planning legislation, delegation of discretionary power, budgeting, control of information, and control of foreign and military affairs.

The book had its origins in a decision of the American Bar Association in 1971 to launch a study of the respective constitutional powers of the president and Congress to make war. It is a sad comment on the political science discipline that it took a lawyer to cut through all the pontificating about presidential power and do what should have been done long ago: to go back to primary sources and take an impartial look at the facts. Since this is the first of an expected three volumes, the material is basically descriptive with little attempt at interpretation. If there is a new Corwin or Leonard White somewhere, this book should provide mighty grist for their mills. Meanwhile, it will be an invaluable reference work for anyone studying or teaching American government. Certainly, anyone using one of the standard textbooks in this area should consult Sofaer's work as an antidote to the conventional oversimplifications about changes in the presidency and Congress.

This is not to say that the book is perfect. The organization of the exposition breaks down in places, jumping back and forth among incidents and confusing the chronology. There is a tendency toward indiscriminate inclusion of too much information and extraneous footnoting. But these are small problems and a natural result of the author's obvious excitement about his heroic project.

The main danger awaiting the reader who confronts this undigested historical material is the temptation it fosters to adopt an extreme position that is the opposite of the prevailing ahistorical political scholarship. Particular incidents can easily persuade the reader that there is a precedent for everything and that nothing

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has changed. I doubt, for example, that anyone will be able to read the author's description of the American pullout from Derne in 1805 without perceiving an eerie similarity to the evacuation of Saigon. But the real educative value of this book is not in identifying reflections of our own time. It lies in helping us to understand the complex forces of continuity and change that grow out of our form of government. Watching the founding fathers operate in office rather than in a constitutional convention, one realizes that the real answer to the most difficult questions of presidential and congressional power was a refusal to ever press for a definitive answer. The Constitution dealt with the problem of power by offering not an answer but a process. Once in government, the founders from both parties did many of the things for which we now chastize our presidents; they could be hypocritical, expedient, ruthless, secretive, manipulative, and at times deceitful. But they had a prudent regard for the virtues and dangers of the process of governing amid divided institutions sharing powers. It is such wisdom above all that seems to separate them from their modern counterparts.

HUGH HECLO
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Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection *by Graham Allison and Peter Szanton. New York, Basic Books, 1976. 238 pp. $10.95.*

Periodic sponsorship of elaborate studies recommending reorganization of the executive branch for the conduct of foreign affairs has been a hobby of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee since World War II. Dozens of other organizations have also prepared reports. The literature is immense. The principal beneficiaries, however, have always been the researchers themselves as authors, the academic community as readers, and perhaps some members of the sponsoring organizations as patrons. For good or ill, the practitioners in foreign affairs have rarely been moved—and if moved have usually soon reverted. I class myself as a beneficiary, in the role of reader and lecturer; but I confess I have felt some ambivalence in working through the latest eight-volume rendition, the report and appendixes of the (Murphy) Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. The philosophy of that enterprise appears to have been that if one got nearly "everybody who is anybody" in the foreign affairs establishment (at least the academic sector) involved in contributing to the research, a new conventional wisdom would arise that could not fail to penetrate a new administration, at least by osmosis through in-and-outers. The resulting thousands of pages are of course uneven yet often very interesting to an academic specialist like myself. There is very little of it, however, that I would venture to recommend to anyone else who is not an academic specialist; and practitioners themselves are not likely to be bothered to absorb such studies directly, only indirectly if at all.

Now, however, comes what was needed: a thoroughly readable condensation of the whole Murphy Commission product, with a pair of identifiable, able authors,

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Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, to take responsibility for the recommendations they derive. (They were top staffers of the Commission.) There exists no better compact, up-to-date study than *Remaking Foreign Policy* of the organizational problems of American foreign relations and defense (richly replete with case-study illustrations). Undergraduates and informed citizens can now be directed to Allison and Szanton for the latest word. And specialists will want to skim it as an installment in intellectual history at least. Thus they will note that the Imperial Presidency is now "out"; Congress is "in"—so is the bureaucracy and (lo and behold) some of the cabinet; and the State Department is encouraged to pride itself in better tending its own garden, no longer urged upon a vain quest for primacy.

My small reservation about the book is generally that it is focused on recommendations (like the Murphy Report itself), the authors professing some optimism about their actually being heeded. My own jaded response-rate would be quickened by more analysis, less prescription, throughout; but the Carter administration's permeability may yet prove me overly cynical about the authors' ambition for reform. In any case a critic is not supposed to malign an author for not writing a kind of book he did not try to write. So my residual doubts have to do simply with some of Allison's and Szanton's specific recommendations, especially some concerning the presidency and the domestic departments. (Congress is adequately, if unexcitingly, treated; and the chapters of State, Defense and the CIA are mostly very good indeed.)

I have room here for only one pair of examples. I happen to agree with the authors that the State Department can never achieve lasting primacy, largely because its traditional personnel do not really want that kind of work. When Allison and Szanton recommend instead that the Department should perfect its own nature as the foreigners' friend at Court, the proposal is in a congenial direction (though some occasional flag waving at Foggy Bottom should still be encouraged to salvage the Department's reputation for "Americanism"). Yet in contrast with their realism about State's inherent limitations Allison and Szanton indulge themselves in stale mythology about the practicability of a meaningful cabinet under the American presidency. Or at least their rhetoric does so, though, regarded closely, their cabinet shrinks to committees, including an "ExCab" (ugly neologism built on Kennedy's "ExCom" of the National Security Council) that is designed to take the NSC concept and expand it considerably by adding some domestic cabinet officers as members for an age of "interdependence." Yet, besides the secretary of the treasury, who has often been at NSC deliberations anyway, the authors are vague about who else should be members and why. The head of HEW is mentioned in one sentence and then totally ignored in the rest of the book. The secretary of labor *or* commerce is recommended (a move that would be politically almost impossible if both were not included—so why *not* both?) All other department heads are relegated to ad hoc ExCab status, an exclusiveness sensible in itself, I think, but hardly in keeping with the authors' rhetorical aim to accentuate the cabinet itself or at least a "supercabinet" notably broader than the NSC. The problem, apart from ambivalence about imposing particular cabinet channels upon

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a president, is that the authors are shrinking from the obvious fact that nonparochial domestic concerns have become institutionalized in recent administrations largely in agencies of the White House Office (for example, the Council of Economic Advisers). It would be more convenient to incorporate these units (and perhaps the head of the Federal Reserve Board and the secretary of energy) along with the secretary of the treasury in an expanded and rechristened NSC than to add any of the other departments to the standing membership. So at least it seems to me. But Allison and Szanton retain Sisyphean dreams of downgrading the presidency as a whole and upgrading the domestic departments for "interdependence" affairs.

Again, Carter just might bring it about. But not likely, not lastingly, not under the American constitutional system, with Watergate memories probably short, in the challenging world environment that Allison and Szanton elsewhere amply describe.

If space permitted, there are other bones I would pick in their book—but I am more concerned to report that its central nervous system is sound. Whether or not it accomplishes actual reforms, it can and should communicate valuable messages to the many readers it deserves to have. And not the lest of its contributions may be to rescue the Murphy Commission itself from the traditional oblivion of its predecessors.

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China Policy: Old Problems and New Challenges *by A. Doak Barnett. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1977. 131 pp. Cloth, $8.95; paper, $2.95.*

Since the Shanghai Communique of 1972 the United States and the People's Republic of China have been going steady, but it is not yet clear whether the relationship will be consummated by the establishment of full diplomatic relations, or the engagement broken off because of such unresolved problems as Taiwan. Over the years Doak Barnett has done an excellent job of defining for the foreign policy public the main problems in the Sino-American relationship and preparing neat packages of policy proposals. These have usually turned out to be very close to the course of action adopted by Washington. *China Policy* follows this successful formula.

Barnett's theme is that time may be running out on the process of normalizing relations begun in 1971. Unless the United States takes the initiative to consolidate the relationship with the People's Republic, past gains may be undone and the resulting instability in the East Asian balance of power may jeopardize America's long-term interests. If progress is to be achieved in bilateral areas such as economic and cultural exchanges and in multilateral areas such as arms control and resource sharing, the dialogue between Washington and Peking must be intensified. Even

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with full diplomatic relations and the best of will, it will not be easy to achieve progress in these areas because of continuing disparities between Chinese and American interests and their modes of perceiving the issues and the global system itself. Barnett counsels that the United States should complete the process of normalization while attempting to ensure Taiwan's security, and then press Peking for discussions on a wide range of vital issues.

Believing that Sino-American relations are an important element in the stable equilibrium of power in East Asia which he posits as the primary U.S. objective in the region, Barnett succinctly analyzes the complex network of relations involving the Soviet Union, Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia as well as America and China. He suggests that economic and political competition is replacing the military confrontation of the recent past, but he argues for the continued presence of a reduced U.S. military force, especially in South Korea, to promote stability.

This latter point raises a basic question about Barnett's analysis. In assuming that the United States functions as a beneficent force for political stability and economic progress, he misreads the evidence of the 1960s and early 1970s when U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia caused massive political and social upheavals and wrought untold suffering. To say simply that "it took years of costly fighting in Vietnam for the United States to conclude that its *vital security* interests are really not at stake in Southeast Asia" (p. 105) is to adopt a peculiarly narrow, bloodless, American-centric view of politics which may be inappropriate even to the policy maker let alone to the academic analyst. Analyzing policy options in this fashion reduces the task to a kind of parlor game in which the cleverest players display their ingenuity and wit.

Aside from this, perhaps the chief deficiency of the study is its failure to delve into the complexities of Chinese politics which will help determine Peking's willingness to explore Barnett's agenda of issues. The bureaucratic, regional, military, and factional components of Chinese foreign policy making are as yet poorly understood, but it is certainly no longer possible to see the People's Republic simply as a unitary actor. In the American case it *is* possible to define the web of interests. Yet in prescribing in great detail how the United States should approach China, the author nowhere suggests that America's China policy will itself be forged in a pluralistic policy-making world wherein the task of defining what the United States should do is not as simple or self-evident as Barnett often makes it appear to be.

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The Inheritance of Economic Status *by John A. Brittain. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution 1977. 185 pp. Cloth, $9.95; paper, $3.95.*

Equality and inequality are among the few central things American society, culture, and history are all about. Americans are all for as much equality as possible,

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of as many different kinds. But we are so more in the abstract, as an ideological and constitutional commitment, than in every day concrete reality. We do not know too well how to cope with the various paradoxes of equality, for example, the way one type of equality, say of opportunity, may often result in other kinds of inequalities, say of outcomes. Nor have we learned to deal with the way certain inequalities, such as ethnic or economic inequality, may result in inequalities elsewhere in the social system, as in the polity or the family.

But we go on trying to make the concrete reality of our society come a little nearer our powerful abstract ideals. And we go on making analyses and studies to see how much inequality there is and how we might construct social and political reforms to reduce it. Right now there is an especially large amount of social concern and study of equality and inequality.

Modern social science, with its more systematic theory, its better research methods, its new modes of sampling, and its more powerful mathematical analysis has been making an important contribution to the recent study of equality and inequality. Though the results of notable studies are not always in agreement, still they give one a sense of cumulation and refinement of knowledge that is of the essence of science.

About ten years ago, using national sample data, Blau and Duncan found a relatively weak influence of parental socioeconomic status on men's chances for occupational mobility and a strong effect on mobility from educational achievement independent of those familial origins. Five years ago the "radical" economist, Samuel Bowles, reported a study showing a more considerable influence on inequality from family background and a lesser independent effect of education on equality than that found by Blau and Duncan. At about the same time, again using national sample data, Jencks and his colleagues, by comparing brothers one with another, found no strong effects from either family or education on occupational success. They offered the explanation that equality and inequality were largely matters of luck.

Now comes John Brittain, an economist from the Brookings Institution, with a study of a representative sample of the population in the metropolitan Cleveland area, using an improved version of the technique of comparing the relative achievements of brothers one with another. The Cleveland sample, Brittain shows, is representative of the national population. His findings are partly similar to some of the earlier studies, partly different. His data show a strong influence of family and also a "substantial" effect of education independent of familial origins. Thus the picture is a mixed one, a combination of inheritance of inequality and a somewhat open opportunity structure provided by education. My impression, from all these and other historical and contemporary data, is that Brittain's findings of a mixture of inequality and equality are pretty near the mark.

Brittain concludes his careful study with various suggestions for reform. He thinks it is not feasible to change the "root causes" of economic inheritance in the family. So he recommends a variety of "after-the-fact" measures of "redistribution" to reduce inequality, such as a really progressive income tax, a stronger in-

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heritance tax, and more public support for education. Hardly original suggestions, of course, and not likely to satisfy those who wish to attack the "root causes" in the family or in the economic system as a whole. Still, they could go some way to creating the greater measure of real equality our abstract ideals prescribe.

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Congress Against Itself *by Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1977. 306 pp. $15.00.*

As political scientists who served on the staff of the House Select Committee on Committees in 1973–74, Roger Davidson and Walter Oleszek are well-situated both to reflect on Congress' organizational problems and to chronicle the Select Committee's ill-fated attempt to deal with those problems. In *Congress Against Itself* they perform the latter task particularly well. They provide a helpful overview of the decade of House "reform" just past, showing how the attempt of the Select Committee to rationalize the committee system drew on some of the same pressures for change but also represented a corrective to those reforms which, in institutionalizing the subcommittee system, greatly dispersed policy-making resources and authority. "The caucus reformers succeeded in taming the committee leadership," they write, but "they did little to resolve the problems caused by the underlying fragmentation of the committee system itself" (p. 57). The Select Committee's solution, "using such guidelines as subject-matter coherence, equality of work load, and balance of interests," proposed fifteen "major" committees, consolidating jurisdiction in the areas of energy, environment, health, transportation, and trade (pp. 139–40). The Committee was not above making strategic concessions—to the Republicans in splitting Education and Labor, for example, and to clientele groups in retaining such particularistic "minor" committees as Merchant Marine (after an early, politically damaging decision to eliminate), Veterans' Affairs, and Small Business. But the Select Committee by and large settled on a consolidative, "one-tier" scheme and thus, ironically, ran afoul of the subcommittee stakes and patterns of clientele access that previous "reforms" had done so much to foster. The House eventually adopted a plan devised by a committee of the Democratic caucus that, while including many of the Select Committee's procedural recommendations, largely opted for the *status quo* in committee jurisdictions.

Davison and Oleszek tell this story in a straightforward and readable fashion effectively lifting their main points from the plethora of detail and pausing frequently to develop summary explanations and to relate episodes to more general patterns of Congressional behavior. Their chapter on the "public phase" of the Committee's work, organized around the functions of a congressional hearing, is particularly well done, as are the accounts of "subgovernmental" politics centering on the attempts of maritime, labor, environmental and other groups to preserve

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their access-points. Less satisfying are the authors' reflections on the substantive problems with which the Select Committee attempted to deal. They offer remarkably few assessments of the quality of individual committees' performance or of the potential of reforms such as those put forward by the Select Committee to alter performance in important ways. They rather settle for the standard indictments of particularistic and uncoordinated congressional policy making, and assert that to recast jurisdictional lines, modernize procedures, consolidate supportive services, and give leaders a true coordinating role," while not sufficing to "transform Congress into a more rational and equitable policy-making body," would nonetheless "go a long way in that direction" (p. x).

They do, to be sure, offer a few caveats as to the advantages of committee-based policy making and even the "value and necessity of some overlap" in jurisdiction (pp. 58–59, 62). But these do not add up to a balanced appraisal of the advantages and disadvantages accruing to Congress by virtue of its "institutionalized decentralization" (p. 18). Is not Congress thereby *strengthened* at certain *stages* of the policy process—the placing of issues on the national agenda, the floating of prospective remedies, the registering of divergent interests and perspectives? The environmentalists rightly saw that, given the "stage" of most of their policy efforts and the access already enjoyed by their opposition, they and their congressional allies had much to lose by the Select Committee's plan of consolidation. And perhaps more importantly, is not Congress' decentralized committee/subcommittee system important as a means of marshalling the energy and effort of its members? Davidson and Oleszek speak of deficient *incentive* systems mainly with respect to the Select Committee's attempt to promote oversight; otherwise, they portray members as anxious to get as much of the "action" as possible. But they thereby underestimate both the *problem* of inducing members to involve themselves seriously in the policy-making process and the importance of the subcommittee system in offering such inducements. They do not conceal their scorn for the self-protective maneuvers of those mid-career subcommittee chairmen Select Committee Chairman Bolling called "dunghill liberals": "sitting on their dunghills they can't see the horizon" (p. 155). But the fact is that the present system brings the needs of such members for recognition and leverage, and the needs of the House for sustained policy efforts, into a rough sort of coincidence. It may be that reorganization on the Select Committee's model, apart from depriving scattered individuals, would leave the House's structure of incentives largely intact. But the question needs to be considered, both in assessing the workings of the present system and in anticipating the consequences of change.

What produces strength at one stage, however, can debilitate at another; one can hardly dispute the conclusion of the authors (and their committee) that in a number of policy areas Congress and the nation have been ill-served by the piecemeal and conflicting legislative efforts to which committee fragmentation has led. The 94th Congress' immobility on energy policy bears this out, even if the extraordinary expedients employed by the Speaker in the 95th partially alleviated the situation. The problems addressed by the Select Committee are still with us, and

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indications are that efforts to deal with them will be renewed in 1978. The work of Bolling's Select Committee represents essential groundwork for such efforts, and its experience a catalogue of shoals that must be traversed skillfully. Davidson's and Oleszek's study thus could hardly be more timely.

DAVID E. PRICE
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The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam *by Herbert Y. Schandler. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977. 419 pp. $16.50.*

More than any other war, Vietnam was characterized by a torrential flood of reports, classified evaluations and policy memoranda which tended to obscure the realities of death, destruction and failing strategies. The paper jungle that was so created is explored by ex-defense department staffer Herbert Y. Schandler in this book and at the end, to this reviewer, the jungle remains murky.

In no way is this to be taken as derogating Mr. Schandler. He is obviously thorough, conscientious and informed. The problem lies with the source material. Vietnam is *too well* documented. There is so much paper that it becomes impossible to discriminate among the pieces so as to render valid judgments on what was significant; what President Johnson actually saw; what part of what he saw actually influenced him; and finally, which of the memoranda were written because the writer actually had a point to advance, and which were written because they were requested as part of a routine.

In this respect, the most significant story in the book recounts General Westmoreland's perplexity in the spring of 1968 when he read in the New York Times that he had requested 206,000 additional troops for Vietnam: ". . . at first I didn't even recognize it", the general told Mr. Schandler "I didn't recognize what they were talking about, and then suddenly I realized that this was the plan that was put in the context of General Wheeler's request" (p. 230).

What General Westmoreland meant was that, upon request, he had supplied General Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with estimates on the force levels that would be required to meet hypothetical goals. Maybe so, but in Washington the document *was* handled as a request for troops by men who presumably were familiar with the thinking and the personality of the United States commander in Vietnam. How is such documentation to be interpreted by historians?

Despite the plethora of memoranda, Mr. Schandler's basic story differs little from the popular perceptions of the war. He identifies roughly the same groups that would be named by any reasonably well-educated man put to a sudden test on his recollections of that period. There was a military wing, backed by some civilians, who wanted to put more force into Vietnam and to mobilize the reserves; there was a corps of civilian officials in the Defense Department who thought the war was a major blunder and who sought quick exits; there was a Secretary of Defense, McNamara, who was replaced when he turned sour—only to have his

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successor, Clark Clifford, undergo a conversion from hawk to dove. Finally, there was a president who was unwilling to admit defeat, but equally unwilling to take the risks that would have meant military victory, and who finally resigned his office to pave the way to a negotiated settlement. To all of this, the book contributes a flood of facts but sheds no new light.

Perhaps the best context for the book emerges from an examination of the reasons that Mr. Schandler gives for writing it. He explains that a "rigorous examination" of the evidence is essential "to see what lessons can be derived from the U.S. involvement in Vietnam . . . (p. xi). After going through 350 pages of carefully documented text this reviewer could find only one "lesson." It was based on the contention that Lyndon Johnson might have been able to "seek a rapid and decisive conclusion to the war" in the spring of 1968 after the Tet offensive by increasing military strength and "removing geographical restraints" (p. 345). The president was constrained from doing so, however, because of the forthcoming election and the unpopularity of the war.

The lesson? "Perhaps, then, enemies of the United States would be well advised in the future to confine their thrusts against us . . . to the period prior to an American Presidential election."

GEORGE E. REEDY
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The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes Law *by Eugene Bardach. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1977. 323 pp. $17.95.*

This book is a worthy addition to the still small, but rapidly growing body of studies that focuses upon the wide variety of political, organizational, and socio-economic issues that arise when trying to put in place new legislation or policy modifications. "It is perhaps this broad focus that distinguishes the study of 'implementation' . . . from the more traditional study of public administration" (p. 46).

After a brief introductory note, the first chapter presents a case history of the 1967 Lanterman-Petris-Short (L-P-S) Act aimed at mental health reforms in California. It tells how Assemblyman Frank Lanterman and his staff implemented the L-P-S Act, and this story is used to illustrate points in later chapters. The next chapter offers a conceptual analysis of the implementation process, mainly through a critique by Bardach of the shortcomings of other peoples' analyses. Although one may question some of his conclusions, Bardach's critique is informative and provocative. He finally argues that the implementation process should be thought of as a system of games. "The idea of 'games' . . . directs us to look at the players, what they regard as the stakes, their strategies and tactics, their resources for playing, the rules of play . . ., the rules of 'fair' play . . ., the nature of the communications . . . among the players, and the degree of uncertainty surrounding the possible outcomes" (p. 56).

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Chapters 3 through 9 look in detail at a number of implementation games. Unfortunately, Bardach is hooked on labels ("Easy Life," "Pork Barrel," "Not Our Problem," etc.) which often distract from and sometimes fail to capture the subtleties of his thinking. He also offers lots of examples from the implemetation literature, some of which are excellent, others not so good. The sum, however, is equal to more than the parts. Bardach is a sensitive observer whose presentation provides a thoughtful, multidimensional, useful picture of implemention.

It is the same grim picture others have drawn, now embellished by Bardach's detail and insight. Except in the rarest cases, implementation is the most difficult part of policy making. Things often go relatively well in the policy adoption phase precisely because below-the-surface problems are ignored. These get dumped into the implementation phase. In implementation, delay and conflict are the norms.

The last two fairly short chapters are prescriptive. First, Bardach recommends scenario writing as an analytic device for anticipating problems that may occur in an implementation effort. Second, he says successful implementation needs a "fixer." This is someone who has the power, the motivation, and the "smarts" to move the various games toward desired outcomes. The heart of the matter seems to be finding someone who is wise enough to monitor performance without being distracted by the noise of the various games, resourceful enough to get information, and powerful enough to punish and reward.

Assemblyman Lanterman fit that bill. And it may be that in theory the legislator is the ideal government fixer being better positioned than those in the executive branch. Alas, very few legislators understand much about implementation. Even fewer have the political will or the power or the "smarts" to push implemetation. Bardach also discusses the possibility of the executive branch fixer. His analysis is pessimistic for both career civil servants and political appointees. A good fixer is hard to find.

Bardach opens and closes the book on the theme of "postliberal heresies." The overriding one is that government—and be clear that this means state and local as well as federal—is poorly suited to administer programs. The alternative is to use the play of market forces. Economists have been in the vanguard of the market movement. Many implementation analysts are now headed in that direction, driven by the accumulating evidence of their studies that show just how badly government works, and even more discouragingly, how unlikely it is to work well.

However, before we jump on the new free market bandwagon with vouchers or direct payments to industry, I would go beyond Bardach to warn that these too are likely to disappoint us. The larger message of implementation may be that our current problems, in part because all require complex organizational efforts (either public or private), can only be chipped away at without dramatic progress. This may be the most uncomfortable postliberal heresy of all.

WALTER WILLIAMS
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The Gray Lobby *by Henry J. Pratt. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976. 250 pp. $15.00.*

The Future of Social Security *by Alicia H. Munnell. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1977. 190 pp. Cloth, $9.95; paper, $3.95.*

Employing the very different perspectives of political science and economics, these two authors offer some fascinating insights into the politicization of the aged in the United States and the implications of this for social policy; and the issues and problems involved in reforming the single most important piece of social legislation affecting the aged, Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI). Given the growth in the number and percentage of aged in our population and the significance of the overall Social Security Act for all of us, these books may be read with profit by those interested in the substantive material as well as by those curious about the use of contrasting analytic perspectives. Each book makes a valuable contribution on its own. However, each also reveals the limitations of a single disciplinary view. As a result, reading them in juxtaposition is particularly rewarding.

The Gray Lobby is a case study of a successful politicization of the aged in mid-twentieth century America, the development of formal organizations representing large masses of the elderly, the role of these interest group organizations in the national political arena, and the overall implications of this development for public policy. The author's primary focus is on the process by which this has occurred; he deals only incidentally with the substance of national policies for the aged today.

Regardless of whether one views the politicization of the aged and the emergence of powerful, representative interest group organizations as the dominant factor influencing recent aging policy, or as merely one of several factors converging on the same issues, the book is a fascinating addition to the literature on the history of social welfare policy in the United States. For those interested in the factors contributing to the success or failure of social movements, it offers an interesting comparison with Gilbert Steiner's *The Children's Cause*, a study of the failure of efforts to mobilize a political constituency around national children's issues. Indeed such a comparison raises questions about the limitations of the theoretical framework employed by Pratt in providing a full explanation of the development of a successful social movement.

If it is inaccurate to attribute the success of the "gray lobby" solely to the growing articulateness and cohesiveness of the aged (as Pratt states and I would agree), it is also inaccurate to suggest that the predominant factor was the emergence of large interest group organizations. Although Pratt describes briefly how external societal factors contributed to mobilizing the aged, he fails to place the role of interest groups and social movements in the larger context of social policy developments. Indeed, the very emergence of these organizations was a product of the supportive social, economic, and political atmosphere of the 1960s. Included among the developments which facilitated the success of these and other interest group organizations were: rapid economic growth providing available funds for

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expanded social programs; a spillover effect from the civil rights movement aiding efforts at enhancing rights and entitlements for many groups; a surge of interest in citizen participation and the political influence of interest groups representing large numbers of voters.

Pratt is far more successful as a chronicler and analyst of how the "gray lobby" developed than of the significance of its role today in influencing current social policy. Clearly, an "old-age policy system" (or systems) has emerged and clientele groups are an important part of it. Implicit in the author's conclusion, however, is that categorical interest groups can be truly effective only when they can form alliances with other groups, and develop broad based constituencies in support of their own priorities. Although I would have liked a much more extensive discussion of this point, the book remains, nonetheless, an excellent account of a fascinating and significant development.

In contrast, what is peripheral in the Pratt book—the content of public policy—is central to the Munnell book. In *The Future of Social Security*, the author actually focuses on only one part of the system, the cash income maintenance programs that represent the major source of income for most of the elderly: OASI (Old Age and Survivor's Insurance) and SSI (Supplemental Security Income). Munnell's major concern is with the various options for reform of OASI. Among the policy choices she explores are those directed at eliminating certain inequities in the system, different approaches to ensuring financial stability for the system, and alternatives for facilitating harmonization of social insurance with other retirement income programs (public and private). Options are described; costs, benefits and trade-offs are analyzed; conclusions are reached and recommendations made.

This is a first-rate economic analysis. Yet some erroneous conclusions are reached because the rational economist ignores certain nonrational political realities. Munnell describes the U. S. Social Security System as a three-tiered system: SSI, the means-tested program providing benefits to the poor elderly (and the blind and disabled); OASI, the social insurance wage-related benefit; and private pension plans. Identifying SSI as a first tier, front line protection program is not only philosphically and politically wrong, but it is factually inaccurate. Indeed the underlying assumption of the 1935 legislation was that all means-tested public assistance programs would disappear over time as the social insurances expanded coverage and emerged in their rightful place as the "first line of defense". Old Age Assistance, later SSI, was seen as only a residual, safety net program, to be used when nothing else was available to protect the elderly against loss of income in retirement. The phrase *three tier social security system* is used internationally to describe systems such as those in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Sweden where the first tier is a universal guaranteed minimum pension, possibly a flat grant, usually funded out of general revenue, and nontaxable to the recipient. The second tier is a wage-related contributory pension which may be either public or private, and which may even be taxable at a certain level. The third tier is a means-tested, safety net program similar to SSI. It is interesting that Munnell's report of the

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conference discussion dealing with these issues indicates that many participants rejected the concept of SSI as the basic program as politically unfeasible. Regardless, the economists continue to view such a program as more efficient because funds go to those most in need; the negative implications of stigma are underestimated.

In conclusion, the underlying question addressed in this book is whether redistribution to the aged is a legitimate social goal or whether only redistribution to the poor is acceptable. Economists, such as Munnell, would support redistribution to the poor, and to the aged only insofar as they are poor. The "gray lobby" would probably support redistribution to the aged per se. For this reader the interesting social policy question is which are the population groups a society defines as warranting support (the aged? children? families with children?) and why? What kind of support and why? Each of these books makes some contribution to identifying how and why such choices are made.

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Policing a Free Society *by Herman Goldstein. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977. 371 pp. $15.00.*

This book should be on the required reading list for all scholars interested in policing urban areas in particular, or in urban service delivery, or local administration in general. Goldstein's own diverse background—as a scholar and teacher in a distinguished Criminal Justice Program; as a former executive assistant to O. W. Wilson when Wilson served as Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department; and as a former assistant city manager—brings a richness of thought to this book that makes it an important contribution to our understanding of the problems of policing a free society. Goldstein argues that it is essential to take "large problems apart in order to deal more effectively with them" (p. 81). This he does well. The book represents a continuous unpeeling of oversimplified concepts into a more complex and meaningful set of components.

Goldstein's basic premise is that our concept of the police function has been grossly oversimplified and too narrowly conceived. Goldstein lists the following objectives of policing: "to prevent and control conduct widely recognized as threatening to life and property (serious crime); to aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm, such as the victim of a criminal attack; to protect constitutional guarantees, such as the right of free speech and assembly; to facilitate the movement of people and vehicles; to assist those who cannot care for themselves: the intoxicated, the addicted, the mentally ill, the physically disabled, the old, and the young; to resolve conflict, whether it be between individuals, groups of individuals, or individuals and their government; to identify problems that have the potential for becoming more serious problems for the individual citizen, for the

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police, or for government; to create and maintain a feeling of security in the community" (p. 35). This list is considerably different from the traditional view of policing. He places the prevention of serious crime in perspective as but one police objective. "Activities in which the police have always been engaged, but which have often been thought to be peripheral or even improper are explicitly recognized" (p. 36). The rest of the volume draws heavily on this complex view of the multiple objectives of modern policing.

Several chapters are particularly noteworthy. In the chapter on "Categorizing and Structuring Discretion," Goldstein explores in considerable depth the problem of structuring police discretion so that police can operate effectively within a system of accountability. In the chapter on "The Corruption Problem" he describes the multiple factors which have made corruption such a pervasive phenomenon in American local policing. And in his chapters on "Upgrading Police Personnel" and "Higher Education and the Police" he discusses both the positive elements of programs that might improve police performance without flinching from honest criticism of the failures of some of the panaceas of the past.

One can quibble with Goldstein on several points. Viewing police as an agency of municipal government seems a strange limitation to his broad conception of policing. It ignores the need for policing by all levels of general purpose government and adds nothing to his theoretical conception. His interpretation of several research projects related to the issue of community control of the police is also somewhat strained. However, there is less here to quibble with than in most current volumes on police, and more here for positive action and constructive thought.

ELINOR OSTROM
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Good Neighborhood: The Challenge of Open Housing *by Morris Milgram. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1977. 248 pp. $10.95.*

Good Neighborhood is a book that puts you back on the moral track by prompting righteous indignation over the institutionalized racial separatism in American living. Yet, indignation over racism is one thing; developing realistic strategies for overcoming it is quite another. Morris Milgram's emphasis on integrated neighborhoods is certainly one important component, but it is neither the only approach nor the primary one that is needed.

The core problem, as Milgram points out, is the traditional process of urban development in the United States. Through this process, poor immigrants move into the oldest and cheapest housing in the central cities. Then, as they acquire the means, they gradually move outward toward new houses in the suburbs. Since World War II, most migrants to cities have been black and Latino, which has created racial as well as income separation in cities. Also, as blacks, and to a lesser extent Latinos, move outward, they encounter racial prejudice and are not assimilated

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in white moderate- and middle-income neighborhoods. As the racial ghetto expands outward and encompasses better housing, whites flee. The steady flow of white residents and businesses to the suburbs is now an established pattern—and in cities like Newark, Detroit, and Gary nearly an accomplished fact.

Milgram urges that this established pattern be changed encouraging black movement to white residential areas well beyond the edges of the ghettos. He would see open housing given a high priority in national policy, arguing: "The time has long passed when we need to justify open housing in moral terms. We have seen how its alternatives create segregated schools, transform our cities into dying enclaves of poor minorities, and create suburbs that are beginning to repeat the old process all over again. In the long run, there is simply no one who profits from segregation; we are all losers" (p. 200).

To accomplish open housing, Milgram advocates a combination of HUD sanctions, legal action by neighborhood organizations and fair housing councils, and affirmative marketing by brokers, builders, developers, and property managers. He provides an extensive compendium of proven methods, ranging from the legal action program to Chicago's Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities to the nonprofit, statewide Connecticut Housing Investment Fund, Inc. Because Milgram focuses on tactics initiated by citizens and investors, *Good Neighborhood* complements Leonard Rubinowitz's *Low-Income Housing: Suburban Strategies*. In combination, the two books serve as a handbook for activists in government agencies, the private sector, and community organizations.

Drawing upon his 25 years of experience in developing, managing, financing, and monitoring integrated housing, Milgram describes many financially and socially successful projects. They are of all types: single-family tracts, large market-rate apartment complexes, cooperatives, subsidized multifamily projects, and full-scale planned communities. Still, integrated projects and stably integrated neighborhoods contain a small fraction of the total urban housing units in the United States. The number of such units is increasing, but open housing is not a movement with a broad constituency.

In increasing order of significance, the key countervailing forces to open housing seem to be: the relative difficulty of multiracial versus uniracial marketing; deep-seated prejudice among all races; and the amount of dispersal that would have to occur before a change would be noticeable in large urban ghettos. The last point is that one that places the open housing movement in perspective: dispersal is not a feasible goal unless it is paired with economic development in the inner city.

Without opportunities for employment and capital accumulation in and near their own communities, poor minority households will not be able to improve their residential environments. Equal opportunity for housing is a legal right that should be enforced. I would argue, however, that creation of opportunities to earn a living is more basic and is of higher national priority.

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Delivering Educational Service: Urban Schools and Schooling Policy *by David Goodwin. New York, Teachers College Press, 1977. 152 pp. $6.95.*

According to David Goodwin, the author of *Delivering Educational Service: Urban Schools and Schooling Policy,* his book is written for school personnel and social scientists "who view the study of schools as a barometer of government service in an urban society" (p. xi). In writing for these two main audiences, Goodwin focuses on the ways in which the attitudes of classroom teachers in one urban district (Baltimore) are affected by the types of bureaucratic rules at the school site, the social class origins and educational performance of students, and the individual personal and professional characteristics of teachers. He chooses to study teacher attitudes toward parents, pupils, school innovation, classroom routines, parental participation, and the principal "because of their seeming importance for the quality of the educational service rendered by schools" (p. 19).

Urban educators, plagued in recent years by sharp criticisms from the research community, will welcome the report card issued by Goodwin, a former teacher himself. Goodwin minimizes the disparity in educational outcomes which he observes between whites and blacks and between students from different income levels. Moreover, he highlights conclusions that reflect well on urban educators; some of these key conclusions follow. Students in inner-city schools may receive equal or favored treatment with respect to the quality of their teachers. There is no convincing evidence that the attitudes of teachers in lower class schools are less desirable than the attitudes of teachers in more affluent settings. Reliance on bureaucratic rules does not breed pathological attitudes; on the contrary, such rules under certain circumstances foster healthy teacher sentiments. Schools confer tenure, employment, and salary increases for advanced degrees on those teachers with the most favorable attitudes. Such conclusions as these will undoubtedly be applauded by the first of Goodwin's major audiences, school personnel.

Social scientists, on the other hand, are apt to react somewhat differently to Goodwin's conclusions. They will be tempted to view his work more as a valuable source of hypotheses than as a body of fully substantiated conclusions. This somewhat more skeptical perspective appears warranted on several grounds.

First, the statistical relationships between the variables are generally weak. In most cases, the coefficients of association are merely directional. Seldom are they statistically significant; even when the coefficients attain statistical significance, they rarely account for much variance.

Second, the measures of teacher attitudes are suspect. Goodwin selects the attitudes, in part, because of the behavior they imply in delivering educational services on a daily basis; however, he offers no evidence to support the inference that teachers who have particular attitudes actually behave as he presumes. The absence of such evidence is especially significant in light of the inconclusive relationships between teacher attitudes and behavior reported in the research literature. Moreover, the items in some of the Guttman scales which he uses to measure teacher attitudes do not possess strong face validity, perhaps the weakest test of validity there is.

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For example, Goodwin relies on five items to measure the Custodial Orientation Toward Pupils, an attitude that subordinates pedagogical functions to the maintenance of order in the classroom. Since there are no items in the scale that focus on pedagogical functions, Goodwin assumes that a teacher who exhibits a high concern for classroom control necessarily attaches less emphasis to pedagogical tasks. The items in the scale, therefore, on their face do not measure what they purport to measure.

Finally, the relationships reported by Goodwin are generally consistent with a perspective that assigns a conservative role to schools in our society. According to the correspondence principle of Levin and Carnoy set forth in *The Limits of Educational Reform*, schools tend to mirror the social, economic, and political structure of the larger society. In line with this principle, one would expect Goodwin to find inequalities in student achievement as a function of race and income, a higher concentration of black teachers and teachers from lower social class origins in the lower socioeconomic schools, a higher custodial orientation toward pupils among teachers in lower class schools, a higher level of formal discipline rules in the more disadvantaged settings, and a higher level of experience and formal training for teachers in the higher socioeconomic schools. Only the latter expectation was not supported by Goodwin's data. As a result, a social scientist, even if he were inclined to accept Goodwin's findings as valid, might challenge one of his central themes. The results suggest a negative, not a positive, view of the educational services delivered in urban schools.

EDWIN M. BRIDGES
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The Public Interest in Government Labor Relations *by Richard P. Schick and Jean Couturier, Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977. 265 pp. $16.50.*

The public interest has been characterized as a spongy, immature and emotional concept. Nevertheless, it is consistently referred to in analyses of public-sector labor relations. The authors, Richard Schick and Jean Couturier, are to be commended for addressing themselves to this difficult topic. Research was performed by the authors for the National Civil Service League under contract to the Department of Labor. Mr. Schick was project director and principal researcher for the League. Mr. Couturier was formerly an executive director of the League.

Schick and Couturier benefitted in the conduct of their study from the guidance of a distinguished advisory panel. They began with an extensive survey of the literature and proceeded to develop an operational definition of the public interest. Public interest was defined as "access to-and-influence upon- the governmental labor relations decision making process by third parties or "interests," who were not parties to the bilateral negotiations between labor and management but who perceived themselves to be affected by the outcome of such negotiation" (p.

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150). The definition was later expanded to include the notion of access to information as a basic prerequisite for holding the parties engaged in collective bargaining responsible for their decisions.

Five case studies were developed in detail to study the public interest in government labor relations. These were of two types. The unit approach emphasized looking at a jurisdiction and identifying third parties and their methods of influencing governmental labor relations. Milwaukee city and schools exemplified this approach. The second type stressed a critical incident such as a law, policy or bargaining settlement as a decision-making output and tracing third-party influence. The three critical incidents were the Philadelphia 1972–73 teachers' strike, the 1975 sanitationmen's bargaining in Memphis compared with what happened in 1968 and the 1975 Berkeley teacher negotiations under the California disclosure law.

Some 150 individuals were interviewed in the course of the study. Conclusions were drawn by the authors from 100 of the major decision makers, interest group representatives and neutral observers. Perhaps surprisingly, there was little agreement among the responses volunteered by study participants as to their understanding of the public interest. The responses, in order of frequency, were: employee equity (35 percent), access or "due process" (33 percent), service delivery (33 percent), pay comparability (31 percent), ability to pay (28 percent) and management rights (18 percent).

The authors found that those groups which generally became involved in seeking to influence the bargaining process were special interest groups as opposed to general interest groups. Although some groups sought appearance at the bargaining table, the modal interest lay in achieving a limited form of structural access. The groups wanted information about the decision-making process as well as facts about what was transpiring. The goal was to hold elected officials responsible for their own decision making. It is of interest that the groups showed little support for a functional seat at the bargaining table. As might be expected, the study found considerable dissatisfaction with the performance of public officials in public-sector labor relations along with high support for the notion that public officials should represent the public interest. One strong perception by respondents was the press, that is, local newspapers, were influential in governmental labor relations decision making.

With some trepidation, the authors advocate creation of a citizens' advisory committee on public employee bargaining in political jurisdictions. The authors recognize that such a vehicle can interfere with the responsibilities of elected officials, is difficult to structure, and can become a captive organization. Nevertheless, they feel it is a feasible method of appropriately publicizing negotiations. The problems, of course, are that the public may not be concerned until it is too late in a given situation, and the publicity generated by an advisory committee may interefere with the parties' ability to remain flexible as the bargaining unfolds. The reviewer believes that an advisory committee can play a useful role but it requires professional administration to know when to hold its hand.

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On balance, the reviewer concludes that the book makes an extremely worthwhile contribution. The authors have helped by getting us off the dead center of armchair philosophy about the public interest in governmental labor relations. They have provided benchmarks for further analysis of the public interest in public-sector labor relations. In particular, they present a well-developed model for analysis of the public interest. Application of the model to a substantial sample will permit useful quantification of results. Also, the case studies themselves are not to be underestimated. They appear to be well done and provide case analysis useful to the many practitioners, public policy makers and researchers interested in understanding and perhaps guiding public-sector bargaining.

WALTER J. GERSHENFELD
Temple University

The Adoption of Innovation by Local Government *by Richard D. Bingham with the assistance of Thomas P. McNaught. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1976. 271 pp. $19.00.*

This modestly sized volume contains the results of national studies of eight different public sector innovations, two (actually three) in housing, two in education, two in library services, one in police services, and one having to do with vehicle maintenance. The energy that went into the project is not only commendable but awe inspiring. The attempt to draw conclusions from the research is primarily based on quantitative techniques, but there are also a large number of case studies reported which added an obvious burden of effort and which do help the reader to develop a feel for the exigencies of innovation with respect to these particular kinds of organizations and ideas.

This is one of the few studies of innovation in political science or sociology to give heavy emphasis to variables indicating incentive, need, or demand. The field will do well to refer to this book in the future as the effort is increased to explore motivational variables as determinants of innovation. These variables did not always pay off in the present study, but they sometimes did, and including them makes good sense on intuitive grounds. Something is surely needed to serve the function that variables such as "profitability" and "liquidity" serve for the economists.

The book has a conceptual orientation, but there is an unfortunate looseness in tying operations to concepts. The basic model involves five concepts: community environment, demand, organizational environment, organizational characteristics, and innovation. The myriad variables actually measured, however, so overlap these various categories that it is difficult indeed to say that the model has been rigorously explored.

The quantitative methodology employed is massive. Heavy reliance is placed on large-order partial correlations, stepwise regressions, and factor analysis. Each of these techniques has enormous potential for misleading the social investigator and all deserve the utmost in delicacy, care, and painstaking justification. I will not

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suggest that the data analysis is misleading in this book, only that there is such a mountain of it, including so many little questionable points flashing by here and there, that it would take nearly as much effort to critique the analysis as to write the book. In this situation, one tends to look for overwhelming findings that are assertive enough to weather the vagaries of massive linear techniques. Even this sort of search is frustrated, however, because of differences in findings with respect to different innovations. Very few pages are actually devoted to conclusions. The authors do try valiantly to explain the different results they obtain with the different innovations studied, but sometimes one senses that Bingham and McNaught have thrown up their hands. The reader will unfortunately have to do the same. Innovation researchers have always obtained mysteriously varying results in different studies and substudies and will probably continue to do so until a radically different approach is tried.

I found the book to be truly interesting in many aspects. On the other hand, I question whether "interesting" is enough. At this stage of social science research, the stage of the millionth correlation, one begins to hope that a sense of cumulativeness will arise from successive studies in the same area. That hope is once again frustrated in the present case. The attempt to distinguish product innovation from process innovation theoretically, that is, for the purpose of obtaining a higher perspective on a theory of innovation, is ultimately unsuccessful, as are the attempts to explain differences with additional typologies that seemed to be suggested as the data analysis progressed. The book is a search for answers to questions in empirical observations, but innovation is extremely complex and the authors were unable to begin with a firm enough theoretical core to make a very large mass of data intelligible. As a consequence, most of the book is tentative, with operational findings not strongly connected to theory and theoretical conclusions not arising out of compelling analysis of data. The raw findings are valuable, but their interpretation is ambiguous. If one is looking for yeoman research within the dominant paradigm—correlationism—then this effort deserves high marks. If one is searching for a thrust into that future which, it is to be hoped is coming, then one must search elsewhere. The valuable contribution to the future of innovation theory that this book does provide is a documentation of the unlikelihood that central problems will be solved by considering innovations to be of two or three distinct types.

LAWRENCE B. MOHR
University of Michigan

Sex Roles in the State House *by Irene Diamond. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977. 214 pp. $12.50.*

This is an important, superbly written analysis of women in state legislatures. Today there are 690 women in state bodies (out of a total of 7,562 members), a proportion which although double that of five years ago, for example, is still only

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9.1 percent. Notably, the number in state senates remains too small for analysis (a total of 103 or an average of 2.6 per upper house in 1977).

In her study utilizing aggregate, survey and interview data, the author sets out to examine sex differences in lower houses and concludes with observations on "what might be necessary in order to create a polity where politics is not the domain of one sex" (p. xi). According to her model, "political competition is inversely related to both the proportion of female legislators and the degree of sex-related differences in legislatures" (p. 7).

The aggregate data support her first hypothesis and explain the election of women in some states and not in others. She finds that the proportion of women varies directly with the number of seats per 100,000 *population*. The greater the competition, the more the professionalism (marked by high status, high salaries, etc.), the fewer the number of women. Historical precedents and cultural history also affect the pattern of female representatives. Contrary to what might be expected, that urban areas, where sex differences tend to disappear, would produce more women legislators, it is in rural town-government New England governed by "citizen" bodies with more seats relative to population which contributes the greatest number of female lawmakers. In western states characaterized by moralistic culture (Elazar's classification) more women are elected than in southern with traditionalist culture or the heavily populated urban states with their individualistic political culture.

Her analysis of sex-related differences forces a modification of the second part of her model. She draws upon data from a 1971 survey of male and female legislators in Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont to describe differences in socialization, social and economic backgrounds, political careers and legislative behavior. Her findings attest that women generally eschew bargining in the legislature and are less independent in decision making. Yet where competition for seats is slight and recruitment nonselective, sex differential is slight as well. Her data are not conclusive, but suggest that as competition increases, sex differences reappear until peak competitive conditions are reached when once more sex differences tend to disappear. In the last circumstance, the female lawyer-legislator approaches her male colleague's behavior.

A fascinating chapter is derived from personal interviews of female legislators in Connecticut and New Hampshire, expanded by another researcher's small sample in New York. From two variables, self-image and attitude toward the role of women in society, Diamond constructs a sex-role typlogy of female legislators: the housewife-benchwarmer, traditional civic worker, passive women's rights advocate, and an all-out women's rights advocate. The bench warmer—from the noncompetitive district—lacking self-confidence and being hostile to the women's movement performs an emotional expressive function. A similar function is performed by the civic worker who, though not lacking self-confidence, supports ERA while rejecting the women's movement. The women's rights advocate with a positive self-image and a negative view of women's present-day role plays an instrumental function "acting for" women and arouses tensions in the body.

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In assessing the consequences of the presence of women in legislatures Diamond notes that the data on declining sex differences do not confirm an inevitable masculinizing of women. If linkages can be welded between women in legislatures and feminist organizations outside and the work-place restructured, substantial numbers of women could appear in political institutions and society would never be the same.

An outstanding addition to the literature of women in politics.

VICTORIA SCHUCK
Mount Holyoke College

Working-Class Women and Grass-Roots Politics *by Kathleen McCourt. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1977. 256 pp. $10.00.*

Professor McCourt has produced a well constructed, lucidly written and strongly evocative work that should be of value to all those concerned with urban politics, political socialization, ethnic and racial relations, community power and the women's movement.

The author addresses three principal questions. What changes in social attitudes have made the contemporary period ripe for political activism among women in working-class communities? What psychological and structural forces peculiar to certain women's lives precede their entry into assertive community organizations? What are the effects of such activism on the lives of the women involved?

The community chosen for examination, the southwest side of Chicago, is virtually all-white, and conservative in its moral norms and social behavior. The women selected for study are mothers between 25 and 55, 75 percent of whom do not work outside the home. They are married to blue-collar workers or men in low-status white-collar jobs; and they have a median family income of $11,500. All are of European ethnic origin; 90 percent are Catholic; 75 percent were born in the neighborhood; 55 percent have no education beyond high school. An overwhelming number, 90 percent, identify themselves as middle class and believe that people of their class (but not their ethnic origin) are treated unfairly. Few of the women who acknowledge a sense of oppression attribute it to their sex.

In 1972 each of the subjects was interviewed in depth for several hours. Twenty-three active respondents from eight different organizations and seventeen inactives constitute the sample. From these taped interviews, McCourt draws a dynamic portrait of women in the process of role transformation. The actives, sparked primarily by the movement of blacks into previously all-white neighborhoods, by the deteriorating quality of schools, and by fears that changes in their communities will result in a loss of cultural identity, have joined militant community organizations. The impulse to participate is political and stems from immediate concerns. They believe that they are being asked to carry the burdens of integrating poor families, but without being given the opportunity to participate in deter-

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mining how this is to be done. Having concluded that local politicians are uninterested in them, these women are devising alternative structures and adopting new strategies as they seek to transform the government into one responsive to their needs. As they attend meetings, make speeches, march in demonstrations, compile statistics on schools, search tax and real estate records, and work in political campaigns, their circle is widening beyond the merely familial. With their expanding activities, they now have opportunities to exercise skills and to grow in self-confidence. McCourt summarizes their experience: "intensive involvement . . . correlates with what may be judged a realistic assessment of minimal input into the political system as things are currently operating combined with a strong sense of potential power and diminishing befuddlement with the complexities of government" (p. 181). In the absence of a feminist perspective, these women are acting in ways that strongly support the goals of the women's movement. In so doing, they are asserting a new "selfhood," are refusing to be "victims," and are giving up the belief that they are "powerless"—common denominators characteristic of all feminist advance. The picture which emerges is inconsistent with the previous "social isolation" image of working-class women delineated by Komarovsky and Rainwater.

Although McCourt modestly characterizes her work as not providing "any definitive analysis" (p. 6), her percipient study abounds in penetrating insights and suggestive hypotheses. There is one factual error: Forest Hills is not a working-class community (p. 15). The omissions of an index and an appendix detailing the interview schedule are regrettable.

McCourt displays no condescension toward her respondents and has a gift for grasping the feelings of women very different from herself and communicating them with precision. Although she does not share their political objectives, she extends the utmost sympathy to her subjects as they grope their way toward greater self-realization as citizens and as human beings. The research was supported by the Center for the Study of American Pluralism and by the Ford Foundation. They made a wise investment, for the recipient of their grants has given us a gem of a book which is a valuable addition to the social science literature.

RITA W. COOLEY
New York University

We Were There: The Story of Working Women in America *by Barbara Mayer Wertheimer. New York, Pantheon Books, 1977. 427 pp. $15.95.*

Women are not new to the American work force, only to written history. All women were forced to work in the harsh, exhausting and often dangerous settlement of America. It was the Indian woman who shared critical information about agriculture and medicine, and taught settlers how to farm and make essential tools. Without women working beside them, the early colonists could never have survived. And when the industrial revolution spread along the eastern seaboard, taking

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women out of their homes to "man" the machines, their households continued to be their responsibility.

Another reviewer of *We Were There* has underscored the fact that unlike men, women could opt out and leave the work force for home and family. Three critical points that Wertheimer makes should set the record straight on this exaggerated notion. First, the women who could choose not to work were those who had the means to escape factory life. But even this decision could not possibly have been made for some 200 years, during which colonial settlement and the westward movement required them to share all the burdens of the common lot. Second, the role of working women has been neglected by scholars so we simply don't know much about their lives. Third, most women were too hard at work to have the "luxury" of time to write of their experiences. Family rearing during the period of which the author writes, the seventeenth century to 1912, involved tremendous burdens and responsibilities.

Women generally earned far less than men for the same work, and many were compelled to take up prostitution to make ends meet. As specialization intensified, women were segregated into those jobs with lower pay and esteem. Forced at times to give up their young children to factories, they also lived in wretched housing. One can only wonder how they survived, working long hours at indecent work places. This is a dramatic account, simply told, of the costs to human decency private enterprise wrung from women and their families.

Since the author has spent a lifetime educating working women, she brings a sensitivity and understanding to two important topics, black women and unionization. Sections of the book focus on black women. Their story is depressing. They served as slaves in both field and factory in the south, and later found work as washerwomen and household workers in the north, where their wages were always lower and their working conditions harsher than those of their white sisters. Rarely, if ever, enjoying the luxury of choice between home and work, they were compelled to supplement their husband's always inadequate wages. Black women have always been faced with unemployment. Those who eventually became heroic leaders experienced the double burden of race and sex prejudice.

The author does not neglect the special problems evoked by women themselves, particularly as these applied to unions. Influenced by the same culture affecting their fathers and husbands, bound by tradition and education, women also feared unionization. Some looked forward to marriage as a possible way out of the drudgery of factory conditions, caring little about unions. There were those who preferred a 10¢ show in town to attending a union meeting Sharing the apathy and hopelessness of male workers, they often turned a deaf ear to the pleas of organizers. Despite all the handicaps of being both a worker and a women, a corps of fine and dedicated female leaders emerged, building communal strength. Except for the Knights of Labor and select leaders among the IWW, women had tough sledding with male-dominated unions. For too long male unionists have kept women at arms' length, away from the centers of power and influence, away from learning the organizational skills essential to unionization, and away from sharing

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the resources of group strength. Add to this the physical difficulties, the distance between factories, and uncomfortable buggy rides and train rides, the inadequate communication system and then, upon arrival in a strange town, having to face unsympathetic community receptions. One can only wonder in amazement that there were successful women unionizers. The gap in studies of women workers left by Commons, Perlman, Taft, and others has finally been filled.

JEWEL BELLUSH
Hunter College, City University of New York

Doing Better and Feeling Worse: Health in the United States *edited by John H. Knowles. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1977. 287 pp. Cloth, $9.95; paper, $3.95.*

This volume is a collection of essays which first appeared in the Winter 1977 issue of *Daedalus*. The authors include some of the most eminent names in American medicine and indeed, for this reason perhaps, the book's point of view might be held suspect. Only two of the twenty-one contributors, their biographies tell us, were born after 1930, all but four are physicians, and none would qualify as consumers of health care.

The book's thesis seems to be that despite rising health expenditures and the triumphs of modern medicine, there is something awry with the health system. Three-quarters of all Americans, says Aaron Wildavsky, are satisfied with their health care, yet most people wish it didn't cost so much and would prefer more contact with their physician. Wildavsky cites what he calls the Law of Medical Money, namely, that costs rise to equal the sum of all private insurance and public subsidies. As a corollary he also gives us the Medical Uncertainty Principle, the idea that "there is always one more thing that might be done—another consultation, a new drug, a different treatment" (p. 108). The result: ever higher costs and health spending.

None of this, of course, is particularly profound and may in fact even be misleading. Another surgical consultation, for instance, may save money by advising against surgery. A new drug may be more cost-effective than traditional treatment.

It is easy to be simplistic about health care. Wildavsky tells us, for instance, that access to care is now "more evenly distributed among rich and poor . . ." (p. 106). Yet this statement is only partly true. The poor now use as many yearly doctor visits as the nonpoor, but in view of their higher illness rate their use is still too low. Similarly, though we are told that health status has improved, it is not emphasized that the gaps in such key health measures as death rates or life expectancy between rich and poor, black and white, have scarcely narrowed at all since World War II.

All of this is a prelude to my opinion of what is wrong with this volume. Admirably written by scholars in the field, it nevertheless fails to address the basic issues. Why are there such disparities in the health of our people? Why is the world's

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richest nation seemingly unable to provide basic health services to large numbers of its citizens? Are the 75 percent who say they are satisfied with their health care really satisfied? *Should* they be?

In an essay on evaluating doctor performance Walsh McDermott tells us that a good doctor is one who "can be trusted" to provide high quality care (p. 137). He dismisses review of individual doctors' records as something that can only ascertain if "minimal standards" are being met. He eschews evaluation of the outcomes of care by telling us that there is seldom any relationship between a doctor's actions and the outcome of illness. Finally, he predicts that methods of judging quality are ten to twenty years away.

This theme—that there is little relation between doctors and health care, and better health—is reiterated in several places in the book. It is a common theme of people who teach and write about health care. It is not, to my knowledge, a common thesis of those poor and indigent who lack health services where they live, nor of the ever increasing numbers who seek care in our crowded clinics and emergency rooms.

Again, this theme points up what I find wrong with this volume. There is little sense of outrage, little sense of urgency. If doctors and hospitals are of only marginal utility in improving health, then perhaps we should use a much greater portion of the $120 billion we now spend for health toward other ends, for instance to enable consumers to set up self-care and other educational centers. Yet none of the essayists in this volume goes so far as to suggest such a remedy.

And what of the known fact that there are both doctors and hospitals which provide substandard care? Are we to wait, as Dr. McDermott suggests, another twenty years before we can correct the excesses and abuses in our surgical suites, our nursing homes, our Medicaid clinics? The issues of inequalities in health status, poor physician performance, inefficient hospitals, overuse of surgery, death and disability in the workplace, and many others—none receive more than cursory attention. John Knowles, the book's editor, admonishes us on the "responsibility of the individual" in preventing illness, but he says nothing about the responsibility of the health industry to supply the data which could enable people to make more informed choices regarding their doctors, hospitals, use of drugs, and so forth.

This book represents the view of what might be called the American medical/health establishment (this reader found the four essays by nonphysicians to be the most engaging). As such, it leaves a good deal unsaid. The volume is not likely, as the dust jacket crows, to generate much controversy or legislative reform. It might be useful as a text for those teaching courses in health policy, or for the general reader but, in my opinion, it should be supplemented by additional readings. There is more, in sum, to the problems and pathology of health care than is contained in this philosophy.

ARTHUR L. LEVIN
New York University

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The Bureaucratic Experience *by Ralph P. Hummel. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1977, 238 pp. $12.95.*

The purpose of Professor Hummel's book is to explain the various hazards of modern bureaucratic life. In a series of lectures before interns in the New York City Urban Corps, he attempted to present ways of avoiding the dangers of this environment. The book seems to be an expansion of his lectures. Hummel warned these neophytes that they were about to enter an entirely new world inhabited by aliens called bureaucrats. These bureaucrats differ from the rest of society socially, culturally, psychologically, politically, and linguistically. Although they were born human, bureaucrats have evolved into "truncated remnants of human being(s)" (p. 5). Why and how did these individuals lose their innocence? Hummel believes that they have exchanged their humanness for security. "In most cases they must allow themselves to be brainwashed into new norms. . . . To the extent they do not, the probability of failure rises" (p. 17). "Bureaucrats can't help the way they act—if they want to remain employed members of bureaucracy" (p. 22). The price of bureaucratic success is loss of intimacy with fellow human beings. Accommodation with the bureaucracy can also lead to sexual problems. Hummel asserts that a bureaucrat's "behavior is characterized by (1) an absence of love, (2) a great deal of emphasis on, and attachment of affect to, technical performance in sexual intercourse, and (3) the narrowing of the range of affect to feelings of power—i.e., replacement of love by sexual aggression" (p. 51).

My first response to this revelation was: Is he kidding? My second was: Where is his data? Hummel is not joking. Freudians rarely joke about such serious matters as sex. As to data showing that bureaucrats have more sexual problems than other groups in society, Hummel offers none. His book is not about data and correlations, it is an experiential enterprise designed to uncover the real feelings of bureaucrats. One can only ascertain these "real feelings" by abandoning behaviorism, systems analysis, and functionalism, and by embracing the humane sciences of Weberian sociology, phenomenology, Freudian psychology and existential psychology.

Hummel warns us to avoid the perils and pitfalls of the bureaucratic life. Government and politics can not help us, we must save ourselves. We must become "reactionaries" and resist the encroachment of the bureaucracy on our daily lives. We must encourage countervailing bureaucracies, establish T-groups and repoliticize the bureacuracy. At all costs, we must avoid a kind of Faustian Contract (the reviewer's term) with the makers of bureaucracies—trading humane goals for an efficient society.

This book is an ambitious undertaking that fails on its own terms. Hummel's experiential treatment of bureaucratic life offers no new insights into the psychology of the organization man. The book also fails as a synthesis of such great thinkers as Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Sigmund Freud and Jürgen Habermas. There is little in this book to recommend it to students of public administration.

WILBUR C. RICH
Columbia University

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Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson: Volume 3, 1957–1968 *edited by John A. Munro and Alex I. Inglis. New York, Quadrangle Books, 1976. 338 pp. $12.50.*

The third volume of Lester Pearson's memoirs makes interesting reading but is too much concerned with the cut and thrust of parliamentary games, too little with the solid matter of legislation and administration. Moreover, in spite of the apparent modesty with which the author speaks of himself, somehow the general impression left is of a man so high-minded, so disinterested, that one wonders how he could have led the Liberal party for a decade (1958–1968) and been prime minister for the second half of that period. Is this really the sort of man who climbs Disraeli's "greasy pole" to political eminence in Canada?

In judging the volume, however, it is important to note that it is largely a posthumous work put together from a variety of sources by its editors. When Mr. Pearson realized that the cancer from which he was suffering was probably fatal, he used the six or seven weeks remaining in which he could still work to write some 30,000 words for it. These have been pieced out by radio and TV interviews left over from the statesman's active years, by correspondence, memoranda left in his files, and by other material that was couched in Pearson's own words. The editors have done their work skillfully, but no topic is covered more than superficially. What we miss most is the extended reflections with which Mr. Pearson would probably have enriched his story if he had been spared longer in retirement to look back on the events in which he played so great a part.

The chapter on "National Unity" shows Pearson at his best (p. 236–269). He was among the first public figures to see the seriousness of the rise of French nationalism which has culminated (for the present) in the choice of the separatist René Levesque as the premier of Quebec. A speech delivered in 1962, of which Mr. Pearson was justly proud, revealed his understanding of the problem: "Confederation meant the rejection not only of political and economic annexation by the United States but also of the American melting pot concept of national unity. Confederation . . . was an understanding or a settlement between the founding races of Canada made on the basis of an acceptable and equal partnership" (pp. 67–70).

One of his first steps on becoming Prime Minister was to set up a Royal Commission on Regionalism and Biculturalism. Its report was a mine of information whose publication probably helped to increase public understanding of the dualism between races which is the supreme fact of Canadian nationhood. He also tried to set a good example by using French on suitable occasions and in other ways. But neither research nor example seemed to make much difference. Indeed the unpopularity of Liberal efforts on behalf of the French perhaps accounts for much of the weakness of that party in the West shown in recent elections. Pearson was also very conscious of the problem of the regions that results from the vast extent and other geographic characteristics of Canada. He believed that although centralization of powers had been acceptable in the past, the provinces must now

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be allowed to assert themselves more and federal-provincial relations revert more closely to those of an earlier time.

Another abiding concern was relations with the United States. Partisan critics accused him of being unduly pro-American, even of "taking his orders" from Washington. In fact no one was ever more watchful of Canadian rights and interests when they were threatened by American actions, more desirous of slowing the march of American economic and cultural domination. But he was also aware of the ambivalence of Canadian national consciousness which has struck most observers and which he exemplified amusingly in his own person: two of his passions were for the American game of baseball and the Canadian game of hockey.

THOMAS P. PEARDON
Barnard College, Columbia University

Between Center and Periphery: Grassroots Politicians in Italy and France *by Sidney Tarrow. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977. 272 pp. $15.00.*

It is only recently that behavioral political science has returned to a fundamental preoccupation of the older legal-institutional studies—the relationship between "sovereign" and subordinate levels of government. Not surprisingly, the re-examination has concentrated initially on federal or quasi-federal systems; Sidney Tarrow's book is an impressive sign that behavioral research has matured sufficiently to provide profound analyses of formally centralized systems as well. One of the most gratifying elements of Tarrow's treatment is his concise juxtaposition of models which represent the distilled experience of previous writers on center-peripheral relations. The "diffusion-isolation model" (derived primarily from Edward Shils's functional sociology), the "dependency-marginality model" (of Marxist antecedents), and the "bureaucratic-integration model" (based on Michel Crozier) all provide insights. Tarrow prefers the third model, but skillfully uses all three to create a more complex framework. Not only is the initial presentation of his approach clearly defined, but it is also applied consistently throughout the book. Tarrow's methodology is as enterprisingly eclectic as his conceptual framework. He interviewed (or, more often, *had* interviewed by native associates) a stratified sample of 250 mayors. Interview data, both coded and open-ended response form, is skillfully interwoven with aggregate data on the political environments. The basic use of "paired comparison" enables Tarrow to discover plausible similarities as well as differences in contemporary France and Italy, as this striking image suggests: "to citizens at the periphery the ideological drama at the top may seem like a fresco of baroque armies locked in futile combat above a stage in which the low comedy of political exchange is being played" (pp. 253–54).

Tarrow emphasizes the force of institutional contexts on molding his political actors' behavior. Neither national psychocultural peculiarities nor the effects of early socialization provide as valid explanations. Ultimately he recognizes, how-

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ever, that systemic explanations are indispensable; these must be "deduced from patterns of historical development" (p. 240). In this conclusion Tarrow agrees with recent concern for providing a longitudinal dimension for political analyses. History, however, is an exacting partner in this enterprise. Tarrow writes that "we begin with the creation of modern local government" (p. 244), that is, with Napoleon and with the *Risorgimento*. Such a drastically foreshortened historical perspective limits Tarrow's ability to interpret some phenomena. Twice he expresses puzzlement that Italy has held together at all (pp. 64, 251), for he believes that "linguistic and cultural unity . . . was practically non-existent" in Italy as late as the 1860s (p. 60). In fact, Florentine, geographically and linguistically suited to mediate between northern and southern dialects (in contrast to the aggressively northern *langue d'oïl* in France), had acted as a vehicle for cultural unification for half a millenium. At the risk of appearing frivolous I must say that Italian willingness to sacrifice for a distinctive way of life was better perceived by Stendhal (through his duchess in *La Chartreuse de Parme*) a generation before political unity was accomplished: *"sans élégance, sans musique, sans amours . . . crois-moi, pour toi comme pour moi, ce serait une triste vie que celle d'Amérique."*

Tarrow also remarks on the relatively high number of communes in France. Recent French historiography shows how these villages arose as a response to the peculiar adaptability of French soil to the agricultural revolution of the late Middle Ages—a fact which might at least suggest that they are vastly too numerous to withstand today's agricultural revolution. Even earlier (Tarrow's data occasionally point to this relationship but he never squarely confronts it) the small-commune institutional framework, with its prodigious waste of intellectual manpower, was to a considerable degree sustained only by the deadlock between Church and (radical Socialist) Left, neither of which would abandon its village strongholds. Seen in this perspective, the Fifth Republic establishment's option for economically dynamic areas is more attractive. Tarrow criticizes this concentration of resources because he believes existing small communities "help to preserve the local and regional diversities of their socieites" (p. 234), and facilitate "local policy choice and democratic dialogue" (p. 248). Such generalizations are rapidly becoming the conventional wisdom of American as well as European intellectuals who—only a generation ago—held that oligarchic control, vested interests, and stifling conformity in small communities required the corrective of central planning.

It is not clear that there are objective criteria for choosing between these positions. Certainly Tarrow's findings are ambiguous. While all statistics indicate a widening of income differentials as a result of French economic rationalization, it is far from certain that politically radical workers in favorable locations have been disadvantaged, though (as Tarrow finds) relatively conservative but poorly situated industrial regions like Alsace-Lorraine have declined. Moreover, as Tarrow readily admits "small towns are not always bastions of grassroots democracy" (p. 238) nor is the level of citizen participation necessarily higher in Italy's loosely organized clientele system than in the effectively centralized system of France (p. 232). To put the matter plainly, comparative examination does not easily resolve

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the complex problem of societal adaptation to modernization. Not the least of Sidney Tarrow's exceptional merits is that, while by no means timid in expressing his views, he is completely honest in presenting critical data that may suggest other conclusions.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG
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The Prefect in French Public Administration *by Howard Machin. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1977. 210 pp. $18.95.*

It is ironic that a major work on the French prefect is published fourteen years after a study of the Italian prefect (Robert Fried, *The Italian Prefects*) and eight years after an analysis of the Soviet prefect (Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Prefects*), for it is the French prefect—that famous and perhaps most enduring of Napoleonic inventions—which has been imitated, reproduced, and imported by would-be centralized states throughout the world. Machin's book is therefore long overdue and it provides us with an intelligent and comprehensive survey of the French prefectoral system, which blends the much-needed synthesis of a too often scattered literature with original field research, a good knowledge of French administrative law, and a remarkable sense of historical perspective. Although the emphasis is on the Fifth Republic and, more precisely, the Gaullist attempt to enhance the rationality and strengthen the scope of prefectoral authority, Machin never loses sight of the historical circumstances which have led scores of governments to reform and/or restructure the Napoleonic departmental administration.

Was there ever an omnipotent prefect? Machin dispels the myth of the all-powerful prefect with rare insight and, drawing on the work of B. Le Clère and Vincent Wright (*Le Préfet du Second Empire*), demonstrates that even the feared "fisted prefect" (*préfet à poigne*) of the Second Empire did not live up to his reputation, for his powers rested more on his ability to co-opt the support of established *notables* than on the blind use of Jacobin coercion. It is the persistence of this myth which compelled the Gaullists to justify the need for "restoring" the prefect's supposedly "lost" authority. During the Gaullist regime, prefectoral power was—at least in theory—reinforced by a number of successive reforms. The prefect thus acquired new responsibilities with regard to the planning and allocation of public investments and new prerogatives for the effective supervision of traditionally independent field services, while remaining the "tutor" of his *département's* municipal councils and the executive officer of his *département's* General Council.

In practice none of the reforms has been successfully carried out. For instance, the new economic role of the prefect, while theoretically substantial, has remained limited to the marginal task of "taking discreet initiatives" (p. 118). In fact, according to Machin's estimation, most public investments initiated by Parisian ministries have been established "without any real consultation of the prefect" (p.

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144). As for the prefect's newly granted powers of supervision over ministries' field services, they are barely more effective than in the past: While the heads of field services "openly acknowledge the hierarchical position of the prefect and show great deference towards him" (p. 140), they jealously preserve their independence in monopolizing access to crucial sources of information without which no serious decision can be taken. They justify their position on the grounds that they alone possess the relevant technical expertise. In the end, Machin argues, the prefect is literally left out of the decision-making process and has no other recourse but to "delegate" his authority to local representatives of the ministries. Of course some prefects, Machin points out, are more influential than others and this is due to their ability to bargain with and eventually to co-opt the support of local administrators. In sum, there is, amidst periods of crisis and tension, an uneasy alliance between the prefect and local technical experts which is not unlike the well-documented mutual dependence and latent complicity which inextricably unite the prefect to prominent *notables* (see Mark Kesselman, *The Ambiguous Consensus* and Sidney Tarrow, *Between Center and Periphery*). The prefect, like Machiavelli's Prince, must therefore practice the "art of pleasing": "The aims of the prefects remain 'consensus' and 'harmony,' their work, that of 'coordination and synthesis,' their methods, 'persuasion and arbitration' " (p. 129).

The only weakness of Machin's study lies in the timidity of its conclusions. While calling into question existing theories of centralization, Machin fails to offer a coherent alternative that would account for the present administrative reality. If, as argued by Pierre Grémion in his recent *Le Pouvoir périphérique*, the cohesion of the French state is undermined by the proliferation of sectorial interests and corporate bureaucratic subgroups, should we not conclude with him that the state has lost its Jacobin legitimacy?

Despite its theoretical shortcomings, Machin's book is a major contribution to our knowledge of French administrative politics.

DENIS LACORNE
University of California, Irvine

Social and Political Movements in Western Europe *edited by Martin Kolinsky and William E. Paterson. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1976. 360 pp. $18.95.*

In view of the paucity of scholarly discussion on contemporary social movements in Western Europe this work is a welcome international contribution. Eight of the eleven contributors are from British universities, one is from Canada, one from Israel, and another from the United States. The editors wisely disclaim comprehensiveness. Obviously, publishing considerations would have made it impracticable to include case studies of all the major movements. However, there are some startling omissions. Communism in Western Europe, hardly an insignificant force electorally or without interest ideologically in the light of the Eurocommunism debate, is dealt with only parenthetically in the articles on the New Left and on

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the labor movements in France and Italy. There is nothing on the highly militant ethnic minority autonomist movements. And a wide range of social movements which are less overtly political and are not linked to specific political parties, such as the feminist and ecology movements, go unmentioned despite their obvious influence as bearers and articulators of ideas, and as agents of changes in social attitudes and behavior.

It has been a besetting weakness of most political science discussion of movements that it concentrates almost exclusively on the movement dimension of political parties. In their introduction to the volume under review the editors frankly admit that their main concern is the relationship of social movements and political parties in France, Italy and West Germany. The high price for this self-denying ordinance is that the case studies tell the reader a great deal more about the parties and party systems of the countries concerned than about the social movements themselves, their internal politics, members, leaders, or their broader relations with societies and cultures. However, judged as surveys of the development of certain Western European political parties, almost all the contributions have the merits of conciseness, lucidity and balance in placing the main political tendencies within a broad historical perspective.

Paradoxically the least satisfactory of the articles is Kolinsky's on the Fascist and Nazi movements, movements which never acquired the typical characteristics of parliamentary parties. Admittedly it is an impossible task attempting to compare the Italian and German fascist movements in twenty-three pages! He finds himself trapped in a kind of breathless reductionism which breaks all too easily into oversimplification and banality. Thus he asserts that "Racism, sharpened by bitter military defeat, merged with anti-Marxist and anti-Socialist attitudes" (p. 36). Yet he never makes it clear precisely whose racism he is referring to, or when and where it was manifested. More serious is his failure to emphasize sufficiently the specifically antisemitic obsession of Hitler and the Nazis, an obsession that certainly was not characteristic of Mussolini's fascism. Kolinsky does not begin to wrestle with the central problems that have perplexed a whole generation of social theorists and philosophers concerning the Nazi movement. How does one explain the depths of its inhumanity and the enormities of its crimes? How did Hitler attain his almost demonic possession of the German soul? It is totally inadequate to try to explain Hitler's rise to power in terms of the Nazi movement's manipulation of conservative interests and exploitation of the weaknesses of the political system. Kolinsky never makes clear the degree to which the Nazis's tactics of legality were augmented by the use of violence and terrorism on the streets, and by one of the most cleverly orchestrated campaigns of mass propaganda and necromancy ever perpetrated. These striking features are strangely missing from Kolinsky's analysis. This is both puzzling and regrettable as in occasional passages he shows himself to be a perceptive commentator, as in his discussion of intramovement conflicts within Italian fascism. The conclusions are wildly off beam. The consequences of Nazism did not lie in its ability "to articulate populist aspirations . . . and link them with the interests of the established elites" (p. 57).

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Nearly every successful nationalist movement in history has been able to achieve that combination to some degree. Clearly what made it, one hopes and prays, a unique movement was its savage evil, its attempted annihilation of humanity epitomized in the murder of 6 million Jews. How and why did it happen?

Warnecke's very interesting and shrewd assessment of rightist extremism in postwar West Germany is now somewhat dated (it is based on a paper completed in 1969). His general conclusion, that "in spite of . . . economic difficulties, the institutions of West Germany remain strong and viable . . ." and that there is little prospect of left or right extremism really effectively challenging the Basic Law, will now seem somewhat sanguine to many observers. For as long as extremist minority movements are sustained by hardcore activitists they provide both rallying points and organizational and ideological bases ready for exploitation by a skilful leader, especially in more opportune conditions of crises of legitimacy or of the economy. It is a common error to discount minority movements on the grounds of their often tiny size relative to the mass parties. But among extraparliamentary movements it is often leadership, tactics, exploitation of confrontation and publicity that can reap dividends for the movement. The distinctive modus operandi of the extraparliamentary movement is brought out very clearly in the chapters by Stephen Hellman on The New Left in Italy and by Ehud Sprinzak on the New Left in France. These are among the most valuable contributions to the book. Both bring out with admirable clarity the importance of changes in mood and style of rebellion among successive generational cohorts of student activists, and they guide the reader knowledgeably through the New Left's complex shifts in alliances, ever-changing labels and slogans.

Geoffrey Pridham ("Christian Democracy in Italy and West Germany") and David Hine ("Labour Movement and Communism in France and Italy since 1945") both provide competent and genuinely comparative analyses. Hine handles the linkages between changes in the labor markets, differing traditions of collective bargaining, and political fluctuations with impressive skill. One's main regret is that neither of these authors had space to extend their comparisons to other cases. The British labor movement for example cries out for inclusion in the analysis as Hine himself infers in observations such as: "although . . . the French working class has demonstrated its capacity for brief, spontaneous and violent action it has yet to demonstrate that capacity for sustained shop-floor organisation which is the pride of British trade unionism, and the bane of British economic policy" (p. 204).

A good example of what can be achieved in a more detailed individual case study is provided by Paterson's first class chapter on Social Democracy in West Germany. He captures more exactly than the other contributors the recurring tension between the movement dimension, symbols and ethos, and the pragmatic compromises of the party bureaucracy and the expediencies of electioneering. But perhaps Paterson's greatest strength, too often lacking in the other chapters, is his understanding of the role, influence and style of the leading personalities in the movement. For example, he provides a brilliant brief vignette of the formidable

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Kurt Schumacher (pp. 221–226). Paterson guides us conscisely and authoritatively through the Godesberg period, the Paulskirche Movement, and the A.P.O. Episode. Students will find it an invaluable aid.

In an interesting tail-piece Gordon Smith speculates on the relationships between movements, parties and mass publics. It is not really clear why he has opted for this particular triad. Political sociologists would almost certainly wish to relate movements, in addition, to social structure, political culture, and values. Smith emphasizes the complexity and ambivalence of the relationships between movements, parties, and publics, and yet ends up opting for a natural-historical model of the rise and fall of movements as kinds of embryonic or proto-parties. Western Europe, he suggests, has now achieved a level of "maturity" which has outgrown the social movement phase. I confess that I find myself unconvinced by this neo-evolutionist account. It seems more than rash to assume that movements will remain domestically quiescent or weakly ineffective. In practically every country in Western Europe there are highly volatile movements capable of inducing dramatic events and confrontations with significant political repercussions, some by means of political violence, some by mass demonstration and protest, and others by mass industrial action. In this reviewer's opinion it would be foolish to underestimate both the potential for conflict in Western European socieies and the availability of organized groups to both promote and engage in such combat. It was the great liberal historian H. A. L. Fisher who observed: "Men wiser and more learned than I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following on another." It seems to me that Fisher's view represents a more realistic picture of our present state of knowledge on the rise and fall of social movements.

PAUL WILKINSON
University College, Cardiff

Political Culture in Israel: Cleavage and Integration among Israeli Jews *by Eva Etzioni-Halevy with Rina Shapira. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1977. 249 pp. $20.00.*

Many observers of Israeli politics were stunned by the rise of Menahem Begin, leader of the right-wing Likud party, to become prime minister last May. In fact, however, the Labor alignment, which had led every previous Israeli government, experienced a gradual erosion of popular support. Eva Etzioni-Halevy and Rina Shapira attribute the weakening of the left-of-center alignment to three principal factors: a toughening of public sentiment on foreign policy issues after the Six Day War of 1967; increased legitimation of the right-wing opposition; and rising discontent among Oriental Jews with their disadvantaged status in society.

In *Political Culture in Israel,* the authors synthesize and critically examine empirical research by themselves and other Israeli scholars, presenting extensive tables and graphs to substantiate their conclusions. The relevant theoretical guide-

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lines are outlined at the outset of each chapter. The narrative is encumbered by a formal structure and by a dry, repetitive style, but the findings and insights of the study are well worth pursuing.

In the authors' assessment, "the Israeli political scene may be seen as an intricate balance in which the disintegrative and integrative mechanisms constantly counteract each other" (p. 205). In Israel's multiparty system, the parties of the left gained hegemony in the central political organizations at the outset. Socialist Mapai netted at least twice as many votes as the second largest party in the most elections, and eventually merged with several smaller parties to form the alignment. However, a shift in public orientations was evident by the 1969 elections, when center and rightist parties gained increased support. Over time, socialist ideologies were undermined by greater emphasis on individual achievement and differential rewards. Attitudes also shifted toward rightist (hawkish) positions in the foreign policy sphere. By early 1973, 52 percent of the public opposed withdrawal by Israel from the major part of the territories occupied in 1967, and 31 percent opposed any withdrawal whatsoever.

The growth of rightist positions is most conspicuous among young Israelis, a phenomenon that contrasts with most Western democracies. The authors explain that because the political elite is associated with the left, youth dissociate themselves by turning toward the right. Jews of Oriental (Afro-Asian) origin also express disaffection with the Western-dominated elite by identifying heavily with rightist parties. Increased alienation has occasionally sparked political protest. The groups involved included the "Black Panthers," articulating ethnic discontent; the "Young Couples," opposing soaring housing costs; and "Our Israel," ridiculing the government's handling of the October 1973 War. The mildness of political protest in each case is attributed by the authors to the elite's skill in handling the demonstrators and to the persistence of collective national identifications, which are reinforced by enduring external threats. Individual mobility also muffles dissent. In 1974, for instance, 82 percent of those surveyed said that they were satisfied with their jobs.

Another factor mitigating protest, the authors suggest, was the public's perception that no more attractive alternatives to the existing elite were available. Increasing criticism was directed, however, against the alleged weakness of the leadership, citing its failure "to work out a clearcut policy with regard to Israel's neighboring countries and its inability to navigate the country with a surer hand toward some well-defined goal" (p. 19). Etzioni-Halevy and Shapira conclude by asking: "Will the establishment be able to . . . replenish its depleted sources of political support, or will political strains become paramount so that the political elite will eventually be replaced" (p. 211)? Little did they know how soon the "eventual" transformation foreshadowed by their analysis would come to pass.

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

My review (PSQ, Fall 1977) of Ved Mehta's latest book suggested that he blended fact with fantasy and sometimes misrepresented persons he portrayed and purported to quote. In his reply (pp. 579), Mehta questioned the three examples I mentioned out of the ninety-six or so I found erroneous. True, I slipped in identifying Defense Minister Ram as Home Minister. But Mehta's assertion that attitudes toward India's scheduled castes (Untouchables) have not changed "at all" as a result of Gandhi's efforts still seems to me incorrect. Nor can I find any evidence, in Gandhi's autobiography or elsewhere, that "Gandhi didn't like his father's praying, or his mother's fasting and temple-going . . . ," although he did deviate from their vegetarian diet and disliked one of the temples the family attended. Mehta also insisted that Gandhi's secretary Pyarelal told him he was "the only man who knows about" Gandhi's views (which were negative) on the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, and was therefore "able to suppress them." Mehta seems unaware that Gandhi stated his views in his weekly *Harijan* on November 26, 1938 and May 27, 1939, and July 21, 1946. How could anyone then suppress them?

Stephen Hay
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

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

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

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

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